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Note on spelling and translations 
 
For Chinese words I have generally used the Hanyu Pinyin system due to both its widespread 
adoption and its employment as the standard for the Romanisation of Chinese characters by the 
People’s Republic of China.  
 
I have translated all original quotations in other languages into English in order to facilitate 
reading. I have opted against the Pinyin transliteration of Chinese book titles & archival sources, 
as doing so renders them more inaccessible for reference. 
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Abstract 
As Deng Xiaoping assumed China’s paramount leadership position in 1978, he first and 
foremost sought to bring China out of a period of economic decline and international 
isolation defined by the Cultural Revolution. Having already established first contacts with 
the US and Western European states in the early 1970s, Beijing under Deng swung open its 
doors further to the rest of the world in order to source foreign investment as well as 
technology transfers. 
While most existing literature has been focused on how Deng’s rise was received in the US, 
Western Europe and Asia, almost no literature exists on how this change was perceived in 
Eastern Europe. This study aims to address this lacuna by examining how the Soviet 
Union’s once ‘most-loyal’ client state and its bastion on the front lines of the Cold War, the 
GDR, increasingly defied a Moscow-imposed anti-China policy to engage China for 
economic and political gain during the 1980s. 
Chapter one will begin with a general overview of GDR-China relations before the period of 
analysis. It will highlight that East Germany first enjoyed amicable relations with China, 
only to be reined in during the Sino-Soviet Split by Moscow to conform to a general anti-
China line. It will argue that as Deng rose to power in Beijing and repeated frictions beset 
Soviet-GDR relations, East Berlin gradually sought an independent foreign policy towards 
China in order to take advantage of China’s opening to the world. Chapter Two examines 
bilateral relations in the early 1980s. It argues that the GDR was at first motivated by 
potential trade ties with Beijing in order to bolster its sagging economy. Chapter Three 
reveals that relations continued to develop towards the middle of the decade, despite 
Moscow’s protestations. Honecker was duly rewarded with a state visit to Beijing in 1986 
for his efforts, the first by a Soviet-bloc leader after the onset of the Sino-Soviet Split. 
Chapters Four and Five show that amidst Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost the GDR 
and the PRC increasingly found ideological commonalities in preserving the political status-
quo in East Berlin and Beijing. This dogmatic resistance towards political reforms would 
eventually lead to very different consequences in both countries.  
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Introduction 
 
 “We are following with great sympathy the monumental shifts in the Soviet Union. We wish our 
Soviet comrades success with their path, but we also say that the GDR faces different 
conditions.” 
Erich Honecker to Zhao Ziyang on 8 June 1987.
1
 
 
On a cold autumn day in October 1986, East German leader Erich Honecker descended 
onto the tarmac at Beijing capital airport. Greeted like an old friend, the Chinese delegation led 
by the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang welcomed the East 
German leader with an honour guard and all the other formalities bestowed upon a state visitor. 
For Honecker, this was a long sought-after prize. As the first Soviet-bloc leader to be granted a 
state visit to Beijing since the onset of the Sino-Soviet Split, he was to be the pathbreaker who 
would welcome China back to the socialist family. In late October 1986 a newspaper article from 
the International Herald Tribune was proudly circulated among the East German Socialist Unity 
Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) elite. It
 
featured Erich Honecker, 
General Secretary of the SED, embracing Deng Xiaoping, Chair of the Central Military 
Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and de-facto leader of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The caption read “Honecker, in Beijing, Vows to Improve Relations”, 
with a sub-heading remarking “Mr. Honecker is the first leader of a close Soviet ally to make a 
state visit to China since the Chinese-Soviet ideological split.”2 While contemporary observers 
suspected that the Soviet Union had given its tacit approval for East Berlin’s rapprochement with 
Beijing, the reality was very different.
3
 
Indeed, a Moscow-defying trend was a feature in East Germany’s engagement with 
                                                          
1
 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, henceforth PAAA, MfAA ZR 2493/90 – Besuch amt. GS ZK KP Chinas, 
Ministerpräs. Des Staatsrats der VR China, Zhao Ziyang – Niederschrift über das Gespräch des Generalsekretärs des 
Zentralkomitees des SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrats der DDR, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit dem amtierenden 
Generalsekretär des ZK der KP Chinas und Ministerpräsidenten des Staatsrates der VR China, Genossen Zhao 
Ziyang, am 8. Juni 1987 im Hause des Zentralkomitees 
2
 BA-SAPMO, DY 30/2436 – Büro Erich Honecker, p. 292. 
3
 “East Germany Steps up Contacts with China”, New York Times, 3 September 1986. 
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China throughout the decade and relates to one of the central questions of this thesis. Namely, 
why and how a formerly loyal client state that owed its very creation and existence to the Soviet 
Union could defy the Kremlin’s antagonistic stance towards China at the end of the Cold War to 
pursue relations with a Soviet enemy? Thus, this thesis is first and foremost an addition to Cold 
War diplomatic history. Indeed, no comprehensive studies have been written on Eastern 
European-Chinese relations, especially on how Eastern European states sometimes sought to 
break free from the confines imposed by Moscow to seek their own agendas. Yet, recent work 
has shown us that Eastern European states were more than just obedient Soviet pawns during the 
Cold War.
 4
 Rather, they used whatever leverage they possessed over Moscow to achieve their 
own goals, even if this meant manipulating or actively defying the Kremlin to do so.
 
Though 
Soviet leaders were able enforce their wills on the foreign policies of Moscow’s client states 
during the early years of the Warsaw Pact, this ability clearly diminished in the last decade of the 
Cold War. Owing to a leadership weakness in Moscow as well as the Kremlin’s distractions with 
renewed Second Cold War superpower tensions, states such as East Germany found 
unprecedented space for diplomatic manoeuvre. Honecker wholeheartedly embraced these newly 
found freedoms and actively ignored Soviet protestations to engage with China.  
This thesis focuses on the time between 1979 and 1989 and will ask why, during this last 
decade of the Cold War, East Germany went from an obedient follower of Soviet China policy to 
actively defying Soviet directives on China and specifically, what East Germany hoped to gain 
from improved relations with Beijing. And on the Chinese side, it asks why Beijing 
enthusiastically sought out relations with East Germany after Deng Xiaoping’s rise and how both 
the desire to build a beneficial trade relationship and an ideological convergence drove bilateral 
ties. Though this thesis uses both East German and Chinese archival material to attempt to a shed 
                                                          
4
 Even during times of seeming solidarity, rifts emerged where client states asserted their own interests above those of 
the centre. Thus, during the onset of the Sino-Soviet Split in 1963, Poland, fearing a severance of trade links to China, 
successfully warded off Khrushchev’s initiative to include Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact so as to redirect the 
alliance towards China. See Lorenz Luethi, Sino-Soviet Split – Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 271. 
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light on the rationale and incentives in both Beijing and East Berlin in engaging in bilateral 
relations, it primarily adopts an East Berlin-centric approach.  
In the following paragraphs I will first provide an overview of the main arguments of this 
study. This will be followed by a discussion of the structure and scope of this project. I will then 
outline the historiographical lacunae that this study will address and what sources it has used in 
doing so. 
 
Simmering frictions with Moscow 
 
When long-time Soviet Ambassador Pyotr Abrasimov was asked in 1989 to describe East 
Berlin’s foreign policy, he sternly answered “Homunculus sovieticus”. In his opinion, just like 
the artificial being in Goethe’s Faust which only gains brief life through the hands of its 
alchemist creators, the GDR lived an existence of absolute dependency and obedience to its 
masters in the Kremlin.
5
 The truth however was more complicated than this simplistic answer 
would suggest. Throughout the existence of the GDR, Moscow’s ties with East Berlin were 
subject to a series of fluctuations and frictions often dictated by diverging interests. After all, this 
was only natural - while the Kremlin was concerned with the advancement of world communism 
and tasks of managing the empire, the ‘lesser’ concerns of its clients in East Berlin were often 
sacrificed for grander designs.
6
 To keep dissenting opinions from bubbling to the surface, much 
energy was expended on both sides to keep ties amicable. As such, with the incorporation of a 
paragraph that stressed the “irrevocable and eternal ties of the GDR to the Soviet Union” into a 
1974 redrafting of the GDR constitution, Erich Honecker endeavoured to forever enshrine East 
                                                          
5
 Stefan Wolle, DDR, (Berlin: Fischer, 2004), pp. 93-94, Ambrassimov was Ambassador from 1962-1971 and 1975-
1983. 
6
 For example, Moscow was reluctant to support East Berlin’s initial forceful pushes for western recognition so as to 
not upset relations with Western Europe. See William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War – The Global Campaign to 
Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 16-17. 
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Berlin’s bond with Moscow.7 
However, this somewhat superficial attempt to cement East Berlin’s allegiance with 
Moscow did not do away with inherent tensions between the two states. With Honecker having 
acquired new momentum for both East German sovereignty and foreign policy after the signing 
of the Basic Treaty in 1972, the East German leader was keen to define the GDR as a 
consequential and influential state in international affairs.
8
 In Africa, for example, Honecker 
pushed for a bigger East German role and Pankow saw itself increasingly as equally as important 
as Moscow in spreading socialist ideals on the continent.
9
 More often than not, this independent 
streak could not be reconciled with Moscow’s general grand strategy, often leading to frictions 
between the centre and the client. In the Honecker era, this dynamic became increasingly visible 
as the East German leader reciprocated West Germany’s Ostpolitik from the early 1970s on. 
Even though Moscow expended considerable effort to restrain the expansion of East German 
commercial and economic ties with Bonn, it became progressively apparent in the Kremlin that 
East Berlin would attempt to pursue its own self-serving course in inter-German relations.
10
 The 
desire to take its future into its own hands, rather than having Moscow dictate it, soon became a 
permanent feature in East German foreign policy. Certainly, these independent tendencies were 
also on full display in East Germany’s determined and forceful push to normalize relations with 
China in the 1980s. Defying Moscow’s antagonistic stance towards Beijing throughout the 
decade, Honecker actively courted and engaged the new generation of pragmatic leaders under 
Deng Xiaoping in order to gain political as well as economic advantages. In doing so, Honecker 
                                                          
7
 Having enjoyed Soviet support in ousting Walter Ulbricht to become the new General Secretary of the GDR in May 
1971, Honecker was eager to refresh his commitment to his Soviet patrons. Gesetz zur Ergänzung und Änderung der 
Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 7. Oktober 1974 (http://www.verfassungen.de/de/ddr/ddr-
gesetz74.htm), accesssed 8 March 2014. 
8
 On East Berlin’s battle against the international ramifications of the Hallstein-doctrine see William Glenn Gray, 
Germany’s Cold War – The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 21-26. 
9
 Gareth Winrow, The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-
104 
10
 J.F. Brown, “Eastern Europe’s Western Connection” in Lincoln Gordon et. al, Eroding Empire: Western Relations 
with Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 56-60. 
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showed complete disregard for Moscow’s wishes and in the process drove Moscow-East Berlin 
alienation to new heights. 
In many ways, these observations seem unnatural and unexpected considering East 
Berlin’s founding history as a Soviet client state. Indeed, during much of the Cold War, East 
Berlin’s close relationship with Moscow was regularly interpreted and observed by outsiders as 
trouble-free. With often-repeated reaffirmations of their intimate bond during well-rehearsed 
meetings of Soviet-bloc forums and bilateral meetings, there was little to suggest trouble in 
socialist paradise.
11
 And seemingly, the importance of the ‘big brother’ was a foregone 
conclusion, considering that only Moscow’s intervention during the 1953 popular unrest in the 
GDR was able to guarantee East Berlin’s survival. Reminders in 1956 and 1968 in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, respectively, further underlined to East German leaders how important the 
Soviet Union was in assuring the territorial and political integrity of the entire bloc.
12
 In addition 
to the security guarantees that the Soviet Union provided, Moscow was of paramount importance 
to the GDR in ensuring its economic survival. Devoid of any natural resources, East Germany 
depended on subsidized raw material deliveries from the Soviet Union to stay afloat.
13
 Thus, 
contemporary observers viewed the East German-Soviet relationship in the seemingly only 
logical way possible; that the GDR was a loyal and subservient client state of the Soviet Union.
14
 
However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the gradual release of East German political 
and diplomatic archival material revealed a very different picture. Pages and pages of previously 
                                                          
11
 Among works that judged the Soviet-GDR relations as trouble-free, see David Childs, The GDR: Moscow’s 
German Ally (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983) 
12
 Especially the events surrounding the Prague Spring outlined Moscow’s iron-fisted will to enforce the Brezhnev 
doctrine. See Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); 
Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert & detlef Junker (eds.), 1968: The World Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968-1970 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
13
 See Hans-Jürgen Wagener, “Anschluss verpasst? Dilemmata der Wirtschaft” in Helga Schultz et al., Die DDR im 
Rückblick – Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kultur (Berlin, Ch. Links Verlag, 2007), pp. 114-134; Andre Steiner, 
The Plans that Failed – An economic history of the GDR (New York: Berghahn, 2010), pp. 69-140 
14
 Even as late as the 1980s, the GDR was seen to be a ‘reliable ally of Moscow’. See “Die Freiheit des treuen 
Vassalen” Die Zeit, 24 February 1984. (http://www.zeit.de/1984/09/die-freiheit-des-treuen-vasallen/seite-2), accessed 
1 March 2014 
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inaccessible material shone a revealing light on the often-fractious nature of the East German-
Soviet relationship.
15
 And it was not long before a new interpretation emerged of the ‘loyal’ 
GDR’s foreign policy. Among the most vivid accounts of these unexpected Soviet-GDR 
divergences, Hope Harrison has shown how even the building of the Berlin Wall, an event 
previously thought to have been actively steered by Moscow
16
, was an East Berlin-initiated 
manoeuvre whereby Ulbricht cleverly used the perceived weakness of the GDR to secure 
Moscow’s backing for his project to permanently divide Germany. As Harrison comments, “the 
Soviet-East German relationship was more two-sided than previously understood”.17 Similarly, 
using SED Politburo files, Hannes Adomeit has forcefully illustrated that rifts between East 
Berlin and the leaders in the Kremlin arose out of issues ranging from disagreements over East 
Germany’s social policies, its debt problem as well as its international strategy. Amongst other 
factors, Adomeit has shown that the SED’s tendency to keep important matters from the Kremlin 
created an absolute lack of trust between the two leaderships.
18
 These observations seem to go 
against many presumptions that we have of the nature of the Soviet bloc. While divergences in 
opinion were expected in the American-led Western Alliance, as a multitude of views were a 
defining feature of democratic governments that ruled most of Washington’s allies, it was often 
assumed that the nature of authoritarian rule espoused by the Soviet bloc would also mean that 
Moscow’s satellites adhered strictly to the centre. This dissertation will argue that this simply 
was not the case. As Tony Smith has shown with his pericentric analysis of the Cold War, it was 
often the tail that attempted to wag the dog in the Moscow-led eastern bloc. For example, East 
Berlin did not waste time to mince words when it forcefully called for the crackdown on 
                                                          
15
 Hans-Hermann Hertle, Konrad H. Jarausch (eds.), Risse im Bruderbund – Die Gespräche Honecker-Breshnew 1974 
bis 1982 (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2006), pp. 46-52. 
16
 The debate on who was the active hand is ongoing. Matthias Uhl of the German Historical Institute in Moscow has 
uncovered a conversation note from August 1, 1962 that seems to indicate that Khrushchev actively pushed for the 
construction of the Berlin wall. “The Khrushchev Connection: Who ordered the construction of the Berlin Wall?” Der 
Spiegel 23/2009 (http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-khrushchev-connection-who-ordered-the-
construction-of-the-berlin-wall-a-628052.html), Accessed 11 March 2014. 
17
 Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 2. 
18
 Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1998), pp. 235-297. 
 
16 
dissident voices in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1980. As Smith 
argues:  
What is most important about these new findings, however, is that they reveal a 
Soviet hesitation, indeed reluctance, to act forcibly to save the empire. Here, East 
Germany played the role of Lady MacBeth, again and again urging her wavering 
husband to strike the fatal blow.
19
  
 
Rebellion against Moscow, engagement with China 
 
The main focus of this dissertation will be to analyze how and why East Berlin initiated 
and sustained its engagement with China in the 1980s, why the GDR leadership ignored Soviet 
warnings in doing so and how China responded. It asks how a client state so utterly dependent on 
Moscow was able to create the necessary diplomatic freedoms to engage with China. It will also 
posit that East Germany had all but abandoned its subscription to Moscow’s world strategy by 
the 1980s. On the Chinese side, it analyzes what Chinese leaders considered when reengaging a 
close Soviet ally after the initiation of Reform and Opening in China. It asks why China 
suddenly found interest in engaging with East Germany after Deng’s rise and how China viewed 
East Germany’s rebellious streak towards Moscow. And overall, it asks how the changing 
international environment defined by superpower tensions during the ‘Second Cold War’ and the 
Sino-Soviet normalization process shaped bilateral relations. The specific time-period of the 
study, 1979-1989, will take us from the initial re-kindling of relations in the aftermath of the 
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 to Tiananmen and the eventual collapse of the GDR. In addition, 
triangular dynamics with the Soviet Union will be taken into account to consider how common 
disagreements with Moscow on both sides served as a catalyst and a binding glue at various 
stages of East Berlin-Beijing engagement. 
At its core, this is a study on how relations were conducted ‘from above’. And thus, it is 
                                                          
19
 Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War” Diplomatic 
History, 24:4 (2000), pp. 567-591, p. 583. 
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important to make the point that this dissertation focuses almost entirely on the highest echelons 
of government, specifically on how Honecker conducted relations with Deng Xiaoping and vice 
versa. As unquestioned and absolute power in their respective foreign policy realms rested in 
their hands, it is safe to assume that Deng and Honecker made or approved major decisions in all 
foreign policy bodies, ranging from the Politburo to the Foreign Ministry. Especially in terms of 
their respective grand strategies, they were masters of their domain. Thus, I argue that while 
Honecker used his far-reaching power in Pankow circles to actively steer East German 
engagement with China as Beijing ‘opened’ at the end of the 1970s, Deng was glad to 
reciprocate with the intention of re-embracing foreign policy after the Cultural Revolution and 
engaging with a leading socialist industrialized state to modernize China. 
 
Incentives in bilateral relations 
 
While historians have habitually analyzed Beijing’s relations with both America and 
Asian states during the Reform and Opening process, virtually no studies exist on its 
simultaneous interaction and engagement with both Eastern and Western Europe after Deng 
Xiaoping assumed power in 1978.
20
 Even though American support and influence on the Chinese 
reform process is undeniable, it would be depriving the reader of a complete picture if one were 
to discount China’s concurrent attempts to learn and engage with European powers.21 This 
dissertation shows that after Beijing reciprocated East Berlin’s initial feelers, Zhongnanhai was 
keen to actively push forward its relations with the GDR in an attempt to not only drive a wedge 
between Moscow and a key Soviet client state during a period still defined by Sino-Soviet 
                                                          
20
 For example, Chen Jian only mentions China’s engagement with America and the “four little dragons” of Taiwan, 
South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong during the Reform and Opening process in Chen Jian, “China’s changing 
policies toward the Third World and the end of the global Cold War” in Artemy Kalonovsky & Sergey Radchenko 
(eds.), The end of the Cold War and the Third World (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 101-121. 
21
 For some work which has been initiated to address this lacunae see Martin Albers, “Business with Beijing, détente 
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animosity, but also to seek specific industrial goods as well as East German industrial and 
economic know-how for its own Reform and Opening process. The latter point might seem 
incredulous since we now know how backward and inefficient the East German economy 
revealed itself to be after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. However, this is to read history 
backwards. In fact, very few outside observers were aware of the shortcomings of the GDR 
economy in the period under analysis.
22
 Certainly to China, it presented a viable and seemingly 
successful model to emulate for much of the 1980s.
23
 By engaging with a leading socialist 
economy like East Germany, it was thought, Beijing could gain an insight into how a socialist 
state could become world class. 
As this study will show, economic interests also served as a key rationale for East Berlin 
to pursue better relations with China. For Pankow, the reality of declining Soviet raw material 
deliveries coupled with the long-known fact that trading with the COMECON community was a 
less than lucrative proposition meant that East German leaders were always looking for 
alternatives to bolster its economy. Having already started to open its door to Western European 
economies, Honecker now looked east after Deng’s first moves to liberalize the Chinese market. 
Thus, much of the early exchanges between East German officials and their Chinese counterparts 
at the beginning of the decade revolved around establishing and solidifying trade links. 
Specifically, Honecker hoped that China could become an important export-market for East 
German finished goods.  
While bolstering the East German economy was a very real incentive for Honecker when 
engaging with China, he also sought to use his budding relations with Beijing to solidify his as 
well as the GDR’s international standing.24 Having achieved diplomatic recognition from a host 
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of states as well as the inclusion of the GDR into international organizations such as the UN after 
signing the Basic Treaty with Bonn in 1972, Honecker increasingly used foreign policy as a 
means to underscore the GDR’s legitimacy as a state. Thus, during his engagement with China 
Honecker was eager to define the GDR as an economically and politically successful country 
that Beijing could learn from. He also spared no energy to showcase his foreign policy successes 
and perhaps most important of all, he was adamant to outline the GDR as an independent actor 
that was capable of making its own decisions, free from Moscow’s directives and dictates. In 
many ways, Honecker’s engagement with China shows that his vision for the future of the Soviet 
bloc was not one where Soviet satellites were dominated and led by Moscow, but rather one 
where former client states would have more room for agency in their own affairs. 
For both Honecker and Deng, pragmatic considerations centering on trade were quickly 
replaced by more pressing ideological concerns towards the end of the decade. As Mikhail 
Gorbachev took over the reins in the Kremlin in 1985 and rolled out his Perestroika and 
Glasnost soon after, East Berlin and Beijing found common language in their defiance to 
Moscow’s new liberal path. Both were adamantly against any sort of reforms that could erode 
the centrality of the party. During the final part of the decade, conversations in bilateral meetings 
increasingly revolved around defying the Kremlin’s proposed path. This ideological like-
mindedness between Honecker and Deng was only strengthened further when East European 
regimes retreated at intense popular pressure in 1989.  
Studying the above causes and circumstances in which East Germany and China 
embraced each other as fraternal states in the 1980s provides us with a unique perspective into 
the thinking of both regimes during the last decade of the Cold War. First, the simple fact that 
East Germany was considered by Zhongnanhai the -at least in the economic sense- most 
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successful socialist state in the Soviet bloc gave it special status in Beijing’s eyes. Thus, studying 
this relationship gives us a unique look at what China sought to learn from socialist countries 
during the Reform and Opening process. Through analyzing the nature of economic exchanges 
between the two countries, one appreciates that China, in addition to paying attention to Western 
models, was very serious about also potentially learning from Eastern European economic 
examples. At least initially, it was hoped in Beijing that socialist economic models would be able 
to be adopted wholesale without much modification. Secondly, Pankow-Beijing engagement 
shows ‘socialist’ regimes continued willingness to be flexible when redefining ‘communism’ to 
fit pressing national interests.
25
 In China, this entailed reshaping ideology to justify the 
abandonment of the central tenets of Mao’s agrarian socialism in favour of large-scale 
urbanization and modernization projects in order to bring China out of decades of economic 
decline. Meanwhile, the GDR readily and willingly abandoned its subscription to Moscow’s 
China-strategy and adopted a softer tone towards China in order to break down the last remnants 
of antagonism between itself and Beijing in order to derive economic benefits and international 
status. It is this unique willingness to be malleable and adaptable on both sides which allowed 
East Berlin’s engagement with China to be so successful. In analyzing East German-Chinese 
relations, this thesis will also make the point that both domestic and foreign policy imperatives 
differed widely among Eastern European states. Thus, East Germany was by far the most active 
of the fraternal states in seeking a re-engagement with China after Deng’s rise. This may seem 
like a well-known fact considering the amount of literature that exists in the West which 
analyzes the individual foreign policies of the fraternal states.
26
 However, this approach will 
especially be beneficial for Chinese readers, a generation of whom have grown up with the myth 
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that the fraternal states were but a monolithic bloc whose policies were entirely dictated by 
Moscow.
27
 
Aside from its specific focus on East German-Chinese relations in the 1980s, my thesis 
also engages with wider fields of Cold War research. In studying the increasingly insubordinate 
behaviour of East Germany, it contributes to a broader understanding of the arising weaknesses 
of the Soviet Empire in the last decade of the Cold War.
28
 Fully embracing a pericentric view, it 
will argue that East Germany’s actions to satisfy its own needs came at the expense of bloc 
solidarity. This insubordination had a direct result in distracting Moscow from its more pressing 
tasks of managing Second Cold War tensions and forcing the Kremlin into concessions to East 
Berlin to maintain a façade of bloc unity. Indeed, instead of being a useful asset to Moscow, East 
Berlin often proved to be a rebellious nuisance which not only floated east towards China but, 
from Moscow’s perspective, also seemed more than willing to give up ounces of its political 
stability for loans from the West.  
To be sure, throughout the Cold War, the actions of the seemingly ‘less important’ allies 
of the superpowers mattered. We would not understand the greater Cold War dynamics if we 
were not to fully comprehend the impact that the strategic allies of the superpowers, such as 
North and South Korea, East and West Germany and North and South Vietnam, just to name a 
few, had on their patrons and international system.
29
 Thus, understanding East Germany’s 
actions in the final years of the Cold War not only grants us a glimpse into the tense bilateral 
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dynamics between Moscow and East Berlin but furthermore provides us with a vivid picture of 
the Kremlin’s increasing inability to control its periphery. Cold War economic historians will 
also find the peculiar economic relationship between the GDR and China interesting. While both 
East Germany’s economy and the Reform and Opening process in China have been analyzed in 
great detail individually, there has been no study to synthesize this information to explain 
China’s drive to establish economic cooperation with Eastern European states, and vice versa, 
and to discuss why Eastern European states such as the GDR were interested in expanding trade 
with China.
30
 Finally, it will also contribute to the burgeoning mosaic of literature dealing with 
the end of the Cold War.
31
 Looking at bilateral relations towards the end of the decade will grant 
us an illuminating look at how both governments attempted to avert destabilization and maintain 
the centrality of the party in the final months of 1989. And here some surprising conclusions can 
be drawn. Though never expressly formulated, East Berlin’s willingness to explore anti-
Gorbachev commonalities with China up until the last minutes of its existence suggests that at 
least some in East Berlin were envisioning a recalibrated socialist world order in which East 
Berlin’s ties with the Soviet Union would be loosened in favour of a closer link with Beijing.32 
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Structure & Scope 
 
So what happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s to allow two previously estranged 
states to re-engage with each other after almost 30 years of complete diplomatic radio silence? 
As mentioned, much of the change can be attributed to the rise of Deng Xiaoping in China. After 
almost thirty years under Mao’s rule, Deng took China in a new direction after the Chairman’s 
passing in 1976. Trying to bring China out of a hermetic economic decline that had resulted from 
years of stagnation brought about by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Deng 
openly rekindled relations with other states. This reorientation by Beijing served as the necessary 
condition that facilitated an opening between China and the GDR. Realizing that Deng’s rise 
presented a break from the past, Honecker and his diplomats started to slowly recalibrate its 
policies towards China. As relations improved, soon both the GDR and the Middle Kingdom 
were eager to shake a polemic past defined by Sino-Soviet animosities.  
The first chapter provides both a background to Sino-GDR relations before the period 
under analysis and dissects the initial independent steps East Germany took towards China in the 
early 1980s. It asks why and how frictions between Moscow and East Berlin contributed to 
Honecker’s independent course towards China and how they were reciprocated by Beijing. To be 
sure, having enjoyed comradely relations right after their respective states’ founding in 1949, 
relations suffered an inevitable setback after the first signs of conflict between Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. While the details of the Sino-Soviet split are outside the 
scope of this study, it is important to note that the onset of tensions between Moscow and Beijing 
eventually directly translated into a Kremlin-imposed East Berlin-Beijing rift.
33
 Through the 
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introduction of coordination mechanisms such as the Interkit, a forum convened by the CPSU 
International Department on an almost bi-annual basis to remind Soviet-bloc states to stick to an 
anti-China line, Moscow sought to control every aspect of its allies’ China policies.34 This 
resulted in a drastic deterioration of Sino-GDR relations. Thus, for much of the 1960s and 1970s, 
Moscow imposed the Sino-Soviet Split upon East Berlin. Only the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 
1978 brought about a reassessment in East Berlin if continued adherence to the Soviet line was a 
wise choice forward. At the same time, a set of emerging frictions ranging from East Berlin’s 
disagreement with the Soviet war in Afghanistan (as it threatened to unravel détente), the 
Kremlin’s inaction during the Solidarnosc strikes to Soviet oil-delivery cut-backs fomented a 
sense of Soviet abandonment in East Berlin. As the Pankow regime’s priorities increasingly 
diverged from Moscow’s and East Berlin appreciated that Deng’s rise might present a chance to 
restart Sino-GDR relations, Honecker was more than happy to turn a blind eye to Moscow’s 
prohibitive China-policy for its allies to seek an advantageous economic and political 
relationship with Beijing. Attitudes changed greatly from February 1979, when East Berlin went 
out of its way to condemn Chinese aggression against Vietnam in line with Soviet coordination, 
to a year later, when cultural feelers were followed by first diplomatic contacts in the spring of 
1980. 
As Honecker sent out initial feelers to Beijing in light of Deng’s rise, Moscow continued 
to call for East German restraint. Not only was Honecker ignoring these dictates but as I show in 
chapter two, by 1982, East Germany was openly rebelling against Moscow’s China policy. 
Subsequently, the Kremlin’s sour tone during both Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko’s 
brief reigns could not slow, much less hinder, bilateral relations as mutual hope for a beneficial 
trade relationship pushed forward exchanges. Chapter three reveals that the rise of Mikhail 
Gorbachev did not bring about substantial transformations in the dynamics in this triangular 
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relationship. Gorbachev, like his predecessors, was unable to discourage Honecker’s regime 
from slowing its advances towards China. Meanwhile, Beijing continued courting the GDR. 
Sino-East German diplomacy reached new heights when Erich Honecker, as the first Eastern 
European leader, was granted a state visit to Beijing in October 1986. Interestingly, as chapter 
four further illustrates, what drew East Berlin and Beijing closer together from 1986 onwards 
was their common ideological commitment to fiercely resist any tinkering to the status-quo as 
proposed by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. As Deng and Honecker attempted to insulate their 
countries from Perestroika and Glasnost, an ideological like-mindedness started to replace 
pragmatic wishes for a beneficial trade relationship as the driving force in bilateral relations. 
Chapter five discusses how this ideological convergence bound the two countries together in 
common defiance in the last years of the Cold War. While East Germany ardently supported 
China’s hard-line stance towards internal unrest, Beijing held fast to its Eastern European ally 
and encouraged East Berlin to stick to its anti-Gorbachev, anti-reform stance until the very end. 
East Germany’s eventual collapse, coupled with the subsequent collapse of the entire Soviet 
bloc, would send shockwaves through Zhongnanhai and propelled Beijing into a period of 
introspection on the future of China under the CCP. 
 
Historiography 
 
The swift and sudden collapse of the GDR resulted in a flood of interest on the ‘other’ 
Germany.
35
 The failed socialist experiment first and foremost aroused the interests of social 
historians trying to make sense of everyday life in the GDR. For example, Armin Mitter and 
Stefan Wolle have traced how protest undercurrents were never washed away after the 
suppressed June 17, 1953 uprising in Berlin while Klaus Schroeder tried to push the idea that 
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these rebellious undercurrents were heavily suppressed as the everyday Lebenswirklichkeit of 
GDR citizens was dictated and penetrated by SED policies.
36
 More recently, Mary Fulbrook has 
presented an alternative view that argues that the SED did not reach into every crevasse of GDR 
life. Through labour unions, church organizations and academic groups, East Germans were able 
to live a life of relative ‘normalcy’.37 This is complemented further by recent research done by 
Josi McLellan, who has lucidly shown that life in the GDR was more colourful than previously 
imagined, that between the assembly lines and FDJ meetings, a sexually liberal populace 
thrived.
38
 These and other works have done a great deal to advance our understanding of how the 
GDR population lived under SED rule. Yet, while considerable ink has been spilled to analyze 
and argue over the exact nature of everyday life in the GDR, a significantly smaller amount of 
research exists on the GDR’s foreign policy. 
Before the archives opened, few authors ventured onto the subject of East German 
foreign policy. Those who did were mostly SED party-historians who preached the Marxist-
Leninist ‘theoretical foundations’ of East German foreign policy from behind the Berlin Wall.39 
Outside the iron curtain, one of the better-known early volumes is David Child’s study.40 Piecing 
together what he could from GDR journals and newspapers, Childs presents the seemingly only 
plausible conclusion about the history of the GDR: That East Berlin was a faithful and loyal ally 
to Moscow. This view is also reinforced in other studies released before the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain. In an edited volume which praised the economic and political viability of the GDR, 
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Michael W. Oszwski described the Soviet-GDR dynamic as a “parent-child relationship”, going 
on to illustrate East Berlin’s affinity towards Moscow.41  
Since the fall of the Wall however, a series of studies have emerged on the subject which 
challenge this premise. Among the more useful ones are Joachim Scholtyseck’s “Die 
Aussenpolitk der DDR” and Benno Eide-Siebs’ “Die Aussenpolitik der DDR, 1976-1989”.42 
Tracing relations from the GDR’s founding in 1949 until its collapse in 1990, Scholtyseck offers 
first and foremost an excellent historiographical discussion of works on GDR foreign policy. But 
it also delves deep into questions which cut right to the heart of East Berlin’s decision-making 
freedoms vis-à-vis China, namely if the GDR had any independent room when it came to 
constructing its own brand of diplomacy and how acquiescent it was to the Kremlin’s general 
Cold War grand strategy. According to Scholtyseck, from the founding of the MfAA until at 
least the 1970s, Moscow was the dog and East Berlin simply the tail that had to wag when the 
body commanded it to do so.
43
 This trend was only partly reversed at the onset of the Second 
Cold War, when, according to Scholtyseck, East Berlin’s strategy turned into one of Honecker 
vigorously attempting to stem the negative effects that the onset of Superpower tensions would 
have on German-German relations and Honecker’s own détente with the West.44 This is largely 
an endorsement of Benno-Eide Siebs’ work, who went even further in arguing for the existence 
of an independent trend in East German foreign policy. Siebs’ work on the GDR’s foreign 
relations under Honecker (covering 1976-1989) is useful for this thesis due to its specific focus 
on the last decade and half of the GDR’s existence. Eide-Siebs observed that from 1981 on, 
aided by the power vacuum during the late Brezhnev years, as well as during the brief reigns of 
Andropov and Chernenko, East German foreign policy gradually shifted to cater to its own, 
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rather than Moscow’s interests.45 Despite the Kremlin’s earlier wariness about German-German 
contacts, East Berlin, to an extent, started to openly defy Soviet wishes in engaging in ever-
closer contacts with Bonn.
46
 Eide-Siebs’ analysis of the latter part of the decade is also revealing. 
By outlining Honecker’s intention to maintain the status quo while Gorbachev was embarking on 
drastic reforms centered on Perestroika and Glasnost, the author illustrates a clear point of 
divergence between Moscow and Berlin by 1987. This view is also entirely supported from the 
memoirs that former high-ranking SED-functionaries have penned since the collapse of the 
GDR. Hans Modrow, the former head of the SED in Dresden, Hermann Axen, the former head 
of the International Department of the SED Central Committee (CC) as well as Egon 
Winkelmann, East Germany’s last Ambassador to the Soviet Union, all tell of mounting and 
finally insurmountable tensions in the 1980s between East Berlin and Moscow on issues ranging 
from inter-German cooperation to personality conflicts.
47
 And the view does not shift 
significantly when one changes perspectives. Hannes Adomeit has shown that from the vantage 
point of the Kremlin, East Germany had become a diplomatic burden rather than a useful ally 
during much of the Honecker era.
48
 
Not only Scholtyseck and Eide-Siebs but also seasoned SED historians such as Stefan 
Przybylski agree that, for the entirety of the Ulbricht and Honecker eras, East German foreign 
policy was a function of who was in charge at the very top.
49
 Their predispositions in terms of 
geographic priority, political orientation and, in Honecker’s case, his pursuit of a ‘great-
statesman’ image, had a crucial bearing on the way that East Germany charted its course across 
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the high seas of international politics. Michael Sodaro outlines the position of the General 
Secretary as having been “accorded sufficient leeway by his colleagues to set the agenda for 
domestic policy and to pursue his preferred foreign policy initiatives…With the final word on 
policy matters held indisputably by one individual, both the content of policy and the style of the 
policy-making process ultimately depend on the supreme leader”.50 According to Sodaro, 
Honecker used this preponderance to pursue three related aims: The first was to reassure 
Moscow of East Berlin’s loyalty by, for example, pushing forward Soviet positions to Third 
World countries; the second was to enhance the visibility of the GDR in the eyes of the world 
and its own citizens by achieving legitimacy through foreign relations. And his third aim was 
ultimately connected to the previous two: To win the GDR to win greater room from Moscow to 
manoeuvre in foreign policy making and to push forward what East Berlin deemed as necessary 
economic relations with West Germany.
51
 
Together, these studies by Scholtyseck, Eide-Siebs and Sodaro on East German foreign 
policy imperatives in the early 1980s provide evidence that Honecker sought to conduct a foreign 
policy which served the GDR’s purposes rather than Moscow’s. My thesis pushes this argument 
further. I argue that in the 1980s an intensification of existing and new frictions between 
Moscow and East Berlin served to strengthen East Berlin’s willingness to show an even brasher 
disdain towards Muscovite directives than before. Its engagement with Beijing revealed the 
Pankow regime’s readiness to not only rebel against Soviet coordination but also its willingness 
to engage a Soviet enemy in doing so. Certainly, Moscow’s two-faced attempts to rein in East 
Berlin while the Kremlin itself pursued normalization with Beijing only fuelled Honecker’s 
desire to accelerate his rapprochement with Beijing. 
The approach of this thesis is particularly beneficial in two respects. Firstly, granting East 
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Berlin greater centrality in its own actions helps explain the GDR’s insubordination towards 
Moscow through examining what the Pankow regime thought it would gain by doing so. This 
allows us to closely examine the individual factors pushing East Berlin’s foreign policy in 1980s. 
Indeed, as David Priestland has argued, ‘explaining communism’ demands that we try to enter 
the mental world that Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevera, Gorbachev, and in this 
case, Erich Honecker, occupied in order to derive their intentions and imperatives when pursuing 
their policies.
52
 Secondly, given its focus on the 1980s, this study examines the period when East 
German insubordination towards Moscow was arguably at its height, therefore allowing us to 
examine if a causal relationship existed between increasing East German-Soviet frictions and an 
independent GDR policy towards China. This will not only add to our understanding of East 
German foreign policy decision-making in the 1980s but also contribute to our conception of the 
drastically changing Warsaw Pact political landscape during the last decade of the Cold War.  
Discerning readers of GDR history will first note that the hitherto most popular approach 
has been to analyze the GDR’s history, whether its cultural or political aspects, in their entirety 
or focus on the two flash points that have defined East German history, namely its founding and 
its dissolution.
53
 Within these studies, accounting the unforeseen and sudden collapse of the 
GDR has predictably been given more attention.
54
 Due to the known fate of the GDR, studies of 
this nature have the tendency to see the 1980s through a lens of predetermined inevitability. That 
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is to say, they weave the immediate period before the GDR’s collapse into a tapestry of 
unavoidable events which can only lead to the ‘inevitable’ demise of the GDR.55 That is 
especially true for economic histories of not only the GDR but COMECON countries in 
general.
56
 My study has attempted to shed this mantle of pre-determinism whenever it can, thus 
offering the reader a sense of East Berlin’s hopes and goals at the time. For example, when 
looking at GDR-China economic relations, deconstructing the GDR’s 1980s independent of the 
final result lets events have their own agency rather than being interpreted towards a 
predetermined outcome.
57
 Thus, we can see that, far from resigned to the GDR’s economic fate, 
Honecker was actually actively trying to secure the Middle Kingdom as an additional market for 
East German finished goods to bolster the domestic economy and reverse the GDR’s economic 
problems. 
In addition to contributing to the historiography of GDR foreign policy, this thesis also 
adds to our understanding of Chinese foreign policy intentions in the 1980s. Especially in 
China’s dealings with Eastern European states, there exists a significant gap in the literature. 
Indeed, while the focal point of East German history has been on the formation and collapse of 
the GDR, historians dealing with modern Chinese foreign policy have in turn dedicated their 
attention on the one man who has defined China since 1949: Mao Zedong. Studies on his role in 
the Cold War
58
, his domestic mistakes
59
, his foreign policy
60
 and his personal traits
61
 have 
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dominated historiography on the PRC both domestically and abroad. This is of course partly due 
to the People’s Republic’s timeline. Having had a hand in all aspects of China’s domestic and 
international affairs for four decades, the Chairman played a role in every major Chinese foreign 
policy initiative before his death.
62
 However, Mao’s passing in 1976 brought about drastic 
changes to China’s political landscape and ushered in a new generation of leaders around Deng 
Xiaoping.
63
 It was under Deng that China not only gradually opened to the West and Asia but 
also to Eastern Europe. Outmanoeuvring and ousting the remnant old guard centered around the 
‘Gang of Four’ which included ‘Madame Mao’ Jiang Qing, Deng immediately set out a new 
policy plan which was designed first and foremost to get China out of the debilitating economic 
decline that had resulted from the Cultural Revolution and onto a speedy modernization drive in 
order to improve the population’s standard of living.64  
 To understand the roots of China’s domestic and foreign policy in the 1980s, one must 
understand Deng Xiaoping’s personal past and political experiences as Beijing’s path during 
Deng’s decade were inexorably intertwined with his formative journey and visions for the future. 
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And here, many studies exist that have done a great deal to illuminate Deng’s motivations.65 
While some Chinese studies have been published on this topic, political sensitivities on the 
mainland which often hinder even slightly unfavourable views of paramount leaders like Deng 
has meant that the more balanced and subjective accounts have appeared in the West.
66
 Among 
these, one of the most comprehensive reviews of the many aspects of Deng’s life was published 
first in a special issue in China Quarterly and then as an edited volume by a consortium of Deng 
experts on the occasion of his retirement from day-to-day party responsibilities in 1993.
67
 
Tracing his life through the changing fortunes during his lengthy career in the CCP, which 
included three purges, the reader is left with a solid impression on why Deng did not see the 
party as a beacon of ideological purity but rather as an instrument to promote his pragmatic and 
progressive policies.
68
 He knew that he was in a special position to realize his vision for a more 
modern China. Having proven himself as a capable politician in a variety of functions in the 
Party, Deng enjoyed widespread popularity from a broad power-base both within the army and 
the Party during much of his reign.
69
 This, according to the current scholarly consensus, is one of 
the main reasons why he was able to impose his pragmatist policies without much resistance 
from different factions within the Party.
70
 
 In terms of Deng’s foreign policy, it is important to note that his focus on an economic 
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revival in China could only be achieved through participating in the world market. Hence, 
fostering new linkages and abandoning the self-imposed international isolation embraced during 
most of Mao’s time became a priority.71 Barry Naughton and Li Zhide, both experts on Deng’s 
economic policies, have concluded that these policies were the driving force behind China’s 
gradual opening to the world from 1978 on.
72
 Recently, Ezra Vogel’s work on Deng has also 
added considerably to our understanding of not only Deng’s reforms but also the difficulties he 
experienced when attempting to impose them.
73
 These ‘modernization-first’ motivations are only 
underlined when one studies his official Nianpu, or annals, as Deng repeatedly emphasized 
economic growth to foreign visitors.
74
 
 However, while most scholarship has focused on the undoubtedly important role that 
America and other Asian states had on China’s modernization process, Vogel and others have 
largely ignored the European dimension.
75
 Deng’s new reformist-oriented domestic policy meant 
that China also looked to improve relations with advanced Western European states as well as 
seeking closer ties with Eastern European states such as the GDR in order to acquire 
technological know-how and to find new trade partners.
76
 Within the small body of literature that 
tackles China’s relations with both Western and Eastern Europe, an even smaller subset has been 
dedicated to the latter. As Michael Yahuda argues, a common conception seems to prevail that 
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these relations have been traditionally less important than even China’s minor ones with Western 
Europe.
77
 Yahuda sees Sino-Eastern European relations not important in themselves; they only 
matter in as far as developments in Poland and Hungary at the end of the Cold War influenced 
Chinese decision-making in 1989 to stem destabilizing influences and preserve the CCP’s 
legitimacy.
78
 This view is largely upheld by Alyson J. K. Bailes. She argues that China and 
Eastern Europe started to develop meaningful contacts in the late 1980s, when both sides, amidst 
Gorbachev’s declining ability and willingness to control Warsaw Pact states, started to build 
relations for their own national interests.
79
  
 While literature on this subject is generally lacking, there has been some recent interest in 
China’s engagement with Eastern European countries due to a seeming ‘awakening’ by Cold 
War historians that these relations mattered more than previously thought. This has led to the 
convening of several high profile conferences on Sino-Eastern European relations, coordinated 
by the Parallel History Project at the ETH Zurich, the Cold War International History Project in 
Washington D.C. as well as a smattering of other academic institutions.
80
 The findings of these 
conferences support our existing understanding of Deng’s overall motivations. Former Soviet-
Bloc ambassadors and policy-makers have corroborated that Beijing was curious at the 
experiences that socialist states like the GDR had made while undertaking their own economic 
reforms.
81
 Certainly, these conferences have confirmed Gilbert Rozman’s early findings that 
Beijing had often looked towards Moscow and its client states in order to assess the benefits and 
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downfalls of its version of socialism.
82
  
 My thesis will add further credence to the notion that Beijing did not only open its markets 
to the United States, Western Europe and Asia but, in the early 1980s, also proactively sought 
Eastern European cooperation during the Reform and Opening process. Among Eastern 
European states, I show that China placed special emphasis on East Germany as the leading 
socialist industrial state. By proactively engaging with East Germany, Zhongnanhai hoped to 
gain an insight into Eastern European economic processes. I argue that Beijing’s engagement 
with Soviet bloc countries were an important part of China’s learning process in the 1980s. 
 Another element of historiography that warrants mentioning are general studies which deal 
with the international environment of the 1980s. Certainly, together with the accompanying 
Warsaw Pact/NATO Missile crisis, the start of the so-called Second Cold War standoff between 
the superpowers had a profound impact on Soviet-GDR relations. As Cold War tensions 
reappeared after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Honecker was stuck between the 
need to uphold his loyalty to Moscow and his interest in continued détente with the West, 
specifically West Germany. Considering the economic needs of the GDR and the economic 
benefits East Berlin was able to gain from Bonn after Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, Honecker had a 
vested interest to keep détente alive. A. James McAdams and Michael J. Sodaro have both 
pointed out that as more and more loans and credits flowed from the FRG into the GDR, 
Honecker was adamant to propose the continuity of a ‘Coalition of Reason” (Koalition der 
Vernunft)
83
 between the two Germanies rather than to side with Moscow’s anti-Western stance 
as superpower tensions emerged after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
84
 This independent 
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streak also played directly into East Berlin’s willingness to ignore Moscow’s warnings against 
seeking a reengagement with China in the 1980s. 
 In terms of the bigger geopolitical picture, transatlantic relations remained chilly under 
Brezhnev’s successors Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985). 
American President Ronald Reagan’s proposal to create a Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in 
1983 served to stoke fears in the Kremlin that the project represented Washington’s attempt to 
gain first-strike capability by rendering the Soviet ICBM-arsenal obsolete. Only the rise of 
Gorbachev to the helm of the Soviet Union in March 1985 brought about a substantial positive 
change in the nature of Soviet-American relations.
85
 Sergey Radchenko’s recent study on Soviet 
policy towards East Asia confirms that while Gorbachev sought to drive forward the stagnant 
Sino-Soviet normalization process in the latter part of the decade, his overtures were met with 
Deng’s insistence that the Soviet Union pull back its troops from Afghanistan, the Sino-Soviet 
frontier and Vietnam before any advances in Sino-Soviet relations could be achieved.
86
 Thus, as 
dialogue increased again between the superpowers, often with varying success, the antagonistic 
atmosphere between Beijing and Moscow largely remained. Péter Vámos and China’s former 
Deputy Foreign Minister Qian Qichen have given us convincing accounts that Chinese anger at 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and disagreements on the Sino-Soviet negotiations 
framework meant that bilateral consultations between Moscow and Beijing only showed tangible 
progress at the end of the decade.
 87
  
This dissertation also delves deep into the question of what two anti-reform regimes in 
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East Berlin and Beijing did in order to repel the reformist tides washing up on its shores at the 
end of the Cold War. In analyzing this angle, this study has been fortunate to be able to build on 
a wealth of literature that has been produced on the Cold War’s end.88 First, Gorbachev’s 
accession to the position of General Secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985 was a fateful moment 
for the entire Soviet bloc. Kremlinologists Archie Brown, Vladislav Zubok and Geir Lundestad 
have argued in convincing fashion that it was Gorbachev’s personality and his hopeful, almost 
naïve vision which were the decisive factors in the path which would ultimately cost Moscow its 
client states and finally, its own existence.
89
  
For the GDR, Gorbachev’s seemingly careless tinkering with domestic reforms aroused 
anger and suspicion.
90
 Among a batch of new work released on the occasion of the 20
th
 
anniversary of the Fall of the Wall, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk’s account (filtering out the often 
highhanded personal political opinions of the author) illuminates the fallout that Gorbachev’s 
policies had on the GDR. For example, in a desperate attempt to stem the formation of any 
liberal opinions, the SED promptly banned reformist literature such as the Soviet journal Sputnik 
from circulation in East Germany in November 1988.
91
 Pankow was not the only place where 
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Gorbachev’s newfound favour for greater political dialogue and transparency elicited worry. The 
GDR’s anti-reformist stance was welcomed and praised in Beijing. As Stefan Halper, Michael 
Yahuda and David Shambaugh show, Deng was also less than enthusiastic about Gorbachev’s 
calls for political reforms as he sought to use the CCP’s strict political control to reform the 
economy.
92
  
Indeed, China and the GDR became two of the most vociferous critics of Gorbachev’s 
reform path. By providing a thorough account of how their common opposition to Glasnost and 
Perestroika played out in Sino-GDR relations, I will add to our understanding of how orthodox 
regimes sought any means necessary to counter the liberalizing trends coming out of Moscow. 
The dissertation will demonstrate that both regimes clung to the hard-line until the very last, with 
drastically different consequences. By analyzing this angle, this thesis adds to an emerging body 
of literature which analyzes how the last decade of the Cold War was perceived outside the 
purely bipolar perspective.
93
 
 My work of course builds on those that have gone before it. Claudie Gardet, Werner 
Meissner and Anja Feege, Bernd Schäfer and Martina Wobst have all done their part to add 
crucial arguments on why East Germany’s engagement with China mattered.94 Without a doubt, 
much can be learned from these works, and their analysis of the major turning points in bilateral 
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affairs have been very helpful for this study. However, both Meissner and Feege as well as 
Wobst’ works are victims of their ambition as they try to provide an account of GDR-PRC 
relations in its entirety. While offering a general narrative account of bilateral affairs instead of 
focusing on pushing forward certain arguments, the authors do not explore the motivations and 
the intentions behind policy formulation, often leaving the reader wanting more. By contrast, 
Schäfer’s work, which focuses on whether or not ‘the Chinese solution’ was considered in East 
Berlin as a remedy against popular unrest in 1989, provides a detailed account of bilateral 
dealings in the final months of the GDR’s existence. However, viewing just 1989’s events gives 
it the shortfall that it does not account for the long-term bilateral dynamics that led to this point 
of intense engagement between Beijing and East Berlin in 1989. Indeed, as I show, ideological 
like-mindedness had become a permanent and binding feature between the two regimes in the 
last half of the 1980s and viewed as such, SED ‘crown-prince’ Egon Krenz’ visit in late 1989 
was a reaffirmation of Beijing and East Berlin’s common hard-line against reformist trends 
sweeping across the socialist world. 
The little Chinese scholarship that exists on East German-Chinese relations have mostly 
been published after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe (and the GDR’s 
disappearance as a state), the impetus being the perceived need to learn from Soviet-bloc 
experiences in order to prevent a similar fate in China. Hua Shaoxiang’s study, which draws on 
published German sources, is a good representative of this body of literature. With little or no 
material from Chinese archival sources, these works are mostly narrative accounts which merely 
superficially describe bilateral relations without giving any consideration to the driving factors 
behind policy.
95
 An added problem with scholarship published on the mainland is that a large 
proportion of foreign policy studies have been fashioned to support ‘Marxism-Leninisim’ or 
‘Mao Zedong Thought’. Noncompliance with these expectations is almost unimaginable and 
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doing so would not only invite penalties but also negative consequences for the author. As the 
recent dismissal of outspoken dissident and free market proponent Xia Yeliang from his post as 
an economics professor at Peking University has shown, Beijing expects its academics to sing to 
its tune.
 96
  As Wang Jisi, the current director of Peking University’s School of International 
Studies observed, all social science theories in the People’s Republic of China are expected to 
contribute to the building of socialism.
97
 Thus, scholarly debate on foreign policy in general, let 
alone GDR-PRC relations and Sino-Eastern European relations, remains very much restricted in 
Chinese scholarship.
98
 
Addressing the lack of literature that exists on the topic of Eastern European-Chinese 
relations, I seek to position my research at the intersection of both diplomatic and political 
histories on China and East Germany as well as general histories of the last years of the Cold 
War. By doing so, I hope to open up a new discussion on Eastern Europe’s engagement with 
China and vice versa, how Beijing actively sought closer relations with Eastern European 
countries after Deng’s rise. In East Germany’s case, this thesis will prove that for both Beijing 
and East Berlin, newly established relations were anything but inconsequential and had a critical 
function for both regimes. This research will show how both governments attempted to cleverly 
navigate the Cold War construct to find each other. In the end, both were posed with the 
fundamental question of socialism’s compatibility with the evolving world around it, with one 
seemingly having found at least a version of the solution while the other one, owing to a series of 
structural and geographic factors, crumbled under internal and external pressures. 
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Sources 
 
Studies of bilateral relations ideally need to explore both sides with equal detail. 
However, owing to the restriction of archival materials in China for much of the modern CCP 
era, researchers are sadly confronted with the sobering reality that informative and revealing 
documents in the central party archives as well as the foreign ministry archives in Beijing are 
mostly inaccessible to foreign scholars.
99
 This has forced historians of modern China to be 
creative. As central directives are often handed down into the provinces when the foreign policy 
direction changes in the centre, one way to triangulate the lack of access in Beijing has been to 
search for evidence of policy changes in the provincial archives. With this method, I have been 
able to obtain insights into Zhongnanhai’s decision-making process from the Shanghai 
Municipal Archives, the Shandong Provincial Archives, the Jiangsu Provincial Archives as well 
as the Hebei Provincial Archives. In addition, I have also sought to creatively utilize CCP-
internally circulated published material, as well as interviews with former Chinese diplomats 
stationed in East Germany to construct the Chinese picture. In a turn of luck, due to the release of 
East German materials, I have also been able to gauge the Chinese position from East German 
records of bilateral summits and meetings. Using these sources, I try to provide an internal look 
at the estimations and calculations behind Beijing’s engagement with a country that it previously 
paid little attention to.  
In contrast, the dissolution of East Germany has resulted in the release of SED politburo 
documents as well as politburo members’ personal files. These have been meticulously 
organized and made available at the The Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen 
der DDR im Bundesarchiv (or SAPMO) collection at the Federal Archives in Berlin. They offer 
a penetrating look inside Pankow’s decision-making rationale to actively engage China in the 
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1980s. In addition to this, special access to consult the Sektor 1 “China” files of the East German 
Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (MfAA) in the German Foreign Ministry Archives 
(Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, PAAA) has done a great deal to illuminate the 
diplomatic intricacies of bilateral exchanges. These were in turn supplemented by files from the 
East German Security Services (Staatssicherheitsdienst, Stasi) at the Behörde des 
Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi-Unterlagen (BStU), which showed that even the security 
services were engaged in the rapprochement process. Furthermore, interviews with former GDR 
diplomats stationed in China have provided me with a first-hand account of how relations 
developed between the two states. 
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Chapter One - Diplomacy behind Moscow’s Back: East German-
Chinese Rapprochement, 1979-1982 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The new character of East German-Chinese relations in the 1980s cannot be 
understood without giving consideration to how Moscow defined this relationship in the decades 
before. Thus, this chapter will begin with an introduction into the history of Sino-GDR relations 
from 1949 to 1979. It will be shown that the GDR’s relations with communist China enjoyed an 
‘independent’ phase between 1949 and the early 1960s, during which relations remained relatively 
unaffected by the immediate fall-out of the growing Sino-Soviet antagonism that arose from 
Khrushchev’s 1956 de-Stalinization campaign. This phase of like-mindedness was short-lived 
however, as Moscow reined in East Berlin under its general anti-Chinese line when Sino-Soviet 
tensions escalated in the early 1960s. Due to Moscow’s strict coordination of Soviet-bloc states’ 
China policies, Sino-East German relations remained cool until early 1979. During this time, East 
Berlin was not only willing to uphold Soviet anti-China policy but it was even prepared to go a 
step further in demonstrating its increasing weight in the foreign policy sphere by actively 
promoting an anti-China line. Nowhere was this more evident than during the Sino-Vietnamese 
border war in 1979. Even though some in East Berlin had begun considering a possible 
recalibration towards China as Deng consolidated power in 1978, Chinese aggression against a 
historically close ally brought about fierce condemnation by Honecker and arguably the last 
instance of close foreign policy cooperation between East Berlin and Moscow.  
 Yet as the Sino-Vietnamese war ended in the summer of 1979, a series of frictions 
between Moscow and East Berlin caused the latter to reconsider its absolute adherence to Soviet 
anti-China policy. Contributing to this shift was the erosion of trust brought about by the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Moscow’s actions threatened to end Superpower-
détente and also to unravel the laboriously constructed East German rapprochement with the FRG, 
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which the Honecker regime had come to rely on, especially economically, for the GDR’s survival. 
Desperate not to let renewed East-West tensions affect German-German engagement, Honecker 
refused to have any part of Brezhnev’s intervention in Afghanistan. 
 Compounding concerns was Brezhnev’s handling of the Solidarność strikes in Poland 
in September 1980, which fuelled doubts about Moscow’s overall leadership capacity. Honecker, 
fearing a spillover effect from a neighbouring socialist state, sought decisive ideological 
leadership and a determined stand from Moscow against the social unrest in the Polish shipyards. 
Brezhnev’s slow, lethargic and uncoordinated reaction to the strikes unnerved Honecker. 
Honecker’s petitions for Brezhnev to send in an armed force to squash the strikes fell on deaf ears 
in Moscow, further adding to his frustrations with the Soviet leadership. 
 The proverbial ‘cherry on top’ in terms of diverging interests between Moscow and 
East Berlin came with the drastic Soviet oil delivery reductions to the GDR in 1980/81. As 
growing economic difficulties in East Germany became evident, Honecker both resented and 
fought Moscow’s cutbacks. However, repeated lobby attempts by East Berlin elicited little change 
in Moscow’s position. Beset by its own economic woes, the Kremlin was intent to sell its oil at 
world market prices rather than delivering it at discounted rates to client states such as the GDR. 
 Amidst both increasing abandonment and diverging interests from Moscow, a gradual 
‘selfish’ reorientation started to occur in East Berlin’s foreign policy. Pankow was now more 
interested in serving its own needs rather than Moscow’s. In terms of the GDR’s China policy, 
this reorientation meant that Honecker, appreciating the significance that Deng’s reformist 
stirrings had on China’s foreign policy direction, saw a chance to engage a post-Mao China in 
order to probe for potential advantages for the GDR. With subtle cultural and diplomatic feelers, 
Honecker signalled to Beijing in 1980 that he was ready for reengagement. By that same year, 
Moscow’s insistence that the GDR stick to its professed antagonism to China had lost all salience 
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in East Berlin, especially in light of Moscow’s own moves to improve the Sino-Soviet 
relationship. The GDR and the PRC established cultural contacts in May 1980 and exchanged 
government delegations in August 1981. The resulting engagement between Beijing and East 
Berlin would spell the beginning of the end of almost two decades of animosity between the two 
states. 
 
Between Moscow and Beijing: from “like-mindedness” to enmity, 1956-1976 
 
 Few could predict the far-reaching consequences of Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech at 
the 20
th
 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU, in 1956. Criticizing 
Stalin’s cult of personality, he vowed to bring the Soviet Union on the right path of Leninism and 
under the rule of a collective leadership. Mao, clearly seeing parallels between himself and Stalin, 
criticized Khrushchev’s initiated path and thereby sowed the seeds for the Sino-Soviet split. While 
the details of the split have been analyzed in great detail, the fallout for Soviet client states is 
relatively unknown.
100
  Considering the founding history of the GDR as a Soviet satellite and that 
its foreign policy, at least initially, was conducted largely under the aegis of Moscow, it shouldn’t 
be surprising that the deteriorating state of Sino-Soviet relations had an immediate detrimental 
impact on GDR-PRC relations.
101
 Exactly how growing disagreements between Moscow and 
Beijing affected the Beijing-East Berlin relationship has been the subject of considerable research 
by German scholars, among them Joachim Krüger
102
, Werner Meissner + Anja Feege
103
, Uwe 
Fabritzek
104
, Nicole Stuber
105
, and Thomas Kampen
106
. What is surprising about their conclusions 
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is that they unanimously agree that GDR-PRC relations did not immediately sour after the onset 
of the first Sino-Soviet disagreements. Despite different interpretations of why East Berlin’s 
relations with China were at first relatively unaffected, it is certain that Walter Ulbricht, himself a 
die-hard Stalinist, viewed Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign with suspicion.107 Mao 
harboured similar feelings. Even though he disagreed with Stalin on many issues, the Chinese 
leader saw clear parallels between their respective personality cults. Thus, Mao watched 
Khrushchev’s moves with unease.108 This created common ground between two regimes that were 
equally disinclined to allow potentially destabilizing political reforms affect the continuity of their 
respective present courses. Against this backdrop, GDR-PRC relations actually carried on 
normally with Chinese-style “People’s Communes” still operating in the East German countryside 
well into the late 1950s and East German officials voicing strong support for China during the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.
109
 A telling sign of how much the GDR’s and USSR’s China 
policies differed can be inferred from their attitudes towards Sino-Indian border tensions in 1959-
1960, with the former adopting a largely pro-Chinese line while the latter displayed 
indifference.
110
 Among contemporary scholars, M. J. Esslin went as far as to speak of an emerging 
“Peking-Pankow Axis” in 1960.111  
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 By the early 1960s, however, a noticeable change occurred in the GDR’s China policy as 
East Berlin increasingly fell into the Soviet line. Due to deepening Sino-Soviet tensions, Moscow 
actively restrained East Berlin from engaging China. Political, economic and cultural contacts 
decreased. As Walter Ulbricht made his pro-Soviet stance known at the VI. SED Party Congress 
in January 1963, heated scenes unfolded. The speech by the head of the CCP delegation Wu 
Xiuquan was met with foot stomping and whistles from the audience. The Chinese delegation 
duly left during the singing of the Internationale.
112
 Indeed, the years between the initiation of the 
GDR-China split and renewed rapprochement in the early 1980s were marked by a general 
absence of relations. To coordinate the China policies of its close allies as Sino-Soviet tensions 
escalated, Moscow initiated shadowy ‘Interkit’ meetings in 1967. Convened almost annually, 
these meetings served as a forum where Moscow instructed the international departments of 
Soviet-bloc states to maintain an antagonistic attitude towards Beijing.
113
 To enforce anti-Chinese 
conformity amongst East German citizens, even the state security apparatus got involved. Thus, 
the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, colloquially Stasi) repeatedly issued orders in the early 
1970s to its operatives to “subvert any kind of Maoist activity…and to investigate all [East 
German citizens’] connections to Chinese nationals.”114 People who came under suspicion of 
having links to China were immediately investigated.
115
 When encountering Chinese citizens and 
diplomats, Stasi agents and informants always made sure to reiterate that the GDR was a loyal ally 
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of the Soviet Union.
116
 The response from China was immediate and harsh. Chinese diplomats cut 
off all contacts with their East German counterparts and protested vociferously against Soviet 
policies at every opportunity.
117
 Internal CCP estimations had also rightly guessed that Moscow 
was increasingly asserting its control over its East German ally.
118
 A general diplomatic ice age 
subsequently set in between East Berlin and Beijing. 
 In the PRC, the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 meant that Chinese foreign policy 
was relegated behind the primacy of internal reform and stamping out ‘reactionary’ domestic 
elements. Foreign policy came to be regarded as a worthless, bourgeois and even reactionary 
activity as the entire country turned inwards.
119
 As a consequence, China’s already brittle relations 
with the GDR soured even further. Red Guards, encouraged by Mao to fight foreign influences, 
vandalized the GDR Embassy in Beijing and damaged Ambassador Martin Bierbach’s car in 
August 1966. In retribution, unknown assailants defaced the Chinese Embassy in Berlin-
Karlshorst.
120
 The ultimate low-point came when four Chinese Embassy employees died as a 
result of a car accident on 27 June 1967 in Mecklenburg. Even though evidence tells us now that 
this accident was most likely a result of careless driving and bad road conditions, both the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry and Mao perceived it as a deliberate act against China.
121
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From Maoism to Dengism: The effect of pragmatic domestic policy on Chinese foreign 
policy 
   
 
 By the 1970s, with China still embroiled in the Cultural Revolution and East Berlin firmly 
in Moscow’s ideological grip, few could have fathomed that GDR-PRC relations would improve 
against Moscow’s explicit disapproval in little over ten years. So how exactly did East Berlin go 
about resetting its relations with a country that was anything but friendly with Moscow in the 
early 1980s? And how were the GDR’s initiatives received in China? 
To be sure, East German-Chinese rapprochement was first and foremost made possible by 
generational change in Beijing’s leadership. As the Cultural Revolution ended with Mao’s death 
in 1976, Deng’s arrival was picked up in East Berlin as a positive development for the future of 
GDR-PRC relations.
122
 A changing international environment also meant that China was able to 
act more freely on the international stage. While Beijing was focused on containing the Soviet 
menace in the late 1960s as border clashes threatened to boil over into all-out war, it had largely 
succeeded in isolating this threat by pursing a policy of Sino-American rapprochement aimed at 
Moscow from the late 1960s on. With the Soviet threat ebbing and radical Maoist discourse 
declining, China’s foreign policy focus started to shift to a more pragmatic attitude centered on 
economic revival and a return to the international stage under Deng’s leadership. 
This pragmatism also influenced Beijing’s relations with Eastern European states as Deng 
sought to learn from their reform experiences in order to draw lessons for China. Politically, the 
time was also right for renewed engagement with the GDR. With the Soviet threat declining and 
border negotiations with Moscow in session, Beijing sought to use this atmosphere of relaxation 
to pursue closer relations with Eastern European states to which it had limited access to during the 
Sino-Soviet split.  
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To be sure, all the right conditions were being created in Beijing for a new Eastern 
European policy. Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1978 marked the official end of the Cultural 
Revolution and the start of a new era of modernization. By ousting Mao’s handpicked successor 
Hua Guofeng and the ‘Gang of Four’, Deng not only eliminated the last remnants of the Mao-era 
elite but also ushered in a new policy direction.
123
 The new paramount leader immediately 
embarked on a path to shed the Maoist policies that, in his opinion, had placed China on a path to 
economic ruin.
124
 He began work on the “Four Modernizations” of the industrial, agricultural, 
science & technology and national defence sectors, although stressing the continued dominance of 
the CCP in all political matters.
125
 Deng’s relationship with the CCP was thus more practical than 
ideological  - not least because he had been ousted three times by Mao in his six decades in the 
Party and lived through numerous contradictory policies carried out in the name of 
communism.
126
 He saw the Party as a tool to implement policy changes that would eventually 
provide the Chinese populace with improved living standards.
127
 Indeed, in a much-heralded 
September 1980 interview with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci about China’s future, Deng 
stressed that Mao’s portrait would remain in Tiananmen Square, even while China sought to turn 
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away from previous “leftist” tendencies.128 
 In terms of foreign policy, Deng was eager to continue the Sino-American rapprochement. 
Yet whereas Mao revived relations with Washington primarily to counter the emerging Soviet 
military threat in light of border tensions along the Ussuri River and the Xinjiang frontier in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, Deng intended to use improved relations with the west to procure 
technologies and expertise for his economic modernization plans.
129
 This is not to say that Deng 
did not see the benefits of a closer relationship with Washington to deter the Soviet threat. Yet by 
1980, the Soviet menace, from Beijing’s perspective, was nowhere near as dangerous as it had 
been in the late 1960s. Preliminary border negotiations had begun between Moscow and Beijing 
in 1979. Soviet border divisions had not moved during China’s campaign against Vietnam in 
February 1979, and while the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was denounced by 
Beijing as an incendiary and provocative Soviet aggression in Asia, it also meant that China had 
ceased to be a top military priority for Moscow.
130
 Indeed, in a rarely publicized television 
interview in April 1980, Deng, while stressing that the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan 
was a threat to world peace, outlined that the danger was not directed at China but mainly at the 
Middle East, Europe and the Third World.
131
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Foreign policy as a means for reform: Renewed engagement with the GDR 
 
 
In this light, Deng’s well-received ‘learning tours’ to Japan and America in 1978 and early 
1979, following Washington’s official recognition of the PRC, only added to the feeling of 
security among the new pragmatic elite in Beijing. It is during this period that Deng’s policies 
started to gain momentum.
132
 In July 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) passed legislation that authorized joint ventures with foreign firms and the 
establishment of ‘Special Economic Zones’ along the coast.133  This economic opening-up was 
steeped in pragmatist thinking. In fact, Deng’s foreign policy initiatives at the turn of the decade 
were almost wholly centered on securing foreign backing and experience for domestic economic 
reform and advancement.
134
  
 This policy direction had clear implications for China’s relations with Eastern European 
states.
135
 ‘Differentiation’ and luring away Soviet satellite states in order to destabilize the Soviet 
Union, as practiced by Beijing during the height of the Sino-Soviet Split, was no longer the sole 
intention behind pursuing contacts with Soviet allies.
136
 China now had very practical reasons to 
seek engagement with Eastern Europe. Firstly, Deng was interested in how socialist states 
responded to reform. In this respect, Eastern European states, unlike Western European states, 
could be looked at as microcosms of what could be expected if widespread reforms were to take 
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place in a socialist country. In East Germany for example, Beijing was interested in the effects 
that Honecker’s 1971 social and economic reforms had on the living standards and productivity of 
the GDR. Trade Minister Zheng Yishan led a sizeable trade delegation to East Germany in April 
1980 to study exactly this.
137
 Secondly, the economic aspects of cooperation were alluring to 
China. Beijing had clear ideas on how to benefit from Eastern European economies, especially in 
terms of scientific-technical cooperation.
138
 As both sides were short of hard currency, it was 
hoped that Eastern European technology, industrial supplies and know-how could be exchanged 
for Chinese consumer goods.
139
 
At the GDR Embassy in Beijing and in the Far Eastern Section of the MfAA in East 
Berlin, Deng’s new economic course initiated a re-appraisal of the GDR’s relations with China. 
Indeed, the Far Eastern section noted in October 1979 that the present course of China was 
changing and now solely revolves around the ‘core’ policy of the Four Modernizations.140 Letters 
from the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Helmut Liebermann in 
Beijing stressed the need to observe the “changing nature of China” rather than treat it as a 
constant Maoist enemy - a position that Liebermann had supported since 1977.
141
 The MfAA’s 
China section also concluded that renewed relations would yield economic and political 
benefits.
142
 The GDR Embassy was not the only Soviet-Bloc post to pick up on Beijing’s change 
in tone. For example, the Bulgarian Embassy in Beijing also noted subtle adjustments in Chinese 
attitudes towards Bulgaria in its annual report of 1978, as it was allowed more freedoms to 
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arrange visits.
143
 These developments were fervently discussed at regular Warsaw Pact 
Ambassador’s meetings.144 
 
The abandonment of Soviet China-policy – From total adherence to total disobedience 
 
East Berlin recognized Beijing’s new course at a time when its own foreign policy was 
undergoing substantial shifts from a stance of total adherence to Moscow’s line to a more 
independent stance. Indeed, even though East German attitudes had started to reappraise China in 
light of Deng’s rise, as late as 1979 foreign policy coordination between Moscow and East Berlin 
still translated into the latter’s absolute subordination to Moscow. Nowhere was this coordination 
displayed more clearly than in the GDR’s reaction to China’s border war with Vietnam. During 
the crisis, Honecker showed a total willingness to coordinate his policies with the Kremlin and 
even went out of his way to reiterate Soviet condemnations of Chinese aggression towards 
Vietnam. However, as events would tell, this would be the last time that the East German leader 
would submit to Soviet antagonisms towards China. 
Indeed, by the late 1970s, Honecker was styling himself as a visionary re-inventor of the 
GDR. Having made significant inroads in legitimizing the GDR as a sovereign and recognized 
state, he celebrated the signing of the Grundlagenvertrag (“Basic Treaty”) between Bonn and 
Berlin in December 1972 as the start of a new and independent East Germany. West Germany’s 
de-facto recognition of the GDR meant first and foremost that East Berlin was able to establish 
relations with states that had hitherto refused to recognize its legitimacy, largely due to the 
international repercussions of the Hallstein Doctrine.
145
 UN membership and the willingness of 
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non-socialist states to begin diplomatic relations with the GDR gave Honecker and the Politburo 
enhanced prestige.
146
 For the East German leader, foreign policy served a dual purpose of 
legitimizing the GDR on the international stage as well as validating his own position in the SED 
leadership and within the Soviet Bloc.
147
 “He enjoyed Foreign policy”, Günter Sieber, former 
Head of the International Department of the SED Central Committee once remarked, “…the 
relaxed nature in which he spoke to foreign delegates you rarely saw at domestic functions”.148 
The rising importance Honecker attached to foreign policy meant that he increasingly 
monopolized decision-making power. The Politburo became a rubberstamp mechanism to validate 
the General Secretary’s foreign policy decisions. SED-Politburo member Günter Schabowski 
recalled that by the late 1970s no foreign policy decision was made without the express consent of 
Honecker, especially those that could increase his international prestige and standing.
149
  
Immediately after the conclusion of the Basic Treaty, Honecker began to see himself not 
only as a rising star on the international scene, but his growing confidence also reinforced his 
belief that he could perhaps use his newly gained visibility to underline his position as a key 
upholder of Soviet general interests, thereby solidifying the GDR as a policy-leader in the Soviet 
bloc.
150
 Accordingly, he sought to pursue and widen the GDR’s influence in the third world. 
Remnants of this stance could be observed as late as 1979, when adherence to the Soviet anti-
China line meant that East Berlin condemned Beijing’s punitive war against Vietnam. Thus, even 
though East Berlin appreciated that Deng’s economic policies represented a drastic departure from 
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Mao, its own foreign policy still showed signs of continuity in early 1979. Indeed, East Berlin 
went to great lengths to repeatedly condemn Chinese aggression. During an extended tour of 
Africa from 15 to 22 February 1979, Honecker feverishly upheld the conclusions reached at the 
tenth Interkit in Havana, where, under Soviet behest, leaders from Soviet-bloc states vowed to 
expose Chinese “cooperation with imperialism” in light of Deng Xiaoping’s January visit to the 
U.S. and to especially condemn its aggressive stance against Vietnam, which had concluded a 
twenty-five year mutual defence treaty with the Soviet Union in November 1978.
 151
  
On his first stop in Libya from 15-17 February, Honecker pressed Muammar Gaddafi to 
sign a joint declaration to condemn Chinese aggression against Vietnam and express his solidarity 
with Hanoi, only to be rebuffed by Gaddafi. Extracting the positives out of the meeting and eager 
to have been successful in pushing forward Moscow’s line, the Politburo report of the visit stated 
that Gaddafi expressed in private meetings that he did condemn the aggressive actions of China 
but couldn’t do so openly because of fears that China would then overtly throw its military 
support behind regional rival Egypt. At the news that Chinese troops had crossed the border into 
Vietnam on 17 February, Honecker stepped up his rhetoric on his next stop in Angola.  
Here, President Agostinho Neto was able to –with Honecker’s prodding- “overcome initial 
reservations to condemn the Chinese invasion”. Honecker encountered more support for his anti-
Chinese stance in Mozambique. In Maputo, President Samora Moises Machel informed him that 
he condemned the Chinese aggression and had called for the immediate withdrawal of all Chinese 
troops from Vietnam. However, nowhere was the East German delegation’s enthusiasm for the 
Soviet-directed anti-China stance more evident than during Honecker’s stop in Zimbabwe. 
Throughout consultations, Robert Mugabe displayed a clear reluctance to make any strong 
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statements against China. Whilst Mugabe stated that the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) condemned aggression from one socialist state towards another, he recounted that China 
had always supported ZANU and that relations with Beijing rested on strong foundations. 
Unsatisfied with Mugabe’s line, Hermann Axen, Head of the International Department of the SED 
Central Committee, went on the offensive. He declared that China’s aggression against Vietnam 
was the most damning evidence that Beijing “was collaborating with imperialism against peaceful 
socialist advancement”. Axen continued to press Mugabe to conclude a joint declaration against 
China, to which Mugabe only responded that internal consultations were still taking place on this 
and that he could only respond in a couple of days. Displaying clear disappointment at Mugabe’s 
position, Axen openly criticized the fundamentally wrong stance (grundlegend falsche Haltung) 
of Mugabe and cancelled the joint press conference.
152
    
Undoubtedly, the GDR’s historically close relations with Vietnam played a role in East 
Berlin’s adamant and angry responses to Chinese aggression in front of the African leaders. But, 
Honecker’s Africa-tour and similar official visits, such as his January visit to India, where he 
stressed the GDR’s ‘unbreakable’ bond with the USSR revealed the underlying dynamics in GDR 
foreign policy that rendered friendly GDR-PRC seemingly unlikely in the spring of 1979, making 
the start of a rapprochement a mere year later even more remarkable.
153
  
When word had reached East Berlin that Chinese troops had begun their punitive war 
against Vietnam, the first point on a list of actions to be taken by the Politburo on 29 February 
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1979 was “Consultations with the Soviet Union.”154 Moscow’s response was to provide a 
thorough “official interpretation” of events in Vietnam to the GDR and other Soviet-bloc states in 
mid-March. It consisted of a background analysis of Beijing’s goals and aims and specific actions 
to be taken by respective East German government departments. To outline the anti-socialist 
nature of China’s campaign, the interpretation speculated that Deng Xiaoping had coordinated its 
war with American President Jimmy Carter during his January 1979 visit to Washington.
155
 Using 
Moscow’s directive as a call to action, East German responses against China ranged from ordering 
the publication of press-items and TV programs that condemned the Chinese aggression, to 
protesting to the chargé d’affaires in East Berlin, Chen Tien Tsien, and barring Vice Trade-
Minister Chen Jie from visiting the Leipzig Messe trade show.
156
 These measures came after Le 
Thanh Nghi, member of the Vietnamese Politburo, was reassured of the GDR’s absolute support 
of Vietnam during his mid-March visit to Berlin.
157
 Indeed, in line with Moscow’s emergency aid 
shipments to Vietnam, the GDR proposed delivering aid to the tune of 110 million Marks to 
Hanoi in early March 1979, including a detailed list of weaponry worth more than 37 million 
Marks.
158
  
In its own internal analysis of the Vietnam problem of 22 March 1979, the Politburo added 
its own flavour to Soviet criticisms of China. Revealing its discomfort and insecurities around 
budding West German-Chinese relations and reiterating its observations at the tenth Interkit in 
Havana
159
, the Politburo strongly condemned China’s continued support for ‘revanchism’ in its 
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relations with the FRG and asserted that Beijing should take note of the sovereign interests of the 
GDR.
160
 The Politburo finally concluded that there was “no basis for the development of political 
relations between the PRC and GDR in the present situation”.161 
Leaving nothing to chance, the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU called together an 
internal meeting on March 30 in Moscow to further ensure a common line against China. 
Addressing party delegates from Bulgaria, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Vietnam and the GDR, Konstantin Russakov, Secretary of the CPSU CC for International Affairs, 
observed that the overall tendencies in Chinese hostility indicated that Beijing was interested in 
using invasions like this as a springboard to dominate all of Southeast Asia. Almost to re-assure 
the delegates that Sino-Soviet relations were still hostile and that they could count on the 
continued leadership of the Soviet Union to lead an anti-China front, Russakov stressed the futility 
of ongoing Sino-Soviet border negotiations and outlined further retaliation in light of Beijing’s 
unilateral cancellation of the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty in February 1979.
162
  
 
 
 
A changing tone – Inter-German relations’ effect on Soviet-GDR relations 
 
 Far from responding with anger, Beijing took East German protestations against its war 
with Vietnam as a simple fact of life. It expected a loyal client state to defend the Soviet position 
when a close Soviet ally is attacked by Beijing. Certainly, few in Beijing or East Berlin, even 
                                                          
160
 BA-SAPMO, DY 30/ IV B 2/20/603. Since diplomatic relations were established between the FRG and the PRC 
in 1972, political contacts were quickly established and trade bloomed from 874 million DM in 1974 to 2.7 billion 
DM in 1978. The PRC, in an attempt to foster better relations with the FRG, made clear that it supported an 
eventual German unification. See Mechthild Leutner, Wolfram Adolphi, and Peter Merker. Deutschland und 
China: Politik, Militär, Wirtschaft, Kultur : Eine Quellensammlung. Quellen Zur Geschichte Der Deutsch-
Chinesischen Beziehungen 1897-1995. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), pp. 143-144. 
161
 BA-SAPMO, DY 30/ IV B 2/20/603 – Zu den Beziehungen DDR-VR China, 22 March 1979. 
162
 BA-SAPMO, DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/2222, 30 March1979; Informed by the regular Soviet briefings to respective 
Soviet-bloc ambassadors, the GDR Embassy in Berlin reported in 27 December 1979 that the Chinese government 
was delaying the negotiations, that the Chinese delegation was behaving brashly during the talks and that Beijing was 
disseminating new anti-Soviet propaganda. PAAA, C 6569 – Zu den Grundlagen der Aussenpolitik der VR China im 
Jahre 1979 und den 1980 zu erwartenden aussenpolitischen Aktivitäten, pp. 213-214. 
 
61 
though both sides had observed improving conditions for an re-engagement before the Sino-
Vietnamese border war, now anticipated any significant improvements in Sino-GDR relations as 
the war raged.  
However, from late 1979 onwards a series of unforeseeable events would drastically 
change the GDR’s foreign policy calculus and, as a result, drastically alter how East Berlin 
viewed relations with China. Indeed, at the same time that Beijing was re-embracing foreign 
policy and changing its tone towards the GDR, the seeds were being sown for a dramatic 
recalibration of the Moscow-East Berlin, ‘Centre-Satellite’ relationship. First, Moscow’s gradual 
reluctance in the early 1980s to provide East Germany with unparalleled access to cheap raw 
resources sparked the realization in East Berlin that it needed to rely more heavily on previously 
established trade relations with Bonn. Added to this, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
threat of imminent collapse of superpower détente –and by implication the possible collapse of 
inter-German cooperation- served to push East Berlin away from Moscow’s international strategy. 
Soviet and GDR interests had started to diverge on the most basic level. East Berlin’s desire and 
need to pursue its own agenda in the midst of changing economic and international factors pushed 
forward East Berlin’s desire to pursue a more ‘selfish’ and independent economic and foreign 
policy. As a direct result, rather than blindly following Soviet policies, East Berlin was now more 
willing to assert its own agency in its foreign affair dealings to seek tangible benefits for itself, 
even at the cost of defying Moscow in doing so. It is out of this dramatic reorientation that East 
Berlin started to shed Soviet dictates to engage with China. And in the aftermath of the Sino-
Vietnamese border war, declining Soviet raw material deliveries were a major catalyst in East 
Berlin’s foreign policy recalibration. 
To be sure, the gradual slowdown of the Soviet economy in the late 1970s had an 
immediate effect on Soviet-East German trade relations. In June 1979, during the GDR-USSR 10-
year plan coordination meeting for the period of 1981 to 1990, the Soviet delegation from the 
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Soviet planning commission GOSPLAN showed a clear reluctance to be held down to rigid raw 
material delivery commitments to the GDR in the coming years, stressing that Moscow had no 
such clause in their plan coordination with other COMECON states. To the great distress of the 
GDR, the Soviet delegation finally rejected East German suggestions on “fixing the delivery-level 
by using 1980 as a basis-amount for the raw material deliveries until 1990”, explaining that the 
USSR could in no way hold such obligations for a time-span of 10 years.
163
  
Moscow’s reluctance to provide the GDR with a steady supply of raw materials came at a 
point when the GDR economy was also showing clear signs of stress. Though explanations differ 
as to the exact cause and start of the downturn, one thing is certain: statistical yearbooks and 
national accounts were tampered with to give the impression that everything was in order, when 
the real picture was rather grim.
 164
 The GDR economy faced a steady decline as its manufactured 
goods could only be pushed to fellow COMECON countries while state-sponsored initiates such 
as its heavy investment in microelectronics were failing to pay off.
165
  
Ironically, the only thing that kept the East German economy afloat -aside from the Soviet 
Union’s subsidies and an (albeit diminishing) willingness to purchase second-rate manufactures 
from the GDR- was increasing trade and economic cooperation with West Germany. Between 
1975 and 1980, imports from West Germany rose from 3.34 to 5.58 billion DM per annum while 
exports into the FRG rose from 3.92 to 5.29 billion DM in the same time period.
166
 The FRG was 
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bankrolling a series of ambitious infrastructure projects, including the Hamburg-Berlin highway, 
the majority of which ran on East German soil. GDR economic historian Maria Haendcke-Hoppe 
Arndt has speculated that West German economic goodwill and inter-German trade was probably 
the single most important factor that kept the GDR economy above water at this time.
167
 
Deepening inter-German economic relations caused great concern in Moscow, as the 
Kremlin feared that East Berlin would slip under Bonn’s influence. In a March 1979 meeting in 
Moscow, Gromyko warned Fischer not to sacrifice too much for material advantages from the 
FRG and reminded him that “political questions and economic questions must be viewed in 
conjunction.”168 Despite the Soviet unease at German-German dialogue, as further displayed by 
Gromyko’s message to Honecker in December 1979 that he and Brezhnev were against a planned 
meeting between Schmidt and Honecker, the GDR could hardly turn back on inter-German 
cooperation at this point, as transfer payments from the FRG presented the only alternative to 
economic ruin.
169
 While Moscow sought to keep the GDR from politically slipping westwards, 
East Berlin remained determined to continue pursing inter-German cooperation. After all, the 
GDR’s economic survival depended on it. 
 
 
Don’t threaten our détente – East Berlin’s intransigence towards Moscow’s war in 
Afghanistan 
 
As Gromyko already sensed, East Berlin’s priorities were shifting dangerously westwards 
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due to its deepening economic interactions with Bonn. To the lament of Soviet leaders, 
divergences between Moscow and East Berlin didn’t stop there. As Moscow sought to prop up the 
socialist regime in Afghanistan in 1979, East Berlin found itself once again ignored as it was left 
to deal with the potential international repercussions of Moscow’s invasion. Indeed, East Berlin’s 
reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is more than telling. While the 
GDR Politburo convened an emergency meeting on December 28 to express support for the 
Soviet invasion, one can only imagine the distress that the SED leadership felt at the prospect of 
what the collapse of détente and renewed superpower confrontation could mean for the future of 
inter-German cooperation.
170
 Holding fast to previous arrangements for a German-German 
summit between himself and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Honecker adhered to the 
planned date of 27 February 1980, showing a strong reluctance to let rapidly worsening 
transatlantic relations affect his own détente with the FRG. Only Moscow’s final order on 23 
January 1980 that the German-German summit be cancelled prevented Schmidt’s visit to East 
Germany from taking place.
171
 Not only threatening its cooperation with West Germany, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also threatened to unravel the GDR’s laboriously constructed, and 
fragile, relations with African states. Third World suspicion of Moscow grew exponentially after 
the Red Army intervened in Kabul. Association with the USSR was becoming more detrimental 
than ever.
172
 
 East Berlin was not shy about showing its displeasure towards the Soviet intervention. 
From the outset of the invasion, Honecker sought to avoid having any part in Moscow’s 
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Afghanistan campaign. The second anniversary of the Afghan communist revolution in April 
1980 only received scant mention in Politburo meetings. Aside from a couple of obligatory 
articles published in Neues Deutschland and Horizont, only four pages in the corresponding 
Politburo report were dedicated to this event, compared to the six pages that the relatively 
mundane visit to Belgium of Horst Sindermann, President of the Volkskammer, received.
173
 
Detecting East Berlin’s disengagement, Moscow found it necessary in May 1980 to encourage the 
GDR leadership to show more support for its campaign to prop up Babrak Karmal’s 
government.
174
 
Honecker was desperate to not let Moscow’s war damage inter-German relations and 
deprive East Berlin of its economic lifeline. Eager to bring this message across to Bonn, Honecker 
used Josip Tito’s funeral in May to express to Chancellor Schmidt, who was among the many 
non-socialist leaders in attendance, that he was still very much interested in further FRG-GDR 
cooperation.
175
 It didn’t help matters that Brezhnev’s repeated criticisms of Honecker’s 
engagement with the FRG must have seemed somewhat hypocritical to the East German leader, 
especially considering that Moscow had planned to host the West German chancellor in June of 
the same year.
176
  
Without a doubt, Afghanistan and its potential fallout for East German Friedenspolitik vis-
à-vis Bonn was a watershed event. East Berlin now realized that strict adherence to the Soviet 
line, which had precipitated renewed East-West tensions, was an untenable way forward for the 
GDR. To East Berlin’s dismay, this would not be the end to a series of emerging frictions between 
the Pankow regime and the Kremlin. As 1980 wore on, Moscow’s seeming unwillingness and 
                                                          
173
 It’s also interesting to note that relatively low-ranking Werner Walde, candidate of the Politburo and first secretary 
of the regional leadership of the SED Cottbus and Wolfgang Bayreuther, State Secretary for work and salaries were 
dispatched to partake in the festivities. DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/2313, 15 April 1980. 
174
 Eide-Siebs, p. 169. 
175
 BA-SAPMO, DY 30/ J IV 2/2A/2319 – Tito’s Bestattung, 7-8 in Belgrad, 13 May 1980. 
176
 Avril Pittmann, From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German-Soviet Political Relations since 1974 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 134-151. 
 
66 
inability to control Polish shipyard strikes added to a growing list of worries in East Berlin. After 
rolling out a counterproductive international strategy that threatened détente, was Moscow now 
also willing to let destabilizing influences rein free in its own backyard? 
 
East German disillusionment and the Solidarność strikes 
 
 When protests broke out in several Polish shipyards in September, the SED Politburo 
pondered their long-term causes and possible consequences in a series of detailed reports.
177
 Out 
of a palpable fear that developments in neighboring Poland could spill westwards, East Berlin 
made it perfectly clear to outside observers that it would not tolerate any such unrest in its 
domain.
178
 Following the Polish crisis in every detail, the Politburo lamented even the slightest 
retreat of the Polish communists and estimated in early September that the circumstances were 
graver than those surrounding the Hungarian crisis in 1956.
179
 Moscow’s solution of strengthening 
Polish leader Stanislaw Kania’s hand in dealing with Solidarity didn’t go far enough for 
Honecker, who advocated mass arrests and an internal clamp-down, even if this led to 
bloodshed.
180
 Sending a message to any potential dissidents in East Germany and eager to show 
his foreign policy competence, he pushed for a Moscow meeting of Soviet Bloc party chiefs in 
early December.
181
 At that meeting, Honecker’s repeatedly criticised Kania’s capitulations to 
Solidarność and demanded that an armed intervention force be assembled to crush the unrest. But 
Brezhnev’s hesitated. The Soviet leader insisted that Kania be given another chance to deal with 
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the situation himself.
182
 With Brezhnev’s health deteriorating and the situation in Afghanistan 
getting more complicated by the week, Moscow’s position on Poland was perhaps best privately 
expressed by Brezhnev’s eventual successor, and the man behind the decision to invade 
Afghanistan, Yuri Andropov, in 1981: “We cannot risk it, even if Poland were to be ruled by 
Solidarność, so be it.”183   
Moscow’s reluctance to intervene in Poland came as a tremendous shock to Honecker, 
who had looked to the Kremlin as the Warsaw Pact’s resolute leader and had expected decisive 
armed action to bolster the hard-line in Warsaw. Fittingly, Honecker displayed the unyielding 
position that he had expected from Moscow. When Brezhnev asked Honecker in August 1981 in 
despair: “Respond to me please, Erich, on a delicate question: Can Kania master the situation? Do 
you personally have confidence in him?”, Honecker resolutely and confidently responded with a 
clear plan to call for Kania’s resignation and recommended that Stefan Olszowski, a former Polish 
Ambassador to East Germany and the Central Committee Secretary for Ideology and Media, 
succeed him as PZPR Secretary.
184
  
Soviet inaction to the Polish unrest only added to the SED Politburo’s conviction that 
Moscow’s international stance was becoming increasingly incompatible with East Berlin’s 
concerns. Matters were only going to get worse for East German-Soviet relations as Soviet 
economic troubles eventually revealed that on top of disagreements over Moscow’s international 
strategy and doubts in its leadership capacity, the deteriorating state of the Soviet economy and 
resulting decline in oil deliveries to the GDR would add to a growing sense of abandonment in 
East Berlin. 
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Soviet abandonment: Missing oil deliveries 
 
That the GOSPLAN planners were reluctant to agree on a long-term oil subsidy plan with 
the GDR can be attributed to a general slow-down in the Soviet economy. Indeed, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that in addition to food-shortages and GOSPLAN coordination 
errors in the so-called ‘Brezhnev stagnation’ period from the mid-1970s to Brezhnev’s death, 
Soviet oil production came to be severely affected by factors ranging from pipeline ruptures to 
ethnic violence in key oil-producing areas. As a result, annual gas production from Azerbaijan, 
Baku and the important Krasnodar and Stavropol regions plummeted in the early 1980s.
185
 Of the 
already decreased amount of Soviet oil available, Moscow, rather than shipping subsidized oil to 
its satellites, decided to sell an increasing amount of its hydrocarbons at world-market prices to 
the West in an attempt to plug the holes in the Soviet economy.
186
 
In light of these developments, no Soviet-bloc state was in danger of losing more than the 
GDR. Devoid of any natural resources, East Germany depended almost exclusively on subsidized 
Soviet raw materials.
187
 Having already reneged on its promises for a long-term agreement in June 
1979, Soviet officials approached the SED leadership to raise the price of oil on East Germany in 
January 1981, stating that the higher price would still be 55% of actual world market prices.
188
 On 
3 August 1981, Brezhnev went a step further by warning Honecker that the Soviet Union had to 
drastically reduce its oil deliveries to the GDR. Citing not only oil shortages but also a fallout 
from successive bad harvests, Brezhnev admitted that he doubted the USSR could fulfil its oil 
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delivery obligations to the GDR in the near future.
189
 Repeated lobby attempts, in which a clearly 
distraught Honecker explained that any cutbacks would have dire consequences for the GDR, 
especially since East Berlin had devised its next five-year plan with subsidized Soviet oil in mind, 
fell on deaf ears.
190
 Sensing abandonment, Honecker forcefully reminded Brezhnev that part of 
the GDR’s oil quota went to supporting the sizable Soviet garrison and, to illustrate his absolute 
desperation, asked Konstantin Russakov whether it would be worth “destabilizing the GDR and 
shaking the confidence of our people in the party and state leaders for two million tons of oil.”191 
In his memoirs, Honecker would write that he knew that the shortened annual volume of 17 
million tons from a previous volume of 19 million tons would have devastating effects on the East 
German economy.
192
 This, coupled with the unilateral cancellation of three to four million tons 
Soviet food aid in the form of agricultural products meant that the East German leader was forced 
to plug the gaps by buying from the West.
193
 
Honecker’s growing disenchantment with Moscow was perhaps best recounted by Egon 
Winkelmann, GDR Ambassador to Moscow from 1981 to 1987. Before Winkelmann was 
dispatched to Moscow in 1981, Honecker imparted on him that “when you are dealing with 
economic questions, the main consideration should first and foremost be the GDR… [in East 
Berlin] the Politburo decides, not the Soviet ambassador, nor Moscow…we are not puppets who 
dance for the Soviet foreign ministry.” 194  
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Renewed contact between East Berlin and Beijing – 1980-1981 
 
 As illustrated, the nature of relations between the GDR and the Soviet Union changed 
drastically in the two-year period of 1979 to 1981. Need, in the form of East Berlin’s increasing 
reliance on West German economic goodwill, and disillusionment stemming from both Soviet 
weakness during the Polish crisis and its reneging of its oil delivery commitments, put doubts in 
Honecker’s mind as to whether blindly following Moscow’s foreign policy was a wise path for the 
future. This recalibration had a direct impact on the GDR’s China-policy. 
 From East Berlin’s perspective, a rapprochement with China made perfect sense. Not only 
were its ambassadors and leaders aware that Deng was a different kind of leader, but East Berlin 
also appreciated that continued Soviet denunciations of China as a revisionist, Maoist state were 
simply a continuation of out-dated policies adopted during the heyday of the Sino-Soviet split. In 
Honecker’s mind, these descriptions no longer applied. Moreover, it was painfully obvious that 
normalization of relations between China and Western European states, as well as America, had 
resulted in trade relations that benefited China’s new partners.195 In the special economic zones, 
Chinese and West German firms had begun joint ventures amidst increasing dialogue between 
Bonn and Beijing.
196
 Considering that the countries which recognized East Germany after the 
signing of the Basic Treaty had yet to deliver any tangible benefits to the GDR, China’s draw as a 
potential market for East German finished goods must have seemed all the greater.
197
  
 For Honecker, the calculus to re-engage with China was straightforward. China could fulfil 
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two important needs. First, by engaging Beijing, Honecker could add an important conquest to his 
foreign policy portfolio, adding to his prestige as a capable operator on the international stage. 
Improved relations with a rising power such as China would also underscore the GDR’s 
legitimacy as a sovereign state. In addition, China could become an important market for East 
German goods in a time of desperate need. 
Keeping these considerations in mind, the GDR sent cultural feelers to test the waters in 
early 1980.
198
 The MfAA actively supported and encouraged East German Professor Hans 
Marnette’s guest-lectureship at Peking University in March 1980 and his return there in 
September 1981.
199
 Soon after Marnette’s first stint in Beijing, Peking University and Humboldt 
University signed an agreement on exchange-professorships (Lektorenaustausch) in February 
1981 in the field of language and literature, initiating more frequent academic exchanges, such as 
Professor Zhang Weilian’s stay in the GDR in July 1981.200 Beijing, fully re-embracing Deng’s 
re-opening to the world, especially with economically and industrially advanced states such as the 
GDR, was eager to reciprocate. The Director of the Institute for History at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences partook in discussions at Leipzig’s Karl-Marx University in 1980 and agreed 
on a partnership where the East German side would send partner institutions in China material on 
research into fascism.
201
 These cultural feelers were supplemented by a flurry of diplomatic 
engagement. In April 1980, the GDR Embassy noted the “relatively high-ranking attendance” of 
the Head of Beijing’s Military district to the cocktail party of the GDR Military-Attaché at the 
occasion of the Nationale Volksarmee’s anniversary, whereas the Chinese boycotted the reception 
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put together for the founding anniversary of the Red Army at the Soviet embassy. Overall, the 
embassy noted that the Chinese colleagues were behaved warmly and avoided polemic and 
provoking remarks.
202
 
In parallel to cultural overtures, East Berlin started to subtly probe for trade deals with 
Beijing. In the summer of 1980, right after Professor Marnette arrived in Beijing, East Berlin 
dispatched a fact-finding mission on a 12-day tour through various electronics factories in China 
to explore potential opportunities for cooperation after the conclusion of a tentative cooperation 
agreement between both electronics ministries covering the year 1980-81.
203
 This is all the more 
remarkable considering that Moscow’s own fresh steps towards Beijing in late 1979 were not yet 
yielding any concrete results.
204
 In fact, during renewed Sino-Soviet negotiations, Soviet 
diplomats on the ground made an extra effort to ensure that Soviet-bloc states’ relations with 
China did not improve out of line with the state of Sino-Soviet relations.
205
 In this light, the 
relaxation in Sino-East German tensions during a time where Sino-Soviet relations were anything 
but rosy seems all the more remarkable. 
Far from hiding his disagreement on Soviet China policy, Honecker made his stance 
known. The SED leadership sent explicit as well as implicit signals to Beijing that it no longer 
followed the Soviet anti-China line Moscow imposed on its satellites. For example, in 1981 Dietz 
Verlag, the official East German government publishing press, on the order of the SED Politburo, 
ceased publishing polemical material on China and even brought out an information brochure on 
Li Dazhao, one of the original founders of the CCP.
206
 In an effort to signal that East Berlin was 
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now ready for closer GDR-PRC relations, East Berlin also abolished an annual ‘solidarity week’ 
for Vietnam in the same year.
207
 Considering the traditionally close relations between Vietnam 
and the GDR, East Berlin’s abandonment of Vietnam in favour of a Chinese leadership that it had 
condemned for its aggression against Hanoi just two years before was a telling indication of just 
how far the GDR was willing to go to promote relations with Beijing.  
These and similar actions were noticed in Beijing, and to signal its positive reception to 
East German overtures Zhongnanhai started to warm its tone towards East Berlin. Thus, a 
September 1981 meeting to honour the 100
th
 anniversary of the birth of the famous Chinese writer 
Lu Xun at the Humboldt Universität was given an extensive, positively worded write-up by the 
Xinhua news agency.
208
 
 
The waning importance of Soviet policy coordination 
 
 
These proactive East German cultural feelers towards Deng’s China were part of a 
dramatic East German recalibration towards Beijing. Indeed, after the first cultural feelers were 
exchanged, the political establishment was ready to follow with its own initiatives. Thus, the 
annual East German foreign policy plan for 1981 (Aussenpolitische Orientierung des MfAA) that 
was circulated to the Politburo shortly after the tenth SED Party congress in June 1981 stated that 
relations with China should be developed in all areas and that efforts should be made to stop the 
trend of declining trade in order to increase both imports from and exports to China.
209
 Rhetoric 
turned into action on 7 May 1982, when Vice Trade Minister Eugen Kattner signed an extensive 
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trade deal with Chinese Trade Minister Li Qiang.
210
 This came after the GDR’s trade with China 
had already increased around 21% from 407.5 to 483.7 million Valuta Marks between 1979 to 
1980, as China slowly opened its markets to Eastern European countries.
211
 Even though in 
overall terms, this represented a small portion of China’s trade with other western trading partners, 
it clearly showed China’s increasing interest in trade with East Berlin.212 In September, Kattner 
vowed to strengthen bilateral trade relations and economic cooperation with China at a 
COMECON trade meeting aimed at coordinating a common Soviet-bloc trade policy towards 
China. To facilitate a smooth deepening of bilateral ties, the GDR was more than careful to take 
into account China’s sensitivities. In this respect, Kattner stressed that the GDR would not 
establish official relations with Taiwan and that “trade with Taipei will be conducted at the non-
state level only”.213  Considering Beijing’s unwavering stance on this issue, East Berlin’s clear 
position on Taiwan fulfilled a necessary condition for any substantial improvement in East 
German-Chinese relations. Only in terms of military cooperation was Berlin still reluctant to move 
forward, as doing so would have infuriated Moscow.
214
  
As the first cultural feelers were exchanged and first interest was reciprocated between 
Beijing and East Berlin, Honecker initially remained careful to not deviate too far from the Soviet 
line, even despite repeated frictions with Moscow. At least in the early years of Sino-GDR 
engagement, Honecker and the MfAA were still mindful that the GDR’s existence still very much 
depended on Soviet goodwill. Thus, East Berlin found it necessary to sometimes pay superficial 
lip service to Moscow’s general anti-China line even while engaging with China. To keep 
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Moscow satisfied, Bruno Mahlow, the head of the International Department of the Central 
Committee, stressed Berlin’s total adherence to Moscow’s anti-China policy at the January 1980 
Interkit meeting in Mierki, Poland. Basically repeating the presentation by the Soviet delegation 
that preceded his talk, Mahlow regretted that it was “the goal of Chinese foreign policy is 
cooperating with the US and Japan as well as the western European states.” Adding his own 
flavour to the discussion, he blasted China for supporting FRG revanchism and the West German 
plan for reunification.
215
 
The Soviet presentation highlighted Chinese involvement in training Afghan rebel fighters 
and argued that this further illustrated China’s complicity with the imperialist powers. Going 
along with Moscow’s warnings and uninterested in causing significant ripples at a coordination 
meeting where representatives of the International Departments of every Soviet-bloc country were 
present and, papering over the GDR’s disinterest in getting involved in Afghanistan, Mahlow also 
feigned outrage at Chinese involvement against Soviet undertakings in Afghanistan.
216
  
Considering that the MfAA was establishing cultural relations with China while Mahlow 
made these statements in the Interkit demonstrates that by 1980/81 East Berlin increasingly only 
uttered anti-China rhetoric to placate the Soviet leadership. By this time, most officials in the 
MfAA and the International Department of the Central Committee had in reality started to 
consider Soviet China-policy coordination to be outdated, contradictory and damaging. According 
to Rolf Berthold, Head of the Far Eastern Section of the MfAA, Interkit meetings, which were 
meant to enforce a strict anti-China line in the GDR, had become totally irrelevant as a source for 
China-policy by 1980 as East Berlin sought to take advantage of Deng’s new opening towards 
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East Germany to its full advantage.
217
 
In spite of East Berlin’s intermittent anti-China rhetoric, a gradual GDR-PRC 
rapprochement could nevertheless continue as Beijing fully appreciated the restrictions that East 
Germany’s nature as a key Soviet client state placed upon her. The saying of  “豺狼挡道，安稳
狐狸” (“When the wolf is blocking the road, why pick on the fox”) had been applied since Mao’s 
times when referring to the ‘differentiated’ approach that China must adopt in seeking relations 
with countries under the Soviet aegis.
218
 Under this thinking rooted in the Sino-Soviet Split, 
Soviet satellite states’ attacks on China were simply interpreted in Beijing as East European states 
being forced to adopt Moscow’s line. With this in mind, understanding that both countries 
operated in a triangular system defined by Moscow’s watchful eye, seemingly distasteful polemic 
attacks by both sides were seen as part of everyday life in the rapprochement process. Thus, a sort 
of unspoken mutual understanding to ignore these minor out-lashes was the basis for the renewed 
exchange of diplomatic contacts between 1980 and 1981. Appreciating these special 
circumstances, Chinese diplomats ploughed forward and used unofficial back-channels to 
reciprocate East Berlin’s advances and explore opportunities for better relations. For example, in 
early 1980, at the Beijing Sports Forum swimming pool, consul Willy de Laar was approached by 
Chinese Foreign Ministry officials who, in view of recent GDR successes in swimming, asked for 
increased aquatic sports cooperation.
219
 Three days later, invitations were handed over to GDR 
embassy staff for a dinner with Zhu Ze, head of the International Department of the CCP CC as 
well as other functionaries. At the dinner Zhu asked excitedly for the establishment of a trainer-
exchange program.
220
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Bilateral relations continued to flourish. In April 1981, the GDR embassy in Beijing 
arranged for an East German delegation led by Bruno Mahlow to meet with Yu Hongliang, the 
head of the Soviet/Eastern Europe section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as well as other 
Chinese officials in Beijing. After the meeting, the delegation vowed to use all possibilities for 
contacts and dialogue with Chinese representatives.
221
 The Far Eastern Section of the MfAA noted 
in November 1981 that there had been an expansion of GDR-PRC official contacts as the GDR 
embassy in Beijing and PRC Embassy in East Berlin launched film-nights celebrating “The joys 
of the Chinese language” and vice versa, “The joys of the German language”.222  
In August, Chen Dexing and Du Kening, Deputy Head of the Soviet/East European 
Section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry visited the GDR to conduct a series of meetings under the 
organization and invitation of the Chinese Embassy in East Berlin. During their stay the 
delegation displayed a clear interest both to expand relations and, in line with general Chinese 
curiosity at reform experiences in Eastern European countries, learn more about the GDR’s 
economic development experiences. Aside from its pragmatic purpose, the visit also had symbolic 
meaning - it was the first time that an official CCP delegation visited the GDR under official 
notification since the mid 1960s, ending over a decade and a half of diplomatic cold war between 
the countries.
223
 A true turning point in Sino-East German relations had thus been reached.  
In line with the improving bilateral ties, the January 1982 MfAA report on bilateral 
relations was the first one since the onset of the Sino-Soviet split to leave out any references to 
China’s ‘hegemonic’ and ‘imperialist’ strivings. It was also noted that the Chinese representatives 
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were showing more ‘flexibility and adaptability’.224  
 
 
Soviet duplicity in China 
 
 
Moscow took notice of these developments and followed the budding GDR-PRC relations 
with unease. This became apparent during an August 1981 meeting between Brezhnev and 
Honecker in the Kremlin. Clearly detecting that Berlin was expanding relations with Beijing on its 
own, Brezhnev criticized Honecker for not publishing enough bad press on China, stating that “the 
mass media of the GDR is holding back on the principal criticisms of the PRC’s dangerous 
foreign policy”.225 However, by early 1980, in light of Brezhnev’s own moves to seek closer 
relations with Beijing, Soviet anti-China rhetoric voiced to the GDR was beginning to lose 
credibility in East Berlin. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979 
dialogue had commenced between Moscow and Beijing to construct a framework on outstanding 
issues ranging from border demarcation to the limitation of frontier troop levels.
226
  Even though 
in 1981 negotiations were stalled and were still severely affected by Chinese fury at the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, with Deng remarking in April 1980 that an 
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in the near future was unlikely
227
, it was very apparent that 
the Soviet Union welcomed the opportunity to use the talks to alleviate tensions with China 
amidst Washington’s course of rapid military build-up in a post-détente political landscape.228 
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Seeking warming relations with China while propagating an anti-China line towards the GDR, 
Moscow led a duplicitous dual strategy that added to the GDR’s growing list of annoyances. This, 
added to the previously mentioned Soviet-GDR disagreements on a variety of other issues meant 
that Soviet directives on China were increasingly only given a superficial nod while being largely 
ignored in principle. 
Rather than having the intended effect of restraining East Berlin from engaging with 
Beijing, Soviet attempts to contain East Berlin’s moves towards China had the adverse 
consequence of alienating Honecker even further. Indeed, during the first rounds of Sino-Soviet 
dialogue in 1980, Boris Ponomarev, Head of the International Department of the CPSU CC and 
Mikhail Suslov, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Soviet, repeatedly 
told SED Politburo member and coordinator for the GDR’s relations with African and Asian 
states, Hermann Axen, that Sino-Soviet negotiations were in fact not progressing fruitfully and 
that the GDR should still be vigilant about Beijing’s alignment with American imperialism and 
Chinese attempts to drive a wedge between Moscow and its socialist allies.
229
 This two-faced 
Muscovite approach was also repeated on the ground in China.
230
 In April 1981, Mikhail Kapitsa, 
the Head of the Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, urged the ambassadors of 
Soviet bloc states stationed in Beijing to “land blows against Deng Xiaoping and his followers in 
the ‘pro-imperialist’ faction”. 231  Two months later, the Soviet Ambassador to China, I.S. 
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Shcherbakov, made forceful remarks to the GDR Embassy on China’s turn away from true 
socialism and demanded that every effort should be made to combat the influences of Maoism.
232
 
This continued well into 1982, with Kapitsa remarking in April of that year to Warsaw Pact 
Ambassadors in Beijing:  
…the Chinese government is totally on the side of imperialism…In terms of 
Chinese foreign policy it has only changed its “paint colour”. The Maoist postulates 
remain. The Chinese government is only formulating itself in a more clever way. 
The anti-Soviet stance has remained. In all basic questions the Chinese government 
is adopting a stance which is directly against the interests of socialist countries… 
China supports the armament of the U.S. and the stationing of nuclear weapons in 
Europe, has gone against the negotiations between the USSR and the US and has 
taken part in two wars [in Vietnam and Afghanistan].
233
 
 
That East German-Chinese relations were well on their way towards normalization in 1982 
was testament that East Berlin and, especially its diplomats on the ground, were ignoring 
Moscow’s anti-China polemics234 Honecker, while acknowledging and sometimes agreeing with 
Soviet antagonisms towards China, was at the same time pursuing his own foreign policy aimed at 
improving East German relations with the PRC. At incoming Ambassador Li Qianfen’s 
accreditation ceremony in June 1982 Honecker stated that the foundations were there for further 
relations to be developed, and reminded that Beijing and Berlin were bound by a friendship that 
predated the founding of both countries.
235
  This came after East German State Secretary Herbert 
Krolikowski also assured outgoing Chinese Ambassador Chen Tung that “Taiwan is an integral 
part of China” during Chen’s farewell ceremony 1982.236  
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Conclusion  
 
In many ways, it was remarkable that by 1980, the Soviet Union’s once-most loyal client 
state had started to defy Moscow’s coordination efforts towards China. East Berlin’s pursuit of an 
independent foreign policy towards Beijing was not only shaped by Honecker’s desire to engage a 
post-Mao generation of leaders for potential economic and trade benefits but also out of the East 
German leader’s desire to create legitimacy for himself and the GDR with major foreign policy 
achievements. As Honecker tentatively reappraised his relations with Beijing after Deng’s rise, he 
appreciated the benefits that renewed engagement could bring the GDR. Only the Chinese 
invasion of Vietnam, a close GDR ally, in February 1979 temporarily halted a potential 
rapprochement.  However, after the dust had settled along the Sino-Vietnamese border, a set of 
emerging frictions between the Pankow regime and Moscow, ranging from the threat to inter-
German cooperation from worsening Superpower relations following Moscow’s invasion of 
Afghanistan, Soviet inaction in the face of Polish workers’ strikes to Soviet oil delivery cutbacks, 
precipitated a drastic East German re-evaluation of its relationship with Moscow. Amidst a trend 
of Soviet policies being detrimental rather than beneficial for East Berlin, Honecker was now 
more willing than ever to follow a foreign policy that benefitted his GDR, even if this meant 
defying Moscow. Thus, in light of Soviet-GDR frictions, Honecker started to ignore Soviet 
disapproval and independently moved forward to forge better relations with Deng’s government. 
Soviet duplicity and highhanded attempts to restrain the GDR’s rapprochement with the PRC only 
strengthened Honecker’s resolve to engage with China. 
In Beijing, Honecker’s interest in rapprochement was eagerly reciprocated. Keen to shed 
the self-imposed diplomatic isolation that had resulted from the Cultural Revolution, Beijing flung 
its doors open to the outside world after Deng’s rise to power in 1978. Having increased contacts 
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with America, Western European and Asian economic powerhouses, Beijing also cast a curious 
eye towards successful socialist economies. And in this sense, East Germany, as the most 
economically successful Soviet-bloc state, deserved special attention. This mutual interest 
translated into an ever-increasing number of exchanges between the two countries, commencing 
with cultural contacts in 1979 and 1980. 
 Relations would continue to develop. By 1982, GDR-PRC relations were on a clear path 
towards normalization. A deepening mutual interest in economic and trade cooperation enticed 
both states into even higher-level exchanges. Aside from these pragmatic interests, first signs were 
also emerging of an ideological like-mindedness between both regimes. Indeed, the Polish crisis 
also elicited fears in Beijing, for Zhongnanhai could clearly see parallels between the challenge to 
the Polish authorities and what could happen in China if workers were to organize. As Deng 
embarked on a reformist path that has not been trodden before in the socialist world, his 
sensitivities to unexpected consequences that similar unrests might occur in China were palpable. 
When Wojciech Jaruzelski eventually imposed martial law in 12 December 1981, Deng Xiaoping 
was one of the very few leaders to openly welcome it.
 237
  This would not be the end of a list of 
growing commonalities between Honecker and Deng.  
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Chapter Two - Defying Moscow - East German-Chinese relations 
during the Andropov-Chernenko power vacuum, 1983-84 
 
Introduction 
 
Honecker’s engagement with China gained even more momentum towards the middle of 
the decade. From East Berlin’s perspective, the international environment from 1982 onward 
seemed to favour a bolder rapprochement policy towards China. By the spring of 1982, the ailing 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had started to show a more conciliatory attitude towards the 
People’s Republic. This change in attitude was best displayed by Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech on 
March 24. In extending an olive branch towards Beijing, the Soviet leader included China in the 
ranks of socialist nations for the first time since the onset of the Sino-Soviet split and stated that 
he had never regarded the hostility between the two states as normal.
238
 Moscow’s new attitude 
was noted in Beijing where the Foreign Ministry convened a press conference to show Moscow 
that it had noticed its subtle change in direction.
239
 
Even though Brezhnev died under 8 months later, Beijing hoped that Yuri Andropov 
would carry forward this conciliatory direction. However as time would tell, both Brezhnev’s 
friendly attitude in his last days in office and Andropov’s initial willingness to seek a new 
beginning with China represented a temporary reprieve in a still-uneasy Sino-Soviet relationship. 
In terms of GDR-PRC relations, Brezhnev’s new stance on China was taken as a positive 
signal in East Berlin as it validated Honecker’s proactive China policy. However, as this chapter 
will show, there was a clear disconnect between what Brezhnev preached during his last days in 
the Kremlin and what the veteran Soviet China-hands dictated to the fraternal states during 
Interkit coordination meetings designed to keep Soviet clients in an anti-Chinese line. As Sino-
                                                          
238
 Michael B. Yahuda, “The Significance of Tripolarity in China’s Policy Toward the United States since 1972” in 
Robert S. Ross (eds.) China, the United States and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy making in the Cold War 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 25-26; The Financial Times described it as “the most emphatic conciliatory gesture 
since the dispute over the border between the two nations took them to the brink of war in 1969” Alan J. Day, China 
and the Soviet Union, 1949-84 (Harlow: Longman, 1985), p. 175. 
239
 Day, p. 176. 
 
84 
Soviet rapprochement talks repeatedly stumbled due to China’s insistence that certain obstacles be 
resolved first, conservative elements in the Soviet leadership also sought to prevent its fraternal 
states from engaging with China. After all, it was argued, a key Soviet client state’s relations with 
China should reflect the state of Sino-Soviet relations. Especially in regards to relations to non-
socialist states, or states which were ‘deviating’ from socialism, the USSR was still insisting that 
Moscow, the centre for world socialism, should determine when and how Warsaw Pact states 
could start the process of re-engagement. However, by 1982 Honecker appreciated that Soviet 
anti-Chinese coordination were but desperate attempts by Soviet China-hands to hang on to an 
antiquated policy conditioned by the Sino-Soviet split. A policy, which in Honecker’s mind was 
becoming irrelevant in light of Deng’s new direction. This appreciation meant that Honecker was 
increasingly willing to rebel against any attempts by Moscow to meddle in his relations with 
Beijing. Refusing to sign the protocols of the 1982 and 1983 Interkits while issuing firm rebuttals 
to Soviet anti-China positions, Honecker and his diplomats were eager to stop skirting the issue to 
tell Moscow once and for all what it had known since 1980: The era for Soviet China policy-
coordination was over.  
With the groundwork already laid between the two countries after the conclusion of the 
Sino-Vietnamese border war, GDR-PRC relations flourished after 1982. Helped by a leadership 
vacuum in Moscow and pushed on by East Germany’s willingness to pursue its own interests 
amidst continued frictions between Moscow and East Berlin, Honecker increasingly conducted his 
relations with China outside of Soviet influence. While the East German leader sought to engage 
with China both to increase his international prestige and out of a sincere conviction that China 
should be drawn into the global socialist camp and away from ‘Western imperialism’, economic 
interests also started to matter more to both sides. As Honecker sought a market for East German 
industrial goods, China looked to the GDR for potential economic lessons it could learn from the 
leading Eastern European industrial state. Thus, a precarious trade and study relationship started 
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to blossom. Indeed, up until the mid-1980s, the hope for bilateral economic advantages turned out 
to be one of the major push-factors for both East Berlin and Beijing.  
 
“Die China-Mafia” – Death of the Interkit  
 
While some saw the Tashkent Speech as Brezhnev’s late attempt to mend fences with 
China, he had little time left to make sure that this symbolic gesture was translated into action. On 
10 November 1982, the Soviet General Secretary died in his sleep. All sources indicate that he 
was in no capacity to conduct state affairs for most of the latter half of 1982.
240
 Hence, his 
conciliatory new line had little effect on the course of Sino-Soviet negotiations in 1982.
241
 
Although talks between the Soviet Union and China had resumed in August, first initiated by 
contacts between Deputy Foreign Ministers Yu Hongliang and Leonid Ilychev, China stuck to its 
conditions that Moscow (1) withdraw its troops from the Chinese border and Mongolia, (2) end its 
intervention in Afghanistan and (3) end its support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.
242
 
Indeed, with both parties unwilling to compromise on these issues, the outlook for an 
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in 1982 seemed bleak. Outside observers were also rather 
pessimistic at the chances of Sino-Soviet rapprochement. In May 1982, the CIA estimated that a 
“significant Sino-Soviet rapprochement is unlikely in the near future” because, among other 
factors, “the historical geopolitical rivalry is too long, too deep, and by now too 
institutionalized”.243 
As Brezhnev extended an olive branch to Deng in his last months in office, powerful 
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elements in the Kremlin questioned his move. They doubted that anything had really changed in 
China since Mao’s death in 1976. Hardened officials who were conditioned by the polemic past of 
the Sino-Soviet Split such as Oleg Rakhmanin, First Deputy Director of the International 
Department for Relations with Fraternal Parties from 1968 to 1985, were keen to keep the 
fraternal states from engaging in closer relations with Beijing. In their view, Moscow’s client 
states’ relations had to reflect the state of Sino-Soviet affairs. And since no significant 
improvements had taken place since the ‘Tashkent line’ had been brought forward, no fraternal 
states should have friendly relations with China. However, unexpected by many in the Kremlin, 
Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech had the effect of validating Honecker’s adventurous China policy 
and reinforcing the GDR helmsman’s belief that he was a pioneer in Soviet-bloc international 
affairs. After all, at the time of the conciliatory Tashkent speech, first contacts between the GDR 
and China had already been made and bilateral relations were improving. From East Berlin’s 
view, Honecker’s China-gamble had already begun to pay off by 1982 and Brezhnev appeared to 
be a late comer to the dance. Honecker had revalidated himself as a foreign policy operator who 
was, in many ways, ahead of Moscow.
244
  
By 1982, Honecker’s resistance to Soviet coordination towards China was hardly a secret 
anymore. He had, albeit subtly, already refused to heed earlier calls by Brezhnev at more restraint 
in establishing relations with China.
245
 In 1982, Honecker was undoubtedly also emboldened by 
the fact that, due to factors ranging from Brezhnev’s relatively weak physical state to Moscow’s 
escalating engagement in Afghanistan, reining in East Berlin’s adventurism towards China had 
become even less of a Kremlin priority. Honecker thus made his stance towards China absolutely 
clear two months after the Tashkent Speech at the XII Interkit meeting in Sofia. The SED 
delegation, headed by Bruno Mahlow, the Deputy Head of the International Department of the 
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Central Committee, arrived in Bulgaria with an explicit goal to make a statement about the GDR’s 
China-policy.
246
  
Indeed, few suspected the dramatic events that would unfold in Sofia. According to 
convention, Oleg Rakhmanin started the meeting by reiterating the official Soviet stance towards 
China (the content of which was circulated before the meeting in a report entitled “China in the 
years 1981-82”). It urged the fraternal states to use caution when engaging with what remained a 
deeply reactionary regime in Beijing. Whereas the SED delegation had mostly held its tongue in 
previous meetings, it now broke rank and went on the offensive after Rakhmanin’s speech.247 In a 
very direct tone, Mahlow observed that, in light of the more conciliatory tone towards China that 
emerged from both the XXVII Party Congress of the CPSU, the tenth party congress of the SED, 
and especially after the recent Tashkent Speech by Brezhnev, the Interkit’s stance towards Beijing 
was “not right” (nicht richtig).248 Mahlow made it clear that the SED welcomed Brezhnev’s 
Tashkent-line which called “for a principled rapprochement of the fraternal parties to develop 
long-term cooperation with China, as outlined at the XXVI. Party Congress of the CPSU.”249 A 
battle of words commenced. Rakhmanin, in a thinly veiled rebuttal, urged fraternal parties to act 
against the desire to take individual points of comrade Brezhnev’s talk to justify their own 
diverging policies.
250
 Rakhmanin further stressed that relations with China must be developed “in 
a coordinated manner”. He emphasized that China was currently still trying to recruit allies in its 
anti-Soviet foreign policy and that its engagement with communist states was but an attempt to 
achieve a ‘Romania-nization’ (Rumänisierung) of more Soviet satellite states in order to isolate 
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and differentiate between Moscow and its allies.
251
 The SED delegation under Mahlow seemed 
immune to these warnings and issued continued protests against Rakhmanin’s statements, 
demanding extensive changes in the wording of the protocol. Mahlow’s requests were duly 
ignored by the Soviet delegation. In the end, the SED delegation refused to sign the final protocol 
of the meeting and simply stated that they would present the findings to the Party leadership.
252
 In 
its own internal report, the delegation accurately observed that Rakhmanin was actively playing 
down the Tashkent speech.
253
 Mahlow’s explicit act of protest was nothing short of a mutiny. One 
can only imagine the shock that Rakhmanin and the other members of the Soviet delegation felt at 
the insubordination displayed by Moscow’s once-loyal client state. 
The East German delegation’s vociferous stance is all the more remarkable when 
considering the setting in which they were made. With representatives of all the fraternal parties 
present, Bruno Mahlow was not only openly protesting against the CPSU’s China policy, but was 
also showing his government’s foreign policy confidence and audacity in front of the other Soviet 
Bloc states.
254
 Mahlow must have been more than satisfied that representatives from the 
Hungarian, Polish and the Czechoslovak parties told him privately that they partly agreed with the 
SED’s stance.255 
 This episode showed that the GDR realized and understood that what was reiterated in the 
forum was clearly not in line with Brezhnev’s conciliatory China policy displayed at Tashkent. 
Indeed, East Berlin grew increasingly annoyed at the schizophrenic nature of Soviet directives on 
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China, especially at a time when the GDR Embassy in Beijing had reported heightened Soviet 
diplomatic activity back to Berlin, including a note by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to its Chinese 
counterparts that it was ready to reengage in border negotiations on 3 February 1982. This was 
accompanied by an increase in Sino-Soviet trade activity in the spring.
256
 Even though these 
feelers met unsympathetic audiences in Zhongnanhai as Deng still labelled the Soviet Union as 
“social imperialists” and held fast to his demands to first solve the three obstacles before any 
substantive conversations on Sino-Soviet normalization, these new feelers from Moscow certainly 
showed that Brezhnev was genuinely wishing for an improvement in bilateral relations.
257
  In 
Beijing however, Soviet diplomats were still labelling the Chinese as imperialists and restraining 
GDR diplomats from engaging with China. GDR Ambassador Liebermann astutely noted in an 
April 1982 letter to East Berlin that Soviet representatives on the ground were still relaying anti-
Chinese messages in direct contrast to the conciliatory attitude adopted by the Kremlin towards 
Beijing after Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech in 1982.258 Overall, Rakhmanin’s claims at the Interkit 
that few Soviets efforts have been made to improve Sino-Soviet relations must have therefore 
seemed utterly disingenuous.
259
  
 Rakhmanin, reeling from a significant defeat at his beloved Interkit, came back to Moscow 
with the goal of rallying support and seeking confirmation for his position. He prepared a report 
for approval by the CPSU Politburo’s China Commission, a CPSU working group that included 
prominent policy makers such as Yuri Andropov. Beating back calls for restraint by Andropov 
and Ponomarev and vowing to keep Soviet China policy coordination alive, Rakhmanin forcefully 
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pushed forward a 12-page document which was consequently adopted by the commission.
260
 A 
pointed letter of criticism was duly drafted and sent to Honecker on 14 July 1982. Endeavouring 
to represent the entire CPSU Central Committee, Rakhmanin outlined several reasons why an East 
German rapprochement with China was unacceptable, arguing that even cultural and sports 
relations should be stopped.
261
  
During all this, senior MfAA officials as well as GDR diplomats on the ground understood 
that the Interkit was increasingly becoming a one-man show.
262
 While Brezhnev did want to keep 
the GDR in line, it was Rakhmanin and his clique of old China-hands who made it their personal 
mission to enforce strict conformity.
263
 ‘Die China Mafia’ as GDR diplomats called Rakhmanin 
and, in lesser terms, Mikhail Kapitsa, and I.S. Shcherbakov, the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, 
were in their correct estimations, trying to run Soviet China-policy as their own fiefdoms via the 
Interkit.
264
 After all, who was to reel them in? By May 1982, Brezhnev, severely beset by a series 
of strokes found even everyday tasks challenging, and was in no capacity to exert his authority 
over the many forums and working groups of the CPSU.
265
 Matters were no different under 
Andropov and subsequently, Chernenko who both had to deal with more pressing matters in their 
short terms in power.
266
 From the safety of  “The Department”, as Rakhmanin’s all-powerful 
Department for Relations with Socialist Countries in the Central Committee of the CPSU was 
known, Rakhmanin attempted to run China-policy as his own private domain.
267
 As Anatoly 
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Chernyaev, later Gorbachev’s top foreign policy advisor, noted in his diary in July 1982, 
Rakhmanin had been in charge for all things China in the Central Committee Socialist Countries 
Department for the last 15 years, putting out a wide array of anti-China brochures, dozens of 
articles and even books. Chernyaev observed that if Sino-Soviet relations improved, all of his 
literature “would go into the trash bin” and the man would become irrelevant. Undoubtedly 
realizing this and desperate to prevent a slide into obscurity and irrelevance, Rakhmanin was hell-
bent on pushing forward his feverish anti-China line.
 268
   
Honecker often aired his disdain towards Soviet meddling during meetings with Chinese 
representatives. In April 1982 The East German General Secretary remarked to outgoing Chinese 
Ambassador Chen Tung “we all know why relations [between the GDR and China] were tarnished 
(getrübt). We all know, and we don't have to talk about this”.269 At incoming Ambassador Li 
Qianfen’s welcome introduction in September 1982, Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer stressed to 
the Chinese diplomat that Berlin was more than willing to continue the positive path that had been 
embarked upon between both states. Ignoring Rakhmanin’s instructions to not engage with China 
in any domain, Fischer further stated, “the GDR sees many possibilities to deepen the contacts 
between both states. This doesn’t only relate to trade, but scientific-technical cooperation, cultural 
as well as athletic relations.” Welcoming Fischer’s words, Li affirmed that the GDR and the PRC 
were friendly states and that “even though the relations between both states had stagnated, there is 
a common wish to forget the past and look towards the future”.270 Perhaps most telling, East 
German officials did not shy away from relaying information on the Interkit and other Soviet 
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coordination moves to their Chinese colleagues. Thus, Liu Qibao, at the time Political Secretary in 
the Chinese Embassy in the GDR was given detailed information of Interkit happenings by MfAA 
contacts during the early 1980s.
271
 Not only was the Soviet Union’s key client state not listening 
to Moscow’s directives but by 1982, it was also deliberately leaking information to the target of 
the Interkit’s efforts. 
 
Frictions and opportunities – Sino-GDR relations seen through Soviet-East German tensions 
 
After Brezhnev’s death, the leadership vacuum in the Kremlin and Rakhmanin’s 
duplicitous moves only emboldened the East German leadership to pursue its own interests 
towards China. Rather than an individual rebellious act against its Soviet masters, this was one of 
a trend of more independent manoeuvres that Honecker undertook to ensure that East German 
interests were best served, even if this went against the wishes of Moscow. Thus, Honecker’s 
pursuit of an independent foreign policy towards China was brought about by (and must be 
viewed from) the East German General Secretary’s general drive for ‘emancipation’ from 
Moscow. 
For example, by 1981, Moscow’s astute observers were fully aware that the GDR was 
continuing to ignore Soviet wishes for more restraint in engaging in German-German dialogue. 
Officially given the go-ahead from Moscow after Honecker’s insistent pressing, the December 
1981 meeting at the Werbellinsee hunting lodge between Honecker and West German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt gave the German leaders from the opposing sides of the iron curtain a chance to 
build on their budding relationship.
272
 Both Honecker and Schmidt attempted to keep inter-
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German relations out of the influence of Superpower conflicts.
273
 Schmidt’s forthcoming attitude 
in proposing the formation of a common German credit institute (in which West German funds 
would necessarily play the bigger role) as well as the Chancellor’s refusal to cut his visit short 
after the imposition of martial law in Poland on 13 December sent a strong message to the 
doubters of inter-German cooperation.
274
 
The Kremlin showed understandable worry at the Eigendynamik that was developing in 
inter-German relations. Gromyko’s 1979 reminder to East German leaders to remember that 
engagement with West Germany could have political consequences had been repeated again and 
again. But unbeknownst to Moscow, inter-German relations had become a matter of survival for 
the GDR rather than a question of choice as the East German economy became ever more 
dependent on West German credits. Indeed, to say that the GDR economy was treading water at 
the beginning of the 1980s would be a gross understatement. By some accounts, East German debt 
to COMECON states had already risen to almost 14 billion U.S. dollars in 1980, an almost four-
time increase since 1975.
275
 The Milliardenkredite which were secured through Bavarian Minister 
president Franz-Josef Strauss in June 1983 and June 1984, were much needed life-preservers for 
the GDR.
276
 To raise even more money, East Berlin even found it necessary to lift some of the 
compulsory exchange requirements towards FRG citizens who were visiting the GDR (a law 
which had brought the GDR state coffers a substantial amount of money) in order to curry West 
German favour.
277
 As the CIA noted in 1984, West Germany’s government-guaranteed financial 
credits, such as one issued in 1984 with a 50-year maturity, helped ease East Germany’s liquidity 
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problems. The CIA estimated that by doing so, Bonn was taking East Berlin under its ‘financial 
umbrella’ to encourage Western bankers to revive lending to East Berlin. These expanding 
financial linkages only re-emphasized the importance of inter-German relations to Honecker.
278
  
 Soviet leaders certainly made no secret of their disapproval for the continuation of what 
they saw as reckless inter-German cooperation. At their last meeting on 11 August 1982 at the 
Kremlin, Brezhnev, in addition to ignoring East Berlin’s pleas for increased raw material 
deliveries, reacted negatively to Honecker’s request to visit the FRG in order to take up Schmidt’s 
post-Werbellinsee invite.
279
 By this time, as Hans-Hermann Hertle and Konrad Jarausch have 
observed, permanent ‘rifts’ had started to form in the ‘Bruderbund’ due to disagreements on inter-
German relations.
280
 Soviet attempts at restraining East Berlin continued throughout the decade.
281
 
As before, Honecker chose to ignore all advice from his Soviet patrons. If Egon Krenz, 
Honecker’s brief successor in 1989 and long-time lieutenant, is to be believed, then Soviet 
Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov even raised the possibility of removing Honecker 
during a recess of a COMECON summit in Moscow in June 1984. Krenz, at the time the clear 
number two in the SED leadership, was clearly taken aback. Surprised, he reacted diplomatically 
and answered that “Erich Honecker’s authority is substantial. I know nobody in the Politburo or in 
the Central Committee who would abuse his trust”.282 Until its fateful demise, East Germany’s 
slide into economic dependency on the West was never successfully dealt with and, as Moscow 
had warned, its dependency on the West gradually eroded East Germany’s economic 
independence.
283
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In 1983, Honecker’s frictions with Moscow became ever more visible. A notable example 
was Honecker’s insistence to replace Soviet Ambassador Pyotr Abrasimov in June 1983. 
Abrasimov, who was put in place with the expressed purpose of keeping a close eye on East 
Berlin’s dealings, installed in 1975 to replace Michail Jefremov because the Kremlin had regarded 
the latter as not being forceful enough in pushing forward Moscow’s line. Accordingly, 
Abrasimov threw his weight around like no other Ambassador before him. The man who had 
actively taken part in Honecker’s putsch against Ulbricht during his first tenure as Moscow’s man 
in Berlin enthusiastically participated in Politburo meetings and served as a hardened conduit for 
Soviet policy. The ‘Regierender Botschafter’ (reigning ambassador), as he was known in SED 
circles, was despised by Honecker. The East German General Secretary duly seized the 
opportunity to remove him after Brezhnev’s death. The new man in the Kremlin conceded, 
naming the more moderate Vyacheslav Kotschemasov as Abrasimov’s replacement.284 
These episodes served to deepen Honecker’s mistrust of Soviet intentions and confirmed 
his belief that a certain degree of autonomy and distance from Moscow was beneficial for the 
GDR. They also illustrate Honecker’s increasing willingness to conduct state business in 
accordance to East German needs rather than to satisfy the genrontocrats in Moscow. Against the 
backdrop of increasing East-West tensions after the Soviet downing of Korean airliner KAL 007 
in September 1983 and Bonn’s agreement to station Pershing II missiles on 22 November of the 
same year, the preservation of peace so that the GDR could continue to derive economic benefits 
from the West became ever more of a priority for Honecker.
285
 Thus, Honecker became even 
more adamant on his wish to keep the peace in Europe and continue his engagement with West 
Germany. 
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As Hannes Adomeit has observed, in a normally functioning empire, the dependencies are 
meant to provide benefits to the centre.
286
 In stark contrast, in the 1980s the GDR not only ceased 
to yield political advantages for the Kremlin but had instead started to become a rebellious burden. 
Considering that Moscow supported the East German regime with, albeit diminished amounts, 
subsidized oil and gas, overpaid for its products relative to world market prices and accepted 
industrial products of inferior quality amidst its own economic troubles during the ‘harsh decade’ 
from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, East German intransience left a bitter taste in the mouths of 
many in the Kremlin.
287
 To make matters even more frustrating for Moscow, its hands were 
essentially tied. In an escalating Second Cold War environment, it could not risk a public rift in its 
most inner circle of client states at the risk of looking like the weaker, less coherent bloc. This 
atmosphere of mutual irritation would shape the East Berlin-Moscow relationship until the GDR’s 
eventual collapse in 1990. 
 
Deepening Relations 
 
 Honecker’s wish to pursue his own policies, the resulting frictions with the Kremlin and 
his knowledge that Moscow had little interest in risking public tensions with the GDR directly 
translated into his willingness to ignore any attempt by the Kremlin to meddle in his new relations 
with China. The East German leader had good reason for doing so. For Honecker, relations with 
China could serve the dual purpose of boosting the GDR’s prestige on the international stage as 
well as secure an alternative market for the GDR’s products, especially its industrial goods.288 The 
changing tone could also be observed from the annual ‘plans’ that the MfAA put together for 
China-GDR relations. These served as a guideline in how relations should be developed in the 
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following year. While the foreign policy orientation for 1981-85 (drafted in 1980) still called for 
coordination with Moscow in aspects of relations
289
, from 1981 on, the plans left little doubt about 
the general GDR foreign policy strategy towards China. In the 1982 plan, drafted in November 
1981, it quoted Erich Honecker’s statements at the X Party Congress in which the General 
Secretary had stated that  
When it comes to the GDR, then it can be said that she is ready to seek 
relations to the PRC according to the principles of equality, the respect 
of sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as the non-involvement in 
internal affairs [of other states]. We are convinced that a policy of 
peace and normal relations would also be in the interest of the Chinese 
people.
290
 
 
Indeed, having already laid the groundwork from the summer of 1979 on, contacts 
deepened significantly in 1982. At East Berlin’s request Horst Siebeck and Helmut Ettinger, both 
members of the International Department of the SED CC, visited China on an extended study tour 
from 4 to 26 March 1982.
291
 The delegation was able to, for the first time since the 1960s, engage 
in conversations with members of the CCP party school, the editorial board of Renmin Ribao, as 
well as with members of the Chinese ‘unions’ and youth groups. During the entire visit, Siebeck 
and Ettinger observed that their Chinese hosts were friendly and even comradely (freundlich und 
freundschaftlich).
292
 The Chinese Foreign Ministry-chaperoned visit, which was officially 
organized and hosted by the GDR Embassy in Beijing, served as a major trust-building initiative 
where the GDR delegation frankly expressed its desire for the expansion of bilateral ties.
293
 The 
improving state of relations between East Berlin and Beijing was certainly reflected in incoming 
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Ambassador Rolf Berthold’s introduction meetings in Beijing in August 1982. Foreign Minister 
Huang Hua told the incoming Ambassador that he wished to see an intensification of bilateral 
contacts in the areas of economics, culture, science and sports.
294
 Regional contacts also 
expanded. In October 1982, GDR Embassy Counsellor Joachim Krüger met with the Deputy 
Premier of Jiangxi province Xi Qin to see what Deng’s course meant for provincial policies.295 In 
the same month, Krüger visited Hunan University in Changsha to learn how Chinese universities 
and colleges were readjusting their curriculum to reemphasize communist ideology in order to 
fight political liberalization during Deng’s reform course.296 That greater local-level contacts were 
now also possible clearly outlined to East German diplomats and policy makers that China was 
embracing a new foreign policy openness towards Eastern European states. Certainly, Zhao 
Ziyang’s speech at the sixth National People’s Congress one year later in June 1983 which 
stressed that China’s relations between itself and socialist states of Eastern Europe should return 
as they were in the “amiable 1950s” created the right conditions for further engagement.297  
1983 boasted some major milestones in GDR-PRC relations. Foreign Minister Oskar 
Fischer met Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian at the margins UN General Assembly to discuss 
bilateral matters. This marked the first time in almost twenty years that Foreign Ministers from 
both countries met. In December of that year, Deputy Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited the 
GDR and was received by Oskar Fischer and Herbert Krolikowski to discuss development as well 
as foreign policy issues in the GDR.
298
 As well as this, cooperation between both foreign 
ministries was intensified further. Klaus Zorn, the head of the Far Eastern Section of the MfAA 
visited China to consider further avenues for additional cooperation with both Qian Qichen and 
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Ma Xusheng, Head of the USSR/Eastern Europe section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
299
  
Beijing welcomed this new momentum in bilateral relations and actively fostered it with 
its own initiatives. After protestations by various embassy staff in Beijing, Zhongnanhai attempted 
to ensure that all Chinese press outlets used the correct terminology when referring to their new 
friends.
300
 The GDR was referred to less and less as “East Germany” or Dongde (东德) in the 
press and during official functions. It was now the “Democratic Republic of Germany” or Minzhu 
Deguo (民主德国) in accordance with its official name, rather than a geographical reference 
which denotes ‘the other Germany’. Proof for China’s changing attitude can be gleaned from the 
centre’s directions to the provinces. To “respect” and “take care” (zhaogu) of East Germany’s 
wishes, a foreign ministry directive went out to the local provincial governments on 10 October 
1984 to ensure that their newspapers and reports referred to the East Germans as a Volk (renmin) 
rather than a Bevölkerung (jumin), with the former indicating a ‘people’ or national identity 
whereas the latter merely denotes ‘a population’. 301 For the meantime, China seemed willing to 
bite its tongue on its previous stance of favouring a German reunification.
302
  
The Kremlin watched these developments with unease. In an October 1984 meeting with 
Honecker, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, albeit in a less polemic tone than Rakhmanin had 
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used, went to great lengths to lecture the East German General Secretary on why relations 
between East Berlin and Beijing should be turned down a notch. In an atmosphere where Sino-
Soviet normalization talks were still being held at ransom by Beijing’s three obstacles, Gromyko 
used frank language to criticize China’s stubborn resistance towards constructive dialogue and 
Beijing’s continued publishing of critical material against the Soviet Union.303 Faced with these 
strong reminders, Honecker could do nothing but duplicitously assure Gromyko that the GDR 
“shares the position of the Soviet Union in this question” and understands the existence of 
“obstacles for a normalization of relations with China”. 304  Considering that Honecker had 
reiterated his interest in deeper relations with China in August 1984 when meeting President Li 
Xianian in Bucharest during the 40
th
 anniversary celebrations of the Romanian revolution, the 
East German leader’s statements to Gromyko were certainly but insincere words to appease the 
Soviet statesman.
305
 Certainly, the Kremlin-enforced cancellation of Honecker’s long-sought visit 
to West Germany in the same month only added to the East German leader’s willingness to ignore 
Soviet dictates.
306
 
 
                                                          
303
 Gromyko was recounting a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, where both disagreed on 
essentially every issue they discussed. For example, Wu expressed support for Japan’s territorial claims over the 
Kurile Islands which was met by Gromyko’s response that “if there were divergences only on this topic, 
normalization would be difficult.” On the questions of Soviet troop withdrawal from Mongolia and the reliquinshing 
of Soviet support for Vietnam, Gromyko concluded that ‘no common language could be found’ (keine gemeinsame 
Sprache war möglich). BA-SAPMO, DY 30/ J IV 2/2A 2678 – Niederschrift des Gespräch des Genossen Erich 
Honecker mit Genossen Andrej Andrejewitstsch Gromyko am 8. Oktober 1984 im Hause des Zentralkomittees der 
SED. 
304
 BA-SAPMO, DY 30/ J IV 2/2A 2678 – Niederschrift des Gespräch des Genossen Erich Honecker mit Genossen 
Andrej Andrejewitstsch Gromyko am 8. Oktober 1984 im Hause des Zentralkomittees der SED. 
305
 BA-SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2A 2679 – Vermerke über Gespräche des Generalsekretärs des ZK er SED und 
Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit ausländischen Delegationsleiter anlässlich des 
40. Jahrestages der antifachistischen und antiimperialistischen Revolution der nationalen und sozialien Befreiung des 
rumänischen Volkes.  
306
 The official Politburo report states that the visit could not take place due to the FRG’s stance on the GDR’s 
sovereignty. The same file contains a draft of the presumptive positive results which would have been circulated if the 
visit had taken place. The report’s predictive issuances of common guarantees for peace in Europe between Honecker 
and Kohl leave little doubt as to advanced the planning or this trip was and how much the East German leader sought 
this engagement with Bonn. BA-SAPMO, DY 30/ J IV 2/2A 2673 – Gemeinsame Erklärung über den Besuch des 
Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands und Vorsitzenden des 
Staatsrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Erich Honecker, in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 
…bis… 
 
101 
Expanding Trade Relations 
 
As the first doors in bilateral relations were opened, both Beijing and East Berlin quickly 
started to realize that aside from the symbolic value, very practical advantages could be gained 
through bilateral exchanges. Indeed, a hitherto undiscussed factor is how important a mutual 
interest for economic advantages was in the development of East German-Chinese contacts in the 
early 1980s.
307
 While East Berlin saw opportunities in the newly accessible Chinese market for its 
industrial goods, the Chinese were interested in procuring know-how on everything ranging from 
production techniques to economic management lessons for Deng’s reform plans back at home.308 
From Beijing’s perspective, Honecker’s GDR presented a very interesting proposition. Far from 
what we now know about the East German economy, throughout the 1980s contemporary Chinese 
observers and diplomats alike thought of the GDR as a leading industrial state and wanted to learn 
from East Berlin’s experiences. 309  Chinese trade officials were most curious on how East 
Germany was able to establish itself as a successful socialist economy. As Beijing’s relations with 
Eastern European states improved, Zhongnanhai had already started to cast a curious eye on 
Hungary to learn from Budapest’s reform experiences.310 Indeed, within the framework of Deng’s 
Reform and Opening, leading Eastern European states could provide China with a look at how 
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socialist countries could conduct reform and responded to reform.
311
 The GDR’s know-how and 
experiences could be passed onto Chinese companies and enterprises. This is one of the main 
reasons that China sought relations with East Germany more than any other Eastern European 
state in the mid-1980s, because, according to former Commercial Secretary in the PRC Embassy 
in Berlin and former member of the Eastern European section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Wu 
Deron, “amidst Eastern European countries, China stood to gain the most from the GDR.”312 
Subsequently, a flurry of delegations were exchanged between both countries in order to ink new 
trade deals and seek opportunities for further exchange. Beijing sought consultations on a wide 
variety of topics ranging from the technology required for the production of vitamins to catalyzed 
cracking techniques of hydrocarbons (Katalyse-Krackung-Reformierungs-Technik).
313
 
East Berlin was ecstatic at Beijing’s interest to expand trade relations. The GDR’s raw 
appetite for a new market for its industrial supplies was hard to hide. Amidst an atmosphere of 
general economic decline and stagnation in the Soviet bloc, China provided a welcome alternative 
as a buyer for its industrial goods.
314
 Thus, while Deng’s actual reform path elicited little interest 
from the GDR, there was a moment of hope for Honecker that trade with the People’s Republic 
could help to alleviate the GDR’s economic malaise.315 Thus, in consultations with its Chinese 
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counterparts in Beijing in 1982, members of the East German Ministry of Science and Technology 
suggested far-ranging agreements which would see its exports (ranging from textile-machines to 
technology that would enhance the production of consumer goods and household-items) go to 
China for “Chinese recommendations for goods that they would like to export to the GDR”.316 
This and other such East Berlin-initiated proposals show that Honecker undoubtedly entertained 
the hope that trade with China could be part of a solution for East Germany’s economic woes. 317 
As high as Honecker’s hopes were, he and his MfAA subtly appreciated that East German 
goods could never surpass the importance that Western goods were gaining for Deng’s 
modernization drive.
318
 Realizing the superior variety and quality of Western European, Japanese 
and American goods, China started to be less interested in East German products but rather the 
crucial reform lessons it thought it could still learn from Soviet Bloc countries.
319
 Thus, as 
Honecker hatched grand plans for his new trade partners in Beijing, the annual negotiations in 
bilateral trade already revealed a very worrying trend for the Pankow regime: China was not 
interested in buying as many East German products as the GDR had hoped. During the 1982 
bilateral trade negotiations, the representative of the Ministry of Trade from the PRC, Wang 
Runsheng told his counterpart Eugen Kattner that China could not fulfil East Berlin’s ambitious 
trade targets for Sino-GDR trade. A disappointed Kattner urged his superiors at the Ministry for 
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Foreign Trade to “explore all channels to promote trade”.320 From East Berlin’s perspective, this 
disappointing reality would only continue to plague its trade hopes. However, Honecker was not 
ready to give up. In the 1983 negotiations, China told the GDR delegation that 60% of the 
proposed GDR exports cannot be accepted because China currently has no need for these 
products.
321
 As this affected GDR staple exports such as electronics and industrial supplies, the 
GDR delegation lobbied intensely to change the Chinese stance. The Chinese delegation, trying to 
reach an accommodation, suggested that the volume could possibly be increased if the GDR could 
increase its sale of chemical raw materials to the PRC. As desperate as Honecker was to expand 
trade ties with Beijing, there were just not enough surplus chemical products to fulfil requests. To 
make matters worse, GDR diplomats and officials in the MfAA knew that Sino-GDR trade 
volumes were mediocre compared to even other Eastern European countries.
322
 The below graph 
shows East German estimations of Chinese trade with the socialist world in the years of 1982 and 
1983, compiled by the trade section of the GDR Embassy in Beijing in June 1983. As the East 
German estimations at the time showed, East Berlin’s trade in 1983 was estimated to be only 
around 55% of the 1982 volume. 
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Trade between China and the socialist world (in CHF, millions)
323
 
     1982 1983 
GDR 
Export  179 100 
Import 173 94 
Total 352 194 
  
  
  
Bulgaria 
Export  58.6 59.7 
Import 58.6 50 
Total 117.2 109.7 
  
  
  
Romania 
Export  54 93 
Import 46 93 
Total 100 186 
  
  
  
Cuba 
Export  301.2 312.8 
Import 280.6 280 
Total 581.8 592.8 
  
  
  
Mongolia 
Export  4.3 4.7 
Import 4.3 4.6 
Total 8.6 9.3 
  
  
  
Poland 
Export  101.4 208.8 
Import 154.2 194.9 
Total 255.6 403.7 
  
  
  
USSR 
Export  300.2 836 
Import 301.2 828 
Total 601.4 1664 
 
While trade volumes were disappointing from the East German perspective, Beijing was 
getting out of these exchanges exactly what it sought – much desired access to some key industrial 
supplies and knowledge-transfer from the leading industrial socialist state. Even though Beijing 
had started to also cooperate with the arguably more industrially advanced West Germany across a 
variety of fields, enthusiasm for the East German economy came from all levels.
324
 In October 
1984, state news agency Xinhua queried the MfAA for more information on the “development of 
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and perfection of economic planning processes” in order to educate the Chinese masses on the 
East German model.
325
 According to Wu Derong, Commercial Secretary in the PRC Embassy in 
the GDR from 1982-89, Beijing did value specific GDR industrial goods in the 1980s, some of 
which it deemed to be on par with those from Western sources, even though overall, China could 
not become the important export-market that the GDR had hoped for.
326
 As an internal estimate by 
the PRC embassy about the East German economic situation in 1985 states: “The GDR is one of 
the ten major industrial powers of the world…in terms of machinery, chemical and electrical 
supplies, East Germany’s products is on world standards…In terms of living standards, it is the 
top in the Soviet bloc”327 Officially, and certainly to the beholder in Beijing, the GDR was the 
most vigorous of the COMECON countries. While according to data available at the time, 
Poland’s net material product fell by 12 percent in 1981, and by 5.5 percent in 1982 and by 0.1 
percent and 0.3 percent in Czechoslovakia, it grew in East Germany by 4.8 percent and 2.5 
percent, with its economic performance being even better in 1983 and 1984.
328
 Accordingly, 
Beijing turned an attentive eye towards what seemed to be an Eastern European economic 
powerhouse. In its trade dialogue with the GDR, Beijing submitted very specific “wish-lists” for 
industrial supplies which it “sought for reconstruction efforts”.329 These ranged from equipment 
for the cement industry which would aid in China’s building boom to machines and equipment for 
laying asphalt in Beijing’s bid to connect the People’s Republic of tomorrow. All in all, Beijing 
was interested in procuring heavy machinery and equipment from the GDR – something East 
Berlin had built a reputation for.
330
 
 Indeed, in the framework of Deng’s modernization project, Beijing made no secret of its 
                                                          
325
 PAAA, MFAA ZR 2557/90 – AI-Arbeit in China (Analyse, Prognose, Plannung), Xinhua an Abt. Journalsitische 
Beziehungen, 22 October 1984 . 
326
 Author’s interview with Wu Derong, Beijing, 2 April 2012. 
327
 “德意志民主共和国概况, 1985 年 6 月“ (Internal Report by the PRC Embassy in the GDR, obtained by author 
from Wu Derong), p. 3. 
328
 Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch, p. 159. 
329
 PAAA MFAA ZR 658/89 – Jahresbeziehungsberichte DDR-VR China – Jahresbeziehungsbericht 1983, p. 6. 
330
 PAAA MFAA ZR 466/86 – WTZ DDR-VR China, 1982 –Vorschläge fuer mögliche Konsultationen von 
Spezialisten der VR China in der DDR (1983), 17 December 1982. 
 
107 
desire and willingness to learn from foreign examples.
331
 As GDR-PRC relations improved, Deng 
and his deputies were also very eager to learn from Soviet Bloc economies. It was hoped that 
socialist Eastern European models could offer more applicable lessons for China. Thus, during the 
early 1980s, learning missions were not a rare sight in the Soviet Bloc.
332
 According to Bai 
Shoumian, former Ambassador to Bulgaria, many inspection delegations were despatched to 
Eastern European countries and many lessons for Deng’s Reform and Opening were derived out 
of Soviet Bloc states.
333
 Especially experiences in the areas of advanced technology and economic 
planning were sought. As the industrial leader of the Soviet Bloc, East Germany deserved special 
attention.
334
 Chinese delegations such as the one led by Lin Hong-Zhu, a member of the Ministry 
of Electronics Industry that visited East Germany in the spring of 1983, sought to absorb as much 
information as he could about the successes of the East German economic example. The explicit 
goal of the delegation was to “acquire information for the improvement of the technical standard 
in the production of electronic devices in the People’s Republic.”335 Without beating around the 
bush, the delegation stressed to their hosts their “great interest in the transfer of GDR’s 
technologies, for both the import of certain single pieces of machinery as well as the transfer of 
entire technological processes.” Lin stressed China’s wish “to make up for the gap in Chinese 
technological backwardness” and “to remedy the negative consequences of the Cultural 
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Revolution.”336 The frankness displayed by this and other similar delegations leave little doubt 
about their genuine Dengist modernization motivations.
337
 In early July 1983, the Chinese 
Ambassador in Berlin, Li Qianfen, requested a meeting with H. Weiz, a representative of the East 
German Ministry of Trade and Technology, where Li brought forth his positive hopes for 
continued trade and stressed that China urgently needed technologies ranging from ship-building 
to scientific machinery. To show his appreciation and in an attempt to build a rapport with the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, Li also hosted a dinner for East German trade officials at the 
Embassy of the PRC.
338
 
 Less than a year later in January 1984, China showed the importance it attached to Eastern 
European know-how by sending eventual Premier Zhu Rongji (then the Vice Head of the State 
Economic Commission) on a whirlwind tour through Soviet bloc states. The delegation spent 
around five to six days each in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland as well as the GDR.
339
 
Wu Derong, who travelled with the delegation, remembers that the delegation was most interested 
in the GDR. “We were all very curious at the inner workings of the East German economy, 
especially how the Kombinate (combines) operated and if they could be replicated in China.”340 
The delegation made their intentions perfectly clear in a prepatory meeting before the actual trip. 
Liu Zhishu, Head of the Ex- and Import section of the State Economic Commission, plainly 
summarized the mission’s goals as “to get to know the development level of the economies of the 
visited countries” and to “create a consensus for a number of reconstruction projects where 
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bilateral cooperation is possible.”341 
 During their stay in the GDR, the delegation visited important state institutions such as the 
Ministry for Science and Technology, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, as 
well as the VEB Elektroapparate-Werke and VEB Studiotechnik Berlin combines. Zhu Rongji 
was especially impressed by the advanced state of technical research in the GDR and expressed 
the wish that further consultations take place so that China could learn from the experiences from 
the scientific-technical advancements of the GDR.
342
 In a list of “questions which interested the 
Chinese delegation”, Zhu Rongji’s hosts noted that he was very curious about the role of the 
combines in advancing scientific research, the connection between party control and production as 
well as and the goals in science and research were laid down in economic plans.
343
 Laying bare his 
basic question, Zhu reportedly asked his East German hosts: “How can China achieve superior 
performance using economic means?”344  
 It is clear that the delegation wasn’t just impressed by the combines but also, how the 
GDR managed this ‘model’ economic system. In this area, the GDR, unlike Western states, served 
as a more applicable, centrally-planned, socialist model to emulate. Indeed, before Zhu Rongji’s 
visit, a study delegation led by Xu Lizheng, Vice-Chair of the Research Centre for the Plan 
Economy of the PRC, had spent four weeks in the GDR to study this exact matter.
345
 After being 
led around industrial facilities of the GDR by Gerhard Schürer, Head of the State Planning 
Commission of the GDR, Xu was further convinced of the “performance and superiority of the 
socialist plan economy”, stressing that the “successful development of the plan economy in the 
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GDR gave him strong confidence [for the development of China under a planned economy].”346 
Xu also viewed combines favourably. His East German minders noted in their report that “a lot of 
attention of the Chinese delegation was dedicated to the working methods and development of the 
combines. They have apparently outlined this as a viable way to organize modern production.”347 
This wasn’t an exaggeration, as Xu found time to visit some eight combines during his time.348 
Thoroughly impressed, the Chinese saw opportunities to adopt working methods from East 
German experiences straight away. Judging from the forthcoming nature of the East German 
hosts, Chinese interest at the East German economy was certainly a welcome reaffirmation of the 
GDR’s industrial prowess for Honecker. 
This trip came at a time when the tinkering around Deng’s Reform and Opening was 
reaching a fever pitch. The centre pushed Deng’s teaching onto provincial-level officials and, 
increasingly, words were being translated into action in the mid-1980s.
349
 In February 1984, Deng 
had encouraged further experimentation and opening to the outside world to his central committee 
colleagues, noting that these zones should be a medium for introducing technology, management 
and knowledge.
350
 In this context, Zhu’s April trip served as a vital study mission to gather 
information about outside experiences and came before Premier Zhao Ziyang made a similar trip 
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to Western Europe a year later in July 1985 to promote trade links.
351
 After the trip, Ambassador 
Berthold was told by Liu Suinan, a deputy in the State Planning Commission, that one of the 
major lessons learnt was that “qualified central planning and guidance of the economy would be 
the best method to bring out the advantages of socialist production conditions.” 352  Liu also 
repeatedly emphasized the fact that China is more than interested to continue cooperating on all 
levels, especially between the two economic planning bodies, making it plain and apparent that 
China wished to siphon East German central planning knowledge for its own use.
353
 Also showing 
his interests in GDR technology, Zhu Rongji told his East German hosts after the trip that “further 
trade would be hinged on technology transfers” and that only the transfer of “competitive methods 
and products would result in a meaningful development of bilateral trade relations”.354 Honecker 
would return the favour and send State Secretary Herbert Krolikowski to Beijing for an extended 
tour to further improve political and economic relations in April 1984.
355
 Relations intensified by 
leaps and bounds after these initial high-level visits in 1984. By 1985, the PRC embassy in East 
Berlin reported back to Beijing that the political conditions were “better than ever” for fostering 
continued relations.
 356
  
To Honecker, China’s seeming appreciation for his economic model was both flattering 
and a vindication of his vision. Fancying himself as a great statesman who had put the GDR on 
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the map by signing the Grundlagenvertrag with the FRG in 1972 as well as having provided his 
people with a standard of living unrivalled in the Eastern Bloc thanks to his “Unity of Social and 
Economic Policy”, he was finally getting the credit he deserved from one of the up-and-coming 
powers in the world.  
As East German-Chinese relations improved, tensions between the GDR and USSR 
persisted. In June 1984, Honecker complained bitterly to Soviet leader Chernenko about Soviet oil 
shortages. Just as he had done with Brezhnev, Honecker reminded the new Soviet leader that out 
of the lower 17 million tons of oil (down from 19 million tons), one million tons went to the 
Soviet garrison in the GDR. Audacious as ever, the East German leader stressed to Chernenko that 
the GDR had sacrificed significant resources in securing the situation in Poland and in an indirect 
attack, remarked that countries “should prove their internationalism with deeds.” 357 Chernenko 
lashed back with criticisms of Honecker’s relations with the FRG, openly questioning if the East 
German leader was adhering to the socialist line towards Bonn, at the same time beseeching the 
East German leader to maintain the façade of unity in the bloc.
358
 On East Berlin’s relations with 
Beijing, Chernenko stressed that “the maximum coordination of our policies is of utmost 
importance, especially in light of the Chinese differentiation attempts towards the fraternal states.” 
Aware of East German intransience towards Soviet directives for its China-policy, the Soviet 
leader went on to remark “We have the impression that our German friends do not always pay 
attention to this. In the mass media of the GDR, the dangerous policies of China are being 
ignored.”359 Far from restraining his engagement with Beijing, Honecker not only shrugged off 
Chernenko’s warnings but further intensified his relationship with China in 1985 and 1986, 
resulting in ever higher-ranking visits.
360
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Conclusion 
 
In March 1982, Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech removed the last reservations Honecker 
might have had about engaging in an independent foreign policy towards China. However, even 
while Brezhnev adopted a more conciliatory tone towards China, elements in the Kremlin still 
tried to forbid the GDR from doing the same. Realizing this blatant Soviet duplicity, Honecker 
rebelled against the Interkit and all other attempts to hold back East German adventurism towards 
Beijing. In particular, Honecker was interested in using his new relationship with China to seek 
potential markets for his industrial goods as well as to increase his own prestige and that of the 
GDR. This economic interest was also reciprocated by Beijing. However, rather than East German 
finished goods, China was more interested in siphoning out its technological expertise and 
economic-planning experience in order to draw potential lessons for its modernization drive. 
While Beijing’s main gaze was undoubtedly cast west for technology transfers, the GDR, as the 
leading industrial socialist state, had a special place in China’s re-engagement with the ‘fraternal 
states’.  
Undoubtedly, Soviet-East German frictions contributed to Honecker’s intransigence 
towards Soviet attempts to slow his engagement with China. The East German statesman was also 
adept at using the international environment for his gain. As Superpower tensions re-emerged 
during the Andropov-Chernenko years, Honecker was able to blaze his own path knowing that the 
Kremlin would think twice about causing a public rift between itself and a key part of the Soviet 
Bloc. GDR-PRC relations forged ahead despite the Kremlin’s intermittent protestations. Indeed, 
by the time Gorbachev rose to power in 1985, the state of East German-Chinese normalization 
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was light years ahead of Sino-Soviet normalization.
361
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Chapter Three – Honecker meets Deng, 1985-86 
 
Introduction 
 
As seen in the last chapter, both Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko’s brief reigns 
in the Kremlin did not cause any significant shifts in the basic dynamics of Soviet-East German 
relations. Honecker remained intent on carving out whatever freedoms he could find in order to 
engage with China, even despite Moscow’s frequent protestations. Things did not change with 
Gorbachev’s ascent to the CPSU’s top position in March 1985. Far from ushering in a reset in 
Soviet-East German relations, Gorbachev’s assumption of the Kremlin reins gave rise to a set of 
newer, more intense frictions between Honecker and Moscow. The East German leader not only 
disagreed with Gorbachev’s proposed reform path for the Soviet Union but also deeply resented 
what he deemed to be inappropriate attempts to encourage liberal attitudes in the entire Soviet 
bloc. If there was still a last ounce of hesitation in Honecker’s mind in seeking an independent 
path for the GDR, they were most certainly cast aside amidst Gorbachev’s initiation of his 
Perestroika and then Glasnost policies. While Beijing was initially optimistic that Moscow’s 
reform path might trigger positive changes for the Soviet bloc, it also quickly started to disagree 
with Kremlin’s proposed path. To Deng, questioning the Party was counterproductive, especially 
since his Reform and Opening project’s implementation rested on the Party’s ability to reallocate 
resources and establish infrastructure projects on a massive scale. 
This chapter will begin with a thorough discussion of the dramatic effects that Gorbachev’s 
rise had on East German and Chinese attitudes from 1985 to 1986. It will describe the 
intensification of disagreements between Moscow and East Berlin as Gorbachev increasingly 
came to see East Berlin as a backward, dogmatic relic while Honecker actively fought back 
against Moscow’s calls for reforms in the Soviet bloc. These frictions between Moscow and East 
Berlin only encouraged East Berlin to further distance itself from Soviet prescriptions vis-à-vis 
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China. In Beijing, emerging disagreements for Gorbachev’s proposed restructuring of the 
communist party also brought forth a new set of ideological frictions with the Kremlin. Thus, a 
budding like-mindedness formed which would strengthen as both countries sought to immunize 
themselves from the increasingly liberal rhetoric coming out of Moscow. 
As Gorbachev continued on the East German policy of his predecessors and attempted to 
discourage Honecker from undermining Soviet directives by pursuing independent, Moscow-
defying relations with Beijing, he was confronted with the fact that, considering East Berlin’s 
disagreement with Gorbachev’s reform path, Honecker was now more than ever willing to diverge 
from Moscow’s dictates. Just like under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, the Kremlin’s 
messages fell on deaf ears in Pankow. Far from restraining himself, Honecker was willing to push 
relations with China to a new level after he had expended considerable effort to lay the 
groundwork for a possible full normalization between the two states. Having received Zhu Rongji 
in East Berlin, Honecker sent Minister-President Herbert Krolikowski on a whirlwind tour of 
China in 1984 to test the waters for increasing trade and economic cooperation and also, to lay the 
groundwork for further high-level exchanges. Beijing enthusiastically received its East German 
guest and, still eager to exploit this bilateral relationship for economic lessons from what it 
perceived to be a successful socialist economy, encouraged further contacts between the two 
nations. Thus, Beijing reciprocated by sending Minister-President Li Peng to the GDR a year later. 
To the annoyance of Moscow, the East German leader duly ignored all Soviet calls for 
restraint and embarked on a monumental state visit to China in October 1986. This visit was laden 
with symbolism. It was the first time that an Eastern European leader was granted a state visit by a 
Chinese leader since the onset of the Sino-Soviet Split. Also, it was an expression of Honecker’s 
total and final rejection of Moscow’s unrelenting efforts to restrain his engagement with Beijing. 
As relations deepened from the initial reset in the early 1980s, East Berlin and Beijing 
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were still enticed by a hope that deepened relations could provide substantial benefits. 
Zhongnanhai still displayed considerable interest in East German economic experiences while 
Honecker continued to hold out the hope that he might still be able to convince China to open its 
gates further for East German goods. Certainly, the East German leader enjoyed presenting the 
achievements of the GDR economy as well as the successes of his Friedenspolitk in Europe to a 
willing audience. Deng found Honecker’s drive for peace especially salient considering that he 
also sought a peaceful environment in which to pursue his Reform and Opening.  
Throughout his 1986 visit, Honecker impressed his Chinese hosts by presenting himself as 
a capable manager and an able statesman. Both sides were also eager to play on their 
commonalities, ranging from their similar distaste towards Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost 
to their resentment at the Moscow-enforced ice age in Sino-GDR relations during the Sino-Soviet 
split. Overall, Honecker’s visit was an unprecedented success. Sought-after trade deals were 
inked.
362
 Although there was certainly a discrepancy between how much East Germany valued its 
engagement with Beijing and how China reciprocated these sentiments (with the former clearly 
being the more eager party), it was clear from Honecker’s stay in China that a new, more intense, 
phase in bilateral relations had been reached.  
Honecker’s 1986 China-visit also reveals volumes about the two men behind the 
relationship. While Deng humbly sought practical advantages for China, Honecker very much 
intended to use his visit to China to further cement his personal standing in the Soviet bloc and the 
international diplomatic arena by engaging a previously inaccessible Soviet enemy. In an attempt 
to maximize the potential prestige gain for East Berlin, he even tried to play middle-man in 
expediting the Sino-Soviet normalization process. Though this turned out to be a drastic 
overestimation of his international stature, it is a revealing indicator of Honecker’s imperatives.  
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Overall, the visit set the stage for an intensification of relations in the latter part of the 
decade where practical concerns over trade would increasingly be overshadowed by wider, more 
pressing common concerns over the effect that Gorbachev’s reforms could have not only on its 
Eastern European allies but the socialist world as a whole.  
 
Gorbachev from Pankow’s perspective 
 
Gorbachev’s ascent to power initiated drastic changes in the Kremlin. Barely 54 years old 
when he was selected to become the sixth General Secretary of the CPSU, he hailed from a new 
generation of Soviet intelligentsia who wanted to breathe life back into the Soviet system.
363
 
Indeed, to people like Gorbachev, Soviet economic and social decay had been evident in the 
Brezhnev era. Figures vary but the West’s adjusted records indicate that Moscow’s claims about 
its economic vitality were completely fictitious. While the Soviet Union flexed its muscle in the 
third world, oil production and the agricultural sector suffered a severe decline in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.
364
 Inheriting a stifled economy, a military burden in Afghanistan and sizeable 
commitments in the third world, Gorbachev decided to first seek domestic improvements in the 
Soviet economy and to cut defence expenditure.
365
 In addition, Gorbachev also inherited the tense 
transatlantic relations that had defined Andropov and Chernenko’s brief reigns. Reagan’s 
antagonistic rhetoric on Soviet actions in the third world irked Gorbachev. It seemed utterly 
hypocritical to the Kremlin that Washington could insist on Moscow’s unilateral withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia while refusing to discuss American hegemony in Central 
America.
366
 Despite these differences, Gorbachev was adamant on reengaging the West, especially 
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on arms control. Never a fan of nuclear weapons
367
, Gorbachev started corresponding with Reagan 
almost immediately after his ascent to power.
368
 Washington seemed to view Gorbachev’s 
potential seriously as initial American estimations of the new Soviet leader were marked by 
optimism. In a June 1985 CIA report where he was called “the new broom”, Gorbachev was said 
to have demonstrated in his first 100 days “that he is the most aggressive and activist Soviet leader 
since Khrushchev” and that his “prospects for success should not be underestimated”.369 
 In terms of foreign policy towards the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev is remembered as having 
loosened his control of the client states. Gorbachev’s “Sinatra Doctrine”, as it is often referred to 
(a reference to the legendary American singer’s song My Way), had encouraged Eastern European 
states to choose their own way and had vowed to never use Soviet troops to prop up regimes in the 
fraternal states, thus presenting a total abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine.
370
 While Gorbachev 
has maintained with hindsight that he sought greater liberalization for Eastern Europe as early as 
1985, evidence suggests that the first few years of the Gorbachev-era were marked by continuity 
rather than change in Soviet Eastern Europe policy.
371
 In fact, far from proposing more freedoms 
for Soviet-bloc states, Gorbachev met with all the Eastern European Communist Party Secretaries 
for Ideology in his role as the CPSU Secretary for Ideology in Moscow on 6 March 1985 - five 
days before he became General Secretary - to urge greater unity in the bloc. During the meeting, 
he called on them to “intensify [their] ideological vigilance” and to strive for “much tighter 
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cohesion in all spheres of the socialist commonwealth”.372 This stance was continued in the 
subsequent months, during which he repeatedly called for greater economic integration within the 
COMECON and the expansion of political-military cooperation among the members of the 
Warsaw Pact. In fact, between 1985 and 1988, the Soviet leader never hinted that Moscow would 
not do everything to quell external or internal subversive threats to Warsaw Pact states. In Mark 
Kramer’s words, “…at no time during his initial years in office did he [Gorbachev] disavow the 
Brezhnev doctrine or display the slightest inclination to accept the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe.”373  
 In East Berlin, Gorbachev’s call for tighter military coordination within the Warsaw Pact 
was a welcome change from the hands-off attitude displayed during the Polish labour strikes of 
1982. However, it was Gorbachev’s simultaneous domestic policy of restructuring and reform 
within the CPSU that started cause considerable worry in East Berlin. As Gorbachev gave 
momentum to his Perestroika and Glasnost in the spring of 1986 at the XXVII Party Congress of 
the CPSU, East Germans waited with abated breath on Honecker’s response two months later at 
the XI Party Congress of the SED (17-21 April 1986). Many in the party and state apparatus at the 
time actually wondered if domestic and political problems would be addressed more openly after 
the Soviet impulses.
374
 However, any indications that the SED might change its conservative 
outlook did not occur. In fact, in Honecker’s opinion, the XXVII CPSU Party Congress had been 
too “spontaneous” and hasty.375  Thus, Gorbachev, who was the first General Secretary of the 
CPSU since 1971 to attend an SED Party conference, was not treated to resounding support for his 
Perestroika but only received token support for his disarmament policies.
376
 Indications of SED 
delineation can also be gleaned from the protocol of the conference. In it, the “goal-oriented 
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expansion of the Bruderbund with the Soviet Union” fell to second place in the rank of importance, 
behind “overcoming of confrontation through the cooperation of states”.377 While Honecker 
assured Gorbachev of his continued allegiance to Moscow, subtle indications of his emerging 
scepticism of Gorbachev’s reform path were beginning to surface. 
  Rather than the drastic changes that the Soviet leader promoted, Honecker bet on 
continuity. Yet, the East German leader ought to have seen every reason to reform. 1986 had been 
another ruinous year for the East German economy. The drastically sinking oil prices in 1985/86 
had hit the GDR especially hard. As East Germany had expanded its export of oil-products to the 
West in the years prior, it lost around 1.5 billion dollars of income in 1986.
378
 Desperate attempts 
were made to plug the hole with additional exports in order to gain foreign currency. However, 
weak demand for GDR finished goods and an accompanying sinking dollar meant that export 
income sank to new lows, bringing about a new wave of indebtedness to the West.
379
 Economic 
reliance on the West, in the form of transfer payments and state credits, became even more 
important to East Berlin in the late 1980s as Honecker actively fostered his economic relations 
with the other Germany against Soviet wishes to maintain a façade of solidarity.
380
  
 However, overall, it seems Honecker put on a set of self-imposed blinders or simply did 
not judge these economic problems to be as severe as we now know them to be with hindsight.
381
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At the XI. Party Conference he praised the superior economic performance of the GDR and its 
“high growth rates”. He laid out a ten point economic plan until the year 2000 which was 
supposed to guarantee the “unassailable” position of his GDR.382 
 Indeed, the last thing on Honecker’s mind was restructuring. If the East German leader 
at least tried to shroud his disdain for Perestroika, he was sure to let the world know how he felt 
about Glasnost. According to Günter Sieber, Head of the International Department of the SED 
Politburo and member of the Central Committee, Honecker “knew that the GDR could not survive 
[freedom of the press]”.383 Though Honecker resented Gorbachev’s calls for liberalization, his 
disdain was not shared by the average GDR citizen living in Leipzig or Potsdam. Indeed, much to 
the regret of the SED-elite, Moscow’s calls for Glasnost found resonance among the East German 
populace. Long-suppressed resentment of the Honecker regime started to find expression. Groups 
such as the ‘Initiative for Peace and Human Rights’ (Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte) 
found legitimacy and momentum in the reform winds that were blowing west from Moscow.
384
 
Witnessing these trends, Honecker started to actively fight back against the spread of Soviet 
liberal influences. He labelled Soviet liberal thinkers such as poet and novelist Yevgeny 
Yevtushenko as “counter-revolutionary” and complained personally to Gorbachev after 
Yevtushenko had given an October 1986 interview to the West German TV channel ZDF in which 
he talked positively about authors working on a “unified German literature” and the reunification 
of Germany. Certainly, Gorbachev’s defence, that these writers were in principle “not bad people”, 
must have irked Honecker even further.
385 
Thus, far from bringing fresh wind into East German-Soviet relations, Gorbachev’s ascent 
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to power actually had the net effect of worsening bilateral dynamics. Not only were Moscow and 
East Berlin confronted with divergences in their respective foreign policy strategies but with the 
new man in the Kremlin, both leaders found that their most basic visions for the future of 
socialism were becoming increasingly incompatible.  
Feeling abandoned by Moscow, East Berlin was now more willing than ever to pursue a 
self-serving, adventurous foreign policy. Certainly, Soviet calls for more coordination in the 
foreign policy sphere carried even less weight than before in East German eyes. To be sure, 
Gorbachev’s initial wish for a tighter cohesion in the Warsaw Pact’s foreign affairs translated into 
a continuation rather than shift of Moscow’s policy towards its client states. Thus, Moscow under 
Gorbachev was still more than willing to flex its muscles to dictate the foreign policy activities of 
its allies. With Reagan and Gorbachev unable to come to an agreement on nuclear disarmament 
and Second Cold War tensions intensifying, Moscow now needed the loyalty of its client states 
more than ever. 
However, if the Kremlin thought that East Berlin would toe an antagonistic line towards 
the Western Bloc amidst an emerging war of words across the Atlantic, it would be mistaken. On 
the contrary, Honecker made no secret that he was desperate to keep Europe from plunging into 
another diplomatic ice-age. As outlined in his previous meetings with West German leaders, it was 
Honecker’s central goal to create his own personal détente in Europe so that the GDR could 
continue to benefit economically from engagement with Western Europe.
386
 Already in 1983, 
Honecker was eager to follow Swedish Minister-President Palme’s suggestion of creating a 
nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe.
387
 Even despite Bonn’s decision to station American 
missiles in West Germany, the East German General Secretary still sought to limit the damage by 
engaging Helmut Kohl to pursue a “Koalition der Vernunft” or a “coalition of reason”. This 
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seemed to work with some success as the West German chancellor talked of a “community of 
responsibility” (Verantwortungsgemeinschaft) in East-West relations. Due to Honecker and 
Schmidt’s efforts, inter-German relations improved considerably despite Moscow’s wish to punish 
Bonn for agreeing to station Pershing II missiles.
388
 The decline of economic aid from the Soviet 
Union due to its overstretched commitments around the world on top of an increasing ideological 
divergence would have been enough reason for the Pankow regime to keep its linkages alive to 
Bonn.
389
 In addition, the self-perceived prestige that successful inter-German contacts garnered 
Honecker only added further impetus for him to continue on his path of détente with Bonn, even 
despite strong criticisms of policy-divergence from Gorbachev.  
 
China and Gorbachev: Gaige Kaifang above Perestroika and Glasnost 
 
In China, Gorbachev’s reforms triggered a similar reaction as in the GDR. With Beijing 
formulating its own path towards modernity, it deemed political liberalization à la Glasnost a non-
starter in the People’s Republic. To be sure, by the mid-1980s, Deng’s Reform and Opening 
policies were more or less on course to bring China out of the economic stagnation that had 
accompanied the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. Chinese economic growth had hit 
double digits by 1983, and the GDP had almost quadrupled over the course of the decade. Special 
Economic Zones were attracting external investment as foreign companies were granted duty-free 
privileges and favourable tax rates.
390
  
Increased cooperation with the West during this initial modernization phase meant that its 
relationship with America and Western European states improved drastically. Aside from a few 
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inevitable bumps in the road relating to the Taiwan issue, China was able to reap the diplomatic 
benefits of its new market-oriented reform path. In the environment of Soviet-American tensions 
arising from issues ranging from Afghanistan, nuclear disarmament and Reagan’s Strategic 
Defense Initiative, China had come to be seen in Washington as an increasingly important 
counterweight against Moscow. Indeed, during most of the 1980s, the U.S. treated China as a de-
facto ally, sharing sensitive intelligence information and providing technology to China that was 
sometimes unavailable to others outside of the United States.
391
  
Washington was not the only superpower courting Beijing in the mid 1980s. Threatened by 
an improving Sino-American relationship and potential strategic isolation, Gorbachev too sought 
to bring about significant change in Sino-Soviet relations, something which his immediate 
predecessors in the Kremlin were unable to achieve.
392
 The new man at the top took matters into 
his own hands when he made his desire to normalize relations absolutely clear at a speech in 
Vladivostok on July 28, 1986.
393
 In it, Gorbachev announced that six Soviet regiments would soon 
be withdrawn from Afghanistan, that some troops might be pulled out of Mongolia, and that he 
was prepared to discuss a reduction of force levels along the remainder of the Sino-Soviet 
border.
394
 These actions were intended to tell Beijing that Moscow was willing to submit to some 
of the “Three Conditions” that Chinese leaders had put forward as a precondition towards Sino-
Soviet normalization.
395
  
With both Washington and Moscow courting China, Beijing judged the international 
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environment favourable to accelerate its economic reforms.
396
 And in early 1986, with Premier 
Zhao Ziyang and Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang leading the way and with the blessing of 
Deng, price controls were dropped from a range of manufactured goods, bold experimentation 
with labour-incentive systems was again encouraged, rural production was delegated to family 
contracting units and collective enterprises were leased to individual entrepreneurs or groups of 
workers.
397
 After sporadic backlashes against the corrupting societal influences that modernization 
brought to China had subsided, by 1986 China was sailing full steam towards further market-
oriented reforms.
398
 And indeed, first results were beginning to show. Average living standards in 
the cities improved. For the first time, Chinese consumers were bringing home one of the ‘eight 
bigs’ (television, refrigerator, stereo, camera, motorcycle, furniture set, washing machine, and 
electric fan). By all measures, Deng could cautiously proclaim that his reform path had borne 
China its first fruits.
399 
Having achieved substantial improvements to China’s economic situation with his own 
brand of domestic reforms, unsurprisingly Deng, like Honecker half a world away, was no fan of 
Gorbachev’s calls for an alternate path to reform via his Perestroika and Glasnost. Without a 
doubt, Gorbachev’s reforms were watched closely in China. Specialty journals such as 苏联东欧
问题 (Issues in Soviet and Eastern Europe) cast a curious, yet sceptical eye towards Moscow.400 
For a brief moment, Chinese leaders and government bodies were relatively split on how to view 
Gorbachev’s reforms. In the Foreign Ministry for example, opinions were divided on whether this 
was a welcome development out of the Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko stagnation or simply a 
capitulation to Western calls for more political reform. Whereas economic reform was welcomed, 
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older Soviet Union-hands in the Foreign Ministry such as the Head of the Soviet/Eastern European 
department Yu Hongliang were sceptical that sudden, wholesale economic reforms like those 
proposed by Moscow could work.
401
 It did not take long for private criticisms of the Soviet path to 
grow as it became clearer that Gorbachev also had political reforms on his agenda, something 
which was fervently opposed in Beijing. Vice-Premier Li Peng, a strongman in the conservative 
faction of the CCP, penned in his diary: “…Gorbachev shouts a lot and does little”. Others thought 
that Gorbachev’s reforms had created leadership rifts in the Kremlin, while Deng had been able to 
bring Zhongnanhai together.
402
  
Another criticism of Gorbachev centered around what Beijing deemed Gorbachev’s 
capitulations to Western standards of governance. In Beijing’s view, Washington was using 
Gorbachev’s liberal stance to weaken socialist regimes through ‘peaceful evolution’, that is, by 
destabilizing communist regimes through peacefully promoting pluralist elements which erode 
central authoritarian powers. Since John Foster Dulles first mentioned this method as a potential 
strategy to weaken China, Chinese leaders have been extremely sensitive to any perceived threats 
of Western subversion.
403
 For this reason Beijing’s leaders have always been very suspicious of 
other nations’ ulterior motives in dealing with communist states, often suspecting that foreign 
demands to change the internal status quo are ultimately tied to efforts to erode sovereignty.
404 
Thus, while Deng was willing to liberalize China’s economy and invite further foreign 
investment, he certainly was not ready to allow the kind of political liberalization that Glasnost 
foresaw. Albeit Deng did expend some effort in learning about potential paths towards political 
reform in the mid 1980s, even setting up a Central Committee Small Group on Political Systems 
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Reform (中央政治体制改革研讨小组) in mid-September 1986, his main concern was still firmly 
centered on getting China into economic modernity.
405
 While clearly a proponent for economic 
flexibility in shaping China’s development path, famously arguing that it did not matter if it was a 
black cat or a white cat that caught the mouse, Deng was not ready prepared to apply the same 
kind of flexibility to the political sphere.
406
 
 
Laying the groundwork – Sino-East German summitry leading up to Honecker’s state visit 
 
 Both the GDR and China found no favour in Gorbachev’s reform path and were more 
than willing to ignore Moscow’s prescriptions. This created the curious net effect in which East 
Berlin and Beijing were increasingly bound together through their common suspicions of the 
Kremlin’s reform efforts. During bilateral exchanges, disagreements with the Kremlin’s new path 
started to be discussed openly. During Honecker’s visit to Beijing in 1986, the East German 
leader, to the satisfaction of his Chinese hosts, would repeatedly stress that the GDR had in fact 
undergone 15 years of reforms in order to become an advanced socialist society since the SED 
VIII Party Congress in 1971 and thus had no need for further reforms as called for by the Soviet 
Union.
407
 Chinese leaders reciprocated this sentiment. Unsurprisingly, Honecker’s independent 
foreign policy stance didn’t just find expression in his dogged pursuit to save détente in Europe 
but also translated into the continuation of an independent stance towards China. The GDR not 
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only displayed the same flexibility and independence towards China that had been characteristic of 
Pankow’s foreign policy during the latter Brezhnev years and the short reigns of Andropov and 
Chernenko, but now motivated by Moscow’s seeming continued abandonment accentuated in light 
of its new reform path, Honecker was willing to put his engagement with China into a new gear. 
As a result, Sino-GDR contacts started to gain in frequency and the relationship blossomed.
408
 
To be sure, after Honecker had seized the initiative in the aftermath of Brezhnev’s 1982 
Tashkent speech, relations seemed to be improving month by month. In this sense, a solid 
groundwork had already been laid to push forward the bilateral relationship during the Gorbachev 
years. Whereas earlier contacts had been largely made up of learning delegations and relatively 
low-ranking diplomats, the middle of the decade brought about a series of high-profile visits by 
relatively senior leaders on both sides. Thus, East German State Secretary and Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Herbert Krolikowski’s visit to Beijing in April 1984 served as a vital milestone to 
expanding relations. Beijing reciprocated by dispatching Foreign Trade Minister Chen Muhua as 
well as the Head of the State Economic Commission, Zhang Jingfu, to East Germany as soon as 
possible to show Zhongnanhai’s equalled determination to foster ties.409  
  Krolikowski came to China with a specific mission – to try to pry the Chinese market open 
for more East German exports. During his visit, the State Secretary hinted to Wu Xueqian that 
“the GDR was a developed industrial country and China possesses over great natural resources 
and a huge market”.410 These oft-repeated sentiments illustrate that the GDR, despite having 
witnessed disappointing trade figures in the early 1980s, had not lost hope in establishing a market 
for their export goods. To the satisfaction of Krolikowski, Beijing on more than one occasion, 
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showed its appreciation for continued economic cooperation. During Krolikowski’s visit, Zhang 
Jingfu made a point of thanking the East German statesman for the warm welcome that Zhu 
Rongji had received during his study tour of the GDR. Zhang stated his enthusiasm after reading 
Zhu’s reports and congratulated Krolikowski on the GDR’s great industrial achievements. Zhang 
expressed his confidence that agreements and contracts that were to be discussed during Zhu’s 
Spring 1984 visit to the GDR would soon be signed.
411
 To outline Beijing’s continued interest in 
learning from one of the leading socialist economies of the world, Zhang made it absolutely clear 
that many in the Chinese leadership were interested in “expanding economic, scientific-technical 
and trade relations with the GDR”, stressing that this “opening to the outside” would be crucial in 
the People’s Republic’s two main goals of “establishing 100 key industrial programs” and the 
reconstruction of certain industries, reiterating that “China is interested in modern technology”.412 
To entice GDR technology transfers, Zhang was not shy to dangle the alluring prize of increased 
Sino-GDR trade in front of Krolikowski. Thus, he intimated to Krowlikowski that “technology 
transfers could only have the effect of increasing trade between both countries” and that “friendly 
countries”, i.e. the GDR, should cooperate with Beijing to create a more open Chinese market.413 
As if to probe if East Berlin was ready to continue assisting China in its modernization efforts, 
Zhang remarked that the “GDR had already helped China during the first 5-year plan, China 
assumes that the GDR is still ready to help in China’s reconstruction” and welcomed the planned 
visit by the Minister for Heavy Industries, Kersten as “trade can be better developed through a 
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deeper understanding of the [trade] partner.
414
 Krolikowski was only too glad to agree 
wholeheartedly at the prospect of improving bilateral trade relations and the possibility of 
exploring the Chinese market. The East German statesman invited Zhang Jingfu to visit the GDR 
to “make his own impression about East German developments”.415 More than its practical nature, 
Krolikowski’s visit was a very important trust-building exercise for both countries. The East 
German statesman was invited to the Peking Institute for the Research into International 
Questions, the first time that a Warsaw Pact leader was extended an invitation in 20 years.
416
  
To impress Krolikowski, the Chinese were also eager to share their experiences of 
Beijing’s implementation of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” by giving him a tour of the 
Special Economic Zones, where Deng was attracting foreign investment with the implementation 
of more liberal economic policies.
417
 Beijing was proud to report that economic growth within the 
last five years had been the most dynamic since the founding of China and these developments 
were only achieved with selected decentralization of single production facilities. His Chinese 
hosts told Krolikowski that these Special Economic Zones would eventually form the basis for 
Chinese modernization efforts and would be instrumental in the collection of reform experiences 
to be adopted across the country.
418
 Krolikowski held back on explicit compliments on the Special 
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Economic Zones. Having already embarked on its own brand of reform, most GDR diplomats and 
leadership alike regarded the Chinese model of reform as ill-informed.
419 
All in all, the visit was a resounding success and had the desired effect of deepening 
bilateral relations. Contacts were established between the East German Volkskammer and the 
National People’s Congress and both countries vowed to continue political dialogue at the 39th 
UN General Assembly in the Fall of 1984. In addition, plans were made for the conclusion of a 
consular treaty, the preparation of a long-term scientific-technical exchange agreement, reciprocal 
visits of the respective heads of the state economic planning commissions as well as the inking of 
a long-term trade treaty for the years 1986-90.
420
  
Krolikowski’s whirlwind tour of China had done a great deal to cast aside any remaining 
suspicions between the two countries. Encouraged by the trip, the second in charge of the Far 
Eastern section of the MfAA, former Ambassador to China and noted Sinophile Helmut 
Liebermann, called together the ambassadors of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary in 
a secret meeting in Beijing to tell them of the successes of the trip and make to stress to fellow 
Warsaw Pact states that the GDR would continue to pursue independent, Moscow-defying 
relations with China. After having led an open revolt in the 1982 Interkit and now fancying its role 
as a bloc leader when it came to China affairs, East Berlin was now staging its own ‘anti-Interkit 
Interkit’ by encouraging Moscow’s close allies to enter into more amicable relations with China 
against the Soviet line.
421
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That the Pankow leadership knew full well that it was embarking on a controversial policy 
of subversion within the Soviet bloc can be told from its intentionally contradictory statements 
allies about Krolikowski’s tour of China. Tellingly, Krolikowski presented a very different version 
of events to close Soviet allies Mongolia and Vietnam during a separate meeting in Berlin. Far 
from gloating about his successes in China in establishing friendly contacts with a multitude of 
ministries and Chinese leaders, the East German State Security made a point to play down his 
China visit, leaving no doubt that East Berlin did not want to emphasize its burgeoning relations 
with China to states that feared China’s rise in the international system. As such, Krolikowski told 
the Vietnamese and Mongolian Ambassador that contacts were only made at the lowest levels and 
that trade negotiations were not progressing as desired.
422
 Predictably, Krolikowski duplicitously 
told Soviet Ambassador through Soviet diplomat V.A. Koptelzew that he had stuck to the agreed 
Soviet line during his meetings in China.
423 
 
Beijing’s interests 
 
From Beijing’s perspective, Honecker’s GDR still presented an enticing proposition in the 
mid-1980s. Zhongnanhai continued to hope that East Germany could provide China with a look at 
how socialist economies could become “world class”.424 Its know-how and lessons could then be 
potentially passed on to Chinese companies and local governments. It is for this reason that 
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Beijing took the initiative to send Minister-President (later Premier) Li Peng in April 1985 to East 
Berlin to foster even deeper relations with East Germany.
425
 In preparation for his visit, the PRC 
embassy stressed to its East German contacts that China was more than eager to learn about “the 
construction of socialism” in the GDR and how East Berlin had been so successful in planning its 
economy, as “[these lessons] would have profound implications for the enactment of reforms in 
China”.426  To play on the heart-strings of East Berlin, the embassy informed that Li Peng would 
be interested in discussing a long term trade agreement while he was in the GDR.
427
 Certainly, the 
possibility of reversing the declining trade trend from the beginning of the decade must have been 
music to Honecker’s ears 
During his talks with Honecker, Li, in line with China’s focus on economic matters 
according to the priorities set forth by Deng, outlined four main topics that he wanted to address, 
with “the implementation of economic reforms” at the top of the list, followed by other reform-
oriented topics such as “the fulfilment of the next five year plan”, “the leadership of industry at 
different levels” and “the opening of the PRC”.428 While asking for East German help to establish 
key Chinese industries, Li was quick to emphasize that China, because of its special 
characteristics due to its large population and relatively backward economy, will have to pursue a 
special path.
429
 As Gorbachev’s calls for Perestroika and Glasnost became more prominent, this 
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line would repeatedly be used by Beijing to differentiate between Chinese reforms and those in 
the Soviet Union. Overall, Li Peng’s visit was another milestone in GDR-PRC relations. Both 
countries had shown that they were more than interested in building a meaningful relationship. 
As relations forged ahead, Beijing made sure that the provinces also sought renewed 
economic engagement with the GDR in order to learn from what was considered an East 
European powerhouse. To be sure, far-ranging cooperation agreements had already been initiated 
at the provincial level. For example, in 1984, the Shandong Medical Department started 
cooperating with GDR experts in order to establish advanced facilities with X Rays and 
respirators in Shandong province.
430
 In July 1984, the Jiangsu provincial electrical cooperation, in 
accordance with directives from the centre, dispatched a study-delegation to learn from the East 
German electrical industry.
431
 In November of the same year, Beijing asked provincial 
governments in Liaoning, Hubei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanxi, Hebei, Tianjin and Guilin to send 
their representatives to the Beijing agricultural show in November 1984 so that they may seek out 
cooperation methods with TEXTIMA, a leading East German textiles company.
432
 In August 
1985, Beijing was proud to report to the provinces that a National People’s Congress delegation 
had visited Poland and the GDR to further build on China’s blossoming relations with Eastern 
European countries. In the GDR, the delegation noted that they were not supposed to be received 
by Honecker, as such an honour was usually reserved for state guests. It was therefore to the great 
surprise of the delegation that the East German General Secretary, clearly showing the importance 
he placed on bettering trade relations, spent around two hours with the delegation.
433
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Setting the stage for a meeting 
 
It was clear by the mid-1980s that both countries knew what advantages they could derive 
from one another and sought to expand its relations accordingly. On top of the practical 
advantages that could be harvested, Honecker also encouraged these more frequent delegation 
exchanges as groundwork for a potentially groundbreaking meeting between himself and Deng 
Xiaoping. While the possibility of a visit was discussed by both sides, it was Wu Xueqian who 
formally extended an invitation to Honecker in April 1986 on his tour of the GDR, stating that 
“comrade Hu Yaobang and comrade Li Xiannian would very much welcome it, if comrade 
Honecker were to visit the People’s Republic of China soon.434 
Beijing was more than enthusiastic about the chance to host not only the leader of a 
previously inaccessible close Soviet ally but also what it deemed an economically vigorous 
socialist state. In the months prior to the summit, preparations for the visit went into high gear. 
Beijing asked provincial governments to suggest specific areas where they would like to see 
further cooperation with East Germany.
435
 In accordance, bilateral exchanges picked up another 
gear and started to get more frequent not only on the state level but also on the provincial level.
436
 
In the western press, this was erroneously taken as a sign that East Germany was now moving 
forward with the consensus of Moscow to mend fences between the two communist giants. As a 
September 3 a New York Times article suspected: 
East Germany appears to have the cautious blessing of the Soviet 
Union, according to scholars and Bonn officials. Since 1982, when the 
Soviet Union made its first overtures to China, East Germany has been 
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quietly mending the relations that were ruptured two decades earlier in 
the course of the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking. The 
visit to China in the latter half of October by the East German leader, 
Erich Honecker, 74 years old, is expected to consolidate relations and 
possibly open the way for other Eastern European Communist chiefs to 
follow…437 
 
Indeed, as the article correctly hints at, being the first Eastern European bloc leader to be invited 
to China, Honecker’s visit further reinforced his own image of himself as a trailblazer in Eastern 
Bloc foreign relations. The New York Times article was proudly circulated in the Politburo.
438
 
What the author of the article, and indeed common perception, failed to appreciate is that East 
Berlin did not have the “cautious blessing” of Moscow but rather completely defied the Kremlin 
in staging the visit.  
Even though Gorbachev appreciated that East Berlin had ceased dancing to its tune, 
especially when it came to foreign policy, he still made every effort to restrain the GDR. Fervently 
against any expansion of Sino-GDR relations ahead of any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, 
Gorbachev desperately tried to prevent a potential visit from taking place. While himself seeking a 
normalization with China, he, like the men in the Kremlin before him was adamant that Soviet 
satellite states should not step out of line when seeking a rapprochement with Beijing. As it 
became apparent that the planning for Honecker’s visit was in its final phase and the East German 
leader had no intention of postponing or cancelling it, the Soviet leader had made his disapproval 
perfectly clear in a series of meetings with East German officials prior to the proposed date of 
Honecker’s visit. Thus, when Planning Chief and Deputy Prime Minister Gerhard Schürer issued 
Gorbachev an overly positive report about the potential for Sino-East German relations from his 
July 1985 trip to China, Gorbachev issued Schürer a stern rebuttal and reminder that China was 
still not a friend of the Soviet Union. As Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko had done before 
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him, Gorbachev implicitly accused Honecker of being gullible and naïve when it came to his 
China policy. Noting that Deng Xiaoping was still labelling the Soviet Union as an enemy and 
that Beijing was still calling for the Warsaw Pact and COMECON to be weakened, Gorbachev 
stressed that it was more than inappropriate for East Berlin to pursue an improvement of relations 
with China.
439
 
Honecker ploughed ahead undeterred by Moscow’s niggling protests and overt attempts to 
sabotage his plans. In East Berlin’s view, Honecker’s visit was not only to validate his hard work 
in fostering GDR-PRC relations in fierce opposition to the Soviet Union but it was also the 
initiation of a ‘second phase’ of foreign relations between the two states. After the initial reset 
between the two countries had yielded substantial symbolic and some material results via cultural 
and economic exchanges, both countries were eager to take their relations to a new level. Thus, 
the SED Politburo’s prepatory report estimated that the visit “will start a new stage in bilateral 
relations between both parties, states and people” and will “build a new basis for the expansion of 
political, economic and scientific-technical relations”.440 Accordingly, Honecker aimed to broaden 
the GDR’s engagement with China on every level and sought to weave the individual strands of 
bilateral contacts that had been won since reengaging Beijing in the early 1980s into a single 
tapestry of lasting relations. For this purpose, contacts were sought at every level. Thus, during the 
East German delegation’s time in China, Secretary of the Economy Günter Mittag planned to seek 
out Li Peng, member of the CCP Politburo and a Vice Minister-President of the state council of 
China. Head of the Politburo’s International Relations Department Günter Sieber was to meet Zhu 
Liang, the Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. While 
Minister for Trade Gerhard Beil planned to foster his contacts with Zhen Tuobin, Minister of 
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Foreign Trade.
441
  
In a last-ditch attempt to keep his client states in a coordinated goose-step, Gorbachev was 
willing to use all the tools at his disposal to spoil the visit. Among East German leaders, Egon 
Krenz recalls Gorbachev’s express disapproval of the visit.442 According to the memories of GDR 
diplomats serving in China at the time, the Kremlin even made Polish leader Jaruzelski take a 
detour to stop over in Beijing on his way to Pyongyang right before Honecker’s visit with the 
explicit goal to spoil Honecker’s prestige-grabbing attempt to be the first Eastern European state 
visitor to China. Jaruzelski’s brief stopover was designed by the Kremlin as a last-ditch attempt to 
send a message of disapproval to Honecker.
443
 This sent a wave of general panic through all 
echelons of the East German foreign policy establishment. Rolf Berthold, East German 
Ambassador in Beijing at the time of the visit recalled that little sleep was had during those weeks 
to ensure that Jaruzelski’s layover would be classed as a ‘working level visit’ rather than a ‘state 
visit’ so as to not deprive Honecker and the GDR of the symbolic importance of the East German 
leader’s trip to Beijing.444 These quiet manoeuvres show that there was little love lost between 
Moscow and East Berlin when it came to China-affairs.  
 
Honecker’s visit 
 
Honecker, having single-mindedly embarked on this path of rapprochement with China, 
was not to be deterred by Gorbachev’s protestations, especially in light of Moscow’s ideological 
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abandonment of East Berlin amidst the initiation of Perestroika and Glasnost.
445
 Honecker soon 
claimed the ultimate prize for his unrelenting persistence by embarking on a monumental state 
visit to China in October 1986. Received by a 21-gun salute and numerous positive write-ups in 
the Chinese press, the East German leader was feted and celebrated in Beijing.
446
 In Honecker’s 
grand ‘red carpet diplomacy’ strategy, China was certainly a big feather in the cap. Although the 
East German leader had visited Italy and Greece in 1985 and Sweden in 1986, his visit to China 
had a special symbolic place for Honecker. He was to be the first Soviet-bloc leader to step foot in 
the Chinese capital with all the pomp and ceremony of a state visitor, the ultimate validation for 
the great statesman that Honecker saw himself as. To the East German leader, the fact that Sino-
Soviet relations were still more than shaky served testament to the truth that he was not only a 
more competent foreign policy operator than the men in the Kremlin but also, that he did not 
necessarily need Moscow’s approval or support anymore to be successful on the international 
stage.  
Interspersed in bilateral efforts to seek practical advantages, both parties were eager to use 
the summit to send a subtle, yet clear message to Moscow in light of their common disagreement 
with Gorbachev’s reform path – that this relationship was not to be affected by Soviet meddling 
anymore. A powerful tool that Honecker sought to use to define this relationship as independent 
and free of third state influences was to reawaken the amicable relations that both states enjoyed 
before the onset of the Sino-Soviet split. By emphasizing the historic connection between the two 
states, the East German leader hoped to place the root of their relationship on historical bilateral 
ties rather than a synthetic one defined by belonging to the same socialist bloc. Therefore, 
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throughout his visit, Honecker consciously and actively reiterated the message that the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Socialist Unity Party had enjoyed ‘unbroken’ relations since 1949. This 
also had the added convenience that party-relations, always a touchy subject in socialist countries, 
would not need to be mended. In his talks with Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping about bilateral 
relations both sides were eager to state that party-ties were never broken and thus would not need 
to be ‘normalized’.447 Wooing his Chinese hosts and evoking pleasant memories of the fraternal 
past, Honecker reminded Hu Yaobang of their historic bond by presenting him with a photo that 
showed the Chinese CC General Secretary posing and discussing with members of the FDJ during 
his time in the World Congress of the Democratic Youth.
448
 Similarly, during Honecker’s talks 
with Li Xianian in Nanjing on 21 October, the East German leader emphasized that he had known 
Chinese leaders like Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian for more than 30 years, since their days in 
their respective youth organizations. For Honecker, who valued old patronage networks at home 
in East Berlin and had composed his Politburo out of comrades he had known from FDJ times, 
this was a high praise indeed.
449
 The East German leader was more than keen to emphasize the 
‘special’ friendship that both states shared due to their founding in the same month of the same 
year.
450
 Deng Xiaoping immediately picked up on this theme of friendship as he told Honecker 
that he “agreed [with Honecker] that relations were never broken, hence one cannot talk of a 
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rapprochement”. Deng went on to remind Honecker of his 1925 trip to Germany where he was 
well taken care of by a Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands family, who, according to Deng 
were “true internationalists” and “true communists”.451 Only too glad to reciprocate Deng’s warm 
messages, Honecker replied that the “feelings of camaraderie of our people are very strong for the 
Chinese people as we strive to hold high the banner of mutual solidarity”.452  
Without a doubt, by casting the Sino-GDR relationship in historic context and giving it an 
‘exclusive’ feel by not mentioning the Soviet Union even once during the initial exchanges, both 
countries sought to define their unique relationship outside of the confines of Soviet influence. 
 
Honecker’s lessons 
 
To make this ‘second’ stage of intensified bilateral contact attractive to Beijing, Honecker 
not only sought to outline the ‘special’ historic connections between both states but also went out 
of his way to present his GDR as a successful socialist state worth emulating. This made sense for 
both prestige and economic reasons. By doing so, Honecker hoped to reverse the worrying trend 
that had been plaguing bilateral trade relations by appealing to the eager reformists surrounding 
Deng. In addition, it would give the East German General Secretary a chance to highlight his 
successes in managing a leading communist state. Thus, during his meeting with Deng, Honecker 
informed his Chinese host East Germany was still successfully pursuing its policy of Unity of 
Economic and Social Policy (Einheit von Wirtschaft und Sozialpolitik) which it adopted in 1971 
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and which Honecker ultimately attributed East Germany’s economic successes. Almost lecturing, 
Honecker told Deng that socialism can only be constructed when “considerable political and 
social work had been done, the economy has been developed and a generous social welfare 
program exists”. “Only this”, Honecker added, “has allowed the GDR to join the ranks of the ten 
leading industrialist states in the world”.453 Of course, Honecker neglected to mention the 
precarious state that the East German economy found itself partly due to the excessive spending 
attributed to this welfare policy.
454
  That his Chinese hosts followed his every word with great 
interest must have been incredibly pleasing for Honecker, who positively thrived on the 
international recognition that foreign visits and compliments garnered him.  
Throughout Honecker’s time in China, the East German leader was eager to uphold the 
image that the GDR was an advanced industrialist state from which China could learn. Not 
mincing words when he met General Secretary Hu Yaobang, he stated at the beginning of their 
conversation that the GDR has achieved “a dynamic development of the economy, and has 
reached a top standard with which we can compete in the world market”.455 Trying to impress his 
hosts, Honecker went on to brag that the 
…national income presently is 4.3% higher than the same time-
span in the year before and will climb further. These increases were 
only possible with a 90% increase in labour productivity…The 
successes of the economy are connected with the increased 
performance in the social aspects of life. The income of the 
population is increasing at 4% annually…it should be noted that 
the prices of 80% of the goods have stayed constant for decades 
(outlining the increased purchasing power of the GDR 
population).
456
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With the benefit of hindsight into the GDR economy, we know that these policies did their part to 
deplete the GDR’s state coffers, but at the time Honecker’s ability to provide his people with ever 
more purchasing power was a point of pride for the East German leader, especially considering 
that the Chinese government was trying to achieve the same for its people.
457
 Thus, Honecker’s 
further description of his extensive apartment building projects, as well as the solution of the food 
question (Ernährungsfrage) with successful harvest techniques, served as a real point of pride in 
front of a Beijing regime that was trying to provide the Chinese population with what Honecker 
seemingly had already given his own population.
458
 The East German leader went on to talk at 
length about his development of the high technology sector (microelectronics, optoelectronics and 
sensor technology), a pet project that he had always derived extreme pride from.
459
 Speaking of 
his ‘successes’ in this area, the Honecker proudly stated that some machines that the GDR 
produced “are only made of robots” and that “laser technology is used even in our textile 
industry”, concluding grandly that the “microelectronics industry has led to a triumphing of the 
GDR economy”.460 In doing so, Honecker even implied the GDR microelectronics industry’s 
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superior ingenuity in comparison with its West German counterparts, remarking that while the 
GDR’s microelectronics industry was homegrown, the FRG’s was simply operating with 
American ideas.
461
 Deng’s answer that “you are a model of emulation in this area” and that “[the 
GDR] is far more developed” certainly only gave Honecker affirmation of the GDR’s worth to 
China. 
 Building on his Chinese hosts’ interest in East German industrial combines, an area where 
Beijing had shown considerable interest in the earlier part of the decade, Honecker also made a 
point to outline his successes there.
462
 The East German leader pronounced that “while different 
socialist countries have tried different things, we think that we did not make a mistake to rely on 
combines”. Stressing that combines have all the “benefits of a capitalist entity, except not being 
capitalist”, Honecker struck a deep chord with his Chinese hosts.463 It was exactly the benefits of 
capitalist development under central authority that Zhongnanhai sought. Certainly, Honecker’s 
intimations that, “it is best to stay with democratic centralism and to encourage regional 
initiatives” found a welcome audience in Beijing circles as it echoed the basic ideology behind the 
special economic zones. Thus, Honecker’s thorough description of his 127 Kombinate was 
followed with great interest by Hu Yaobang. Similarly, during his meeting with Zhao Ziyang, 
Honecker confidently boasted that the West not only “looks up” to East German Kombinate but 
that two East German microelectronics Kombinate were already at American and Japanese levels 
in terms of technology. Zhao Ziyang’s reply that he especially wished to learn more about the 
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work of the combines must have been music to Honecker’s ears.464 That China had turned some of 
the lessons acquired during their early learning missions into operating facilities also served as a 
confirmation that Beijing wasn’t just feigning interest. Indeed, the East German leader happily 
and half-braggingly talked at length about a steel combine near Beijing which had been built with 
GDR help.
465
 With East German technical experts having been instrumental in setting up key 
industrial facilities such as the Joint Electronics Components Factory 718 in Beijing (now an art 
district called “798”) during the early days of friendship in the 1960s, the foundation was certainly 
there for further technical cooperation. 
Throughout the visit, the East German leader was not afraid to make bold claims about the 
overall state of the GDR economy. When Honecker was asked later by Li Xianian on which 
socialist country enjoyed the highest standard of living, Honecker proudly answered without 
hesitation “The GDR!”.466 Although the East German General Secretary’s statement that his 
economic advances had left the GDR population better off than the people of the FRG must have 
raised some suspicious eyebrows in the leadership circle, there can be absolutely no doubt that 
Chinese leaders believed the general picture of economic vigour painted by the East German 
helmsman.
467
 After Honecker’s thorough presentation of the East German economy, Hu 
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enthusiastically stated that “he was happy to learn about East German successes” and he was of 
the opinion that there is a big potential for further cooperation between the two states, especially 
for economic cooperation.
468
 Indeed, a similar ‘humble’ attitude was displayed by Chinese leaders 
throughout Honecker’s visit, with Li Xianian conceding to the GDR leader during their meeting 
on October 21 Beijing’s desire to bring China out of poverty, lamenting that “the Cultural 
Revolution has meant that we have lost ten years of development…the world has developed 
further and China has stayed behind.”469 In a similar fashion, Deng stated during his meeting with 
Honecker that “[the GDR’s] political and economic situation were very stable. You can surely 
help us as you have a very advanced society”. Indeed, this was totally in line with the “eager 
student” attitude displayed through most of the early days of the Reform and Opening process.470  
One can only imagine the sense of validation that Honecker must have felt when Deng 
vowed to send more study delegations to the GDR as, according to the Chinese leader, China “was 
not receiving everything it needed from the US and Japan”.471 Günter Mittag, also present during 
the meeting, promised to exchange know-how with China as this was “a meaningful undertaking 
for the effectiveness of the economies of both countries”.472 As if this praise was not already 
enough to send Honecker’s pride for the GDR into overdrive, Deng’s thanks to GDR trainers in 
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helping China secure medals at the Asian games only added icing on top of what the East German 
leader already regarded as a very successful visit. It gave the chance for Honecker to boast that the 
GDR’s athletes were far superior to that of the FRG, noting that “during the Munich Olympics, 
the Bundeswehr had to play the GDR anthem 20 times. It was said that they didn’t need the notes 
for it after a while”.473 The GDR would continue its commitment to cooperate with China in 
sports matters as a trainer delegation under Roland Mathes, the most successful backstroke 
swimmer of all time, was despatched to China for a 6-month stint in May of the following year.
474 
 
Tangible results 
 
The Chinese leadership, interested in East German technological know-how rather than its 
products, jumped at the chance of further cooperation. At the presence of Honecker and Li 
Xianan, Günter Mittag and Li Peng met to discuss the long-term development of the scientific-
technical cooperation between the GDR and the PRC.
475
 To further entice East German interest, 
Zhao Ziyang also stated that individual Chinese provinces would be given their own autonomy to 
engage with the GDR, thereby potentially opening up the entire country for East German goods.
476
 
Extensive negotiations took place on October 22 between Günter Mittag and Li Peng on the 
details of economic and trade cooperation. From the beginning, Mittag displayed a very eager 
attitude, expressing his desire to cooperate more closely and conveying East Berlin’s willingness 
to provide know-how as well as its help in reconstructing production facilities. Like Zhao Ziyang, 
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Mittag also expressed his hope for inter-regional cooperation between the provinces and the 
Bezirke. Concrete Chinese interests for the East German Kombinat model was also displayed by 
Li Peng who suggested that both countries cooperate to establish a carbochemical industrial 
complex in Wuhai in inner Mongolia as “the GDR possesses over corresponding experiences, 
especially in establishing the Kombinat Schwarze Pumpe and Buna.” Clearly having analyzed 
Wuhai as an especially good place to have such a combine, Li Peng went into great detail on the 
abundance of labour, coal and energy sources which would make this project a success. Li further 
expressed hopes that this project could be done through a joint venture. These hopes soon turned 
to reality. With East German help, the Inner Mongolia Wuhai Chemical Industry Corporation, a 
coal mining and processing facility that is still in operation today, received a vital injection of 
foreign expertise as two months after Honecker’s visit, a special delegation from the East German 
Ministry for Coal Industry was dispatched from the GDR to China.
477
 Considering that most other 
joint ventures in China had been set up with Western European, American or Asian partners, this 
project was a real coup for Honecker.
478 
 Overall, Li Peng’s desire to push forward GDR-PRC 
cooperation in all respects was palpable. To drive home his point, the Chinese statesman intimated 
to Honecker that it was high time that the GDR and PRC have deeper economic contacts, 
considering that such cooperation already exists between capitalist states and China.
479
 The 
Chinese premier expressed hope to Honecker that, pending Moscow’s approval of the use of their 
airspace, a direct flight connection should be set up between Beijing and East Berlin as soon as 
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possible to foster further social and economic contact between the countries. The meeting ended 
with Li and Mittag celebrating the 31 contracts that were signed to aid in China’s reconstruction 
efforts outlining further scientific-technical cooperation until the year 2000.
480
 On both sides, the 
enthusiasm of top-ranking officials such as Qin Zhongda, Minister for the Chinese chemical 
industry, Lu Xueqian, the Chinese Vice-Minister for foreign trade and economics, Gerhard Beil, 
East German Minister for Foreign Trade, showed that mutual interest in cooperation was not 
feigned.
481
 Thus, while trade would continue on a disappointing trend from the East German 
perspective, with the GDR Embassy noting in November 1987 that Beijing’s suggested bilateral 
trade volume for 1987 of 450 million CHF was far lower than the envisaged 610 million CHF that 
East Berlin had proposed, technical exchanges increased.
482  Three months after Honecker’s visit, 
a deal was signed between the chemical products combine Grimma and a gas production facility 
in Harbin for the delivery of specialized gas processing equipment and expertise.
 
In the same 
month, a delegation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences visited the GDR.
483
 Chinese cities and 
provinces were also eager to cast their eyes on East Germany for expertise and lessons. Reflecting 
Beijing’s interests, Shanghai’s Commission for Science and Technology dispatched a delegation 
on a ten-day study tour of the GDR to visit combines and to establish regional contacts for further 
technological knowledge transfers.
484
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While Chinese interest in Eastern European economic know-how and technology remained 
a substantial raison d’être for continuing relations with the GDR, it should be noted that China 
would never be as enthusiastic about bilateral relations as Honecker was. The reason is simple. 
Whereas Honecker used foreign relations to gain international legitimacy and kudos from Eastern 
European states as well as to secure an additional market for East German export goods, the GDR 
offered far less for the Chinese side. As much as China was interested in East German technology 
and practical lessons on how to successfully plan its own economy, it was also engaging a variety 
of other states for the same purpose. Zhao Ziyang made this point absolutely clear during his 
meeting with Honecker on 22 October 1986. Even though he reiterated that “[Beijing’s] door is 
open to [the GDR]”, he also told Honecker that China was simultaneously receiving technological 
assistance from other countries.
485
 However, even though Beijing’s relationship with the GDR 
was perhaps not as important as it was from East Berlin’s perspective, Zhongnanhai was still very 
enthusiastic to explore further contacts in order to siphon technological know-how from East 
Germany. All things considered, this was one of the main reasons that Honecker was invited to 
Beijing as the first Eastern European state visitor.  
Another point of potential friction came from China’s engagement with Bonn.486 Even 
though the GDR more than understood that Beijing, driven mostly by economic interests, was 
intent on fostering a close relationship with the FRG, it still found time to remind the Chinese 
leadership of the inherently anti-socialist nature of the Bonn government in the hopes of doing 
whatever it could to prevent China from getting too close to Bonn at East Berlin’s cost. This was 
especially pertinent considering the drastic expansion of trade relations between Bonn and 
Beijing. With West German-Chinese trade totalling 9 billion DM in 1986, almost 12 times the 
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volume of GDR-Chinese trade, Honecker was intent on outlining the ideological divergences 
between Bonn and the socialist world.
487
 Intimating that it was a “hard ideological fight to have 
three TV stations and over twenty-five radio stations broadcasting imperialist ideology which are 
in German and which every apartment can receive”, Honecker attempted to make sure that Hu 
Yaobang understood the extent of the FRG’s subversion against the GDR during their meeting in 
October 1986.
488
 Without a doubt, Beijing was aware of these challenges as Chinese study 
delegations to West Germany were inevitably always asked to support the West German stance of 
a potential reunification of the country.
489
 Trying to remind Beijing further which Germany it 
should engage with, Honecker stated that even though he had met with Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
and ex-Chancellor Schmidt on several occasions, it was clear to him that “the imperialists cannot 
get rid of their appetite for conquest….After the Second World War, they were happy that they 
got half of Germany, now they want the rest. They won’t be successful.”490 Overall, this fight was 
only waged half-heartedly. While East German diplomats and policy-makers knew full well that 
they were probably the most important Eastern European state that China was engaging with, they 
also appreciated that they could not fully compete with the overall economic importance that its 
western counterpart had gained in Beijing’s economic agenda.491 However, at least in the short 
term, the MfAA was pretty confident that its continued protestations had translated into Beijing’s 
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acceptance and adoption of the existence of two Germanies.
492
 
 
Honecker the statesman 
 
Far more than securing merely additional economic benefits for the GDR, Honecker 
intended to use this grand stage of diplomacy to the fullest. His visit was to both put another 
exclamation mark on his achievements as a great statesman as well as to further underline the 
legitimacy and prestige of the GDR as a sovereign and independent state. Thus, on top of 
presenting himself as a capable economic manager, the East German leader also wanted to outline 
his own initiatives to show the importance that East German foreign policy’s had gained under 
him. Thus, Honecker’s Friendenspolitik permeated his messages in China. The East German 
leader stressed that the SED’s XI Party Congress in April 1986 had concentrated a substantial part 
of its discussions on the upholding and continuation of his policy to promote peace and non-
proliferation in Europe.
493
 Fancying himself as a knowledgeable voice of reason in international 
affairs, Honecker also tried to push China towards the same goal. Honecker welcomed China’s 
efforts at the maintenance of world peace at the UN and stressed that China must also make itself 
heard on issues such as the American SDI initiative. It is after all, Honecker stressed, “the 
responsibility of all communist and peaceful states [to maintain peace].”494  
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 Continuing from his theme of détente and Friedenspolitik, Honecker welcomed the 
meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, where Moscow and Washington had tried 
to come to an agreement two weeks earlier (11-12 October, 1986) to reduce strategic nuclear 
weapons by 50%. To Hu, the East German leader passionately stated that “self-criticism, as was 
done after the Second World War isn’t going to be possible after a third world war… [therefore] 
we connect our fight to strengthen socialism with the defence of peace. We will do everything that 
will lead into this direction.”495 The same message was put forward by Honecker during a state 
banquet in his honour on 23 October. He called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, 
especially with “the lessons that Chernobyl has taught us”.496 His statement that “for the first time 
in history there are nuclear missiles stationed in the FRG as well as the GDR” and that Berlin was 
“interested that these weapons disappear again” found receptive ears in Beijing.497  
 Within this peace theme, Honecker also wished to be instrumental in mending fences 
between Moscow and Beijing. Not only did he want to use his visit to promote his own standing 
as a capable statesman (certainly the most capable in the Eastern Bloc) but he endeavoured to 
utilize his position to be the conduit between Moscow and Beijing. Rather than doing a great 
service to the communist world and Moscow, this was motivated by Honecker’s own selfish 
calculations. If successful, it would be he who would do what Soviet leaders failed to do and be 
the one to bring China back into the socialist camp. It would be he who would end the Sino-Soviet 
conflict. Indeed, Honecker’s interactions with Chinese leaders leave little doubt as to his view of 
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himself as both a capable leader who was managing a successful socialist economy as well as a 
capable diplomat, relaying messages between world leaders and engaging with hitherto 
‘forbidden’ countries. This confident attitude was on full display at the XI. SED Party congress 
from 17-21 April in East Berlin, just 6 months before his eventual visit to Beijing. With 
Gorbachev and delegates from 140 communist parties present, Honecker had gone to great lengths 
to describe the successes of his foreign policy successes and to describe a “gratifying 
improvement of relations between the GDR and China.”498 
However, Honecker’s belief that he could be a Sino-Soviet bridge builder turned out to be 
a total overestimation of his role and influence in interstate relations. It also seems that Honecker 
grossly underestimated the importance that China attached to the Vietnam issue.
499 
During 
Honecker’s visit to Nanjing on 24 October, the confident East German leader held extensive talks 
with Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the CC of the CCP Politburo member, about the state 
of Sino-Soviet relations. When meeting Honecker, Hu was adamant to state that Sino-Soviet 
relations could only improve if the Soviet Union would stop supporting Vietnamese adventurism 
towards Cambodia. Beijing had sent a message to this effect through the Romanians to Moscow to 
drive home this message.
500
 With this issue unsolved, the subsequent ninth round of Vice-Foreign 
Minister level meetings between Moscow and Beijing had not made any substantial progress. Hu 
stressed that “No meeting is to take place at the highest levels without a solution of the Cambodia 
problem.”501 
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 Honecker was not deterred by these negative Chinese assessments of Sino-Soviet relations. 
Driven by both a desire to drive forward a global version of his Friedenspolitik as well as surely 
spurred on by the glory and applause a positive change in Sino-Soviet relations initiated by him 
would garner him, Honecker went on to attempt to play the Sino-Soviet middleman. As if he 
hadn’t heard Hu’s clear Cambodian precondition, Honecker expressed his hope for a meeting at 
the highest levels between the Soviet Union and China, saying that this would be a “monumental 
and historical occasion”.502 Expressing that he sincerely wished for an improvement of Sino-GDR 
relations, he assured that he expressed these wishes as a representative of the SED and not 
Gorbachev.
503
 Honecker persisted further, even claiming to have received hints from Vietnamese 
representatives in Berlin that they were willing to negotiate.
504 
 In the end, these initiatives were met with a negative response with Hu acknowledging that 
Honecker meant well but that Beijing could only negotiate if Vietnam pulled back its troops first. 
Honecker’s last desperate attempt in saying that he had already heard rumours that Vietnam had 
started to withdraw its troops was met by Hu’s steely response that these rumours were merely 
propaganda.
505
 In the end, Honecker’s hopeful initiative to restart the momentum in Sino-Soviet 
talks ran against Beijing’s unrelenting stance that the three conditions must be first eliminated 
before any kind of improvement in Sino-Soviet relations can take place. But what did Honecker 
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have to lose? If he was successful, he would have significantly added to his credos as a force on 
the international scene. If he wasn’t, he would have at the very least presented himself to Beijing 
as a well-connected middleman who had sway in the communist bloc. 
Throughout all this, Beijing also subtly tested the limits of GDR-Soviet divergence. 
Already appreciating that the GDR was probably acting out of line with Moscow by coming to 
China on a state visit, China probed further.
506
 Certainly, Zhu Liang’s statements that “every party 
decides on their own and no party has the right to be the leading party” during his meeting with 
Günter Sieber must have found resounding support by the East German delegation in light of the 
Pankow regime’s disagreements with Gorbachev.507 Setting an example by stressing that China’s 
relations with the GDR would not be affected by third states, Zhu mentioned that Beijing’s 
relations with FRG were not going to be detrimental to the GDR.
508
 Its message that the People’s 
Republic was capable of not letting the relations with third states affect Sino-GDR relations was 
not only steeped in a traditional Chinese non-interventionist foreign policy stance but in this 
instance it can also be understood to contrast against what it considered to be the ‘backward’ 
interdependencies of the Soviet Bloc. In a clear reference to East Berlin’s adherence to Moscow 
during the Sino-Soviet split, Deng stated to Honecker during their 23 October meeting that “many 
mistakes had been made in the past” and that we should “let the wind sweep away the past and 
look into the future”509 
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While the Sino-Soviet conflict could not, despite the East German General Secretary’s 
desperate attempts, be solved by Honecker in one fell swoop, both countries could add to their 
common economic and diplomatic interests important commonalities in the ideological sphere. 
Indeed, throughout the Sino-GDR exchanges in October 1986 a certain hard-lined like-
mindedness came to the fore. Especially in their attitude towards potential reformist tendencies in 
the communist bloc, both East Germany and China displayed a steadfast adherence to the status 
quo. For example, Honecker and the Chinese leadership certainly saw eye to eye on the Polish 
problem, with both parties condemning Solidarnosc and conceding that the situation should have 
been dealt with swifter measures.
510
 Certainly, Beijing had been watching the Solidarnosc 
movement very closely. It had been quick to condemn the strikes and had welcomed Jaruzelski’s 
imposition of martial law. With cases of labour unrest having also gripped China in 1980-81 in the 
Anshan steelworks in Manchuria and having spread to Shanghai, Kunming, Wuhan, Taiyuan as 
well as to Hubei and Shanxi provinces, Beijing had feared a similar situation erupting from its 
own industrial centres at the beginning of the decade.
511
 Predictably, Beijing was quick to 
dismantle labour organizations and condemn the unrest. A Polish-style standoff could have the 
potential to derail Deng’s Reform and Opening. This led to introspection and a further backlash 
against liberal tendencies in Beijing.
 512
 Thus, Honecker’s likeminded attitude only endeared him 
to Chinese leaders. As relations developed further, it would be this emerging ideological 
convergence which would become a major force in bilateral ties. 
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Conclusion 
 
East Berlin’s improving relations with Beijing were not lost on the general populus. On 25 
June 1986, a group of students at the Technical University in Dresden wrote to the Foreign 
Ministry to ask if they could be helpful in light of warming relations. “We assume that due to the 
size of China and her low level of industrial development, there must be a big Chinese interest to 
engage with foreign engineers”, the students wrote. The training engineers offered to learn 
Chinese in order to facilitate these exchanges. Keen to build on this enthusiasm, the MfAA 
answered a month later on 24 July 1986 and advised them to contact the Ministry for Higher and 
Vocational Education (Ministerium für Hoch- und Fachschulwesen) of the GDR in order to be put 
in contact with Chinese counterparts.
513
  
Among large swathes of the East German population, Honecker’s visit initiated a new 
phase of interest by the general public to ‘get in touch’ with the PRC.514 The MfAA started to 
receive a variety of letters ranging from ski-clubs and engineering associations who were eager to 
engage the GDR’s new friend. Almost all of the letters mention Honecker visit as having brought 
about a new phase in bilateral relations.
515
 Even though private exchanges between citizens were 
still quite limited, with new engagement fostered by education and state institutions, a new interest 
in China emerged in the GDR.
516
 Honecker’s visit not only heralded a new phase in bilateral 
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relations but had also piqued the interest of the East German population.
517 
From the East German perspective, Honecker’s state visit was a resounding success. While 
outlining the GDR as a leading industrial state, Honecker had also ‘sold’ its expertise and select 
economic models to China, adding to his belief that he was doing things right at home. For Deng, 
Honecker presented an interesting proposition. He could gain from East Germany a window into 
what economic models had made East German a leading socialist industrial state as well as the 
chance to procure select industrial products. Moreover, Deng had gained the trust of what was 
hitherto an inaccessible Soviet ally, outlining that Eastern Europe was not strictly a Soviet sphere 
anymore. Thus, both countries pursued rigorous talks both during and after Honecker’s visit to 
further intensify relations, ranging from cooperation in the area of trade to sport. Indeed, the 
rigorous exchange between Chinese and East German leaders in October 1986 clearly shows that 
mutual interest was anything but feigned. As Honecker’s visit brought about an even more intense 
phase of bilateral relations, the two countries would soon find a new area of commonality. 
Whereas hopes for trade and technical cooperation as well as a common willingness to resist 
Moscow had been a binding factor, an ideological conservatism in the face of Gorbachev’s reform 
plans drove the two regimes even closer. As both countries sought to resist Gorbachev’s 
Perestroika and Glasnost, an unlikely understanding was forged between East Berlin and Beijing 
that the Soviet development path was not the only way forward. Even though East Berlin and 
Beijing had very different visions for the future of their countries, they both agreed that the 
authority of the communist party must never be put in question. 
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Chapter Four: Friends in the time of turmoil, 1987-88 
 
Introduction 
 
 For Honecker, his 1986 state visit to Beijing came as a crowning moment. It was the 
ultimate reward for his tireless work to engage with China despite persistent Soviet protestations. 
The fact that Beijing granted him a state visit as the first Eastern European leader served to 
validate his China-policy. 
 As discussed in the last chapter, Gorbachev’s elevation to the position of General 
Secretary in 1985 was first accompanied in East Berlin with the hope that the same duplicity that 
had been displayed by Gorbachev’s predecessors would end, giving the two countries a chance to 
work out a coordinated China policy. Yet, Gorbachev’s rise to power only reinforced the same 
Soviet attitude towards Sino-East German relations. While a message of restraint was being 
preached to East Berlin, Moscow would unabatedly, and duplicitously from East Berlin’s 
perspective, seek some kind of rapprochement with China. That Gorbachev seemed to expend 
more effort than his predecessors on Sino-Soviet normalization while still maintaining that East 
Germany should restrain itself from Beijing only estranged Honecker further from Soviet China 
policy. 
 Added to Moscow’s duplicity in its China-policy, Gorbachev’s seeming intransigence 
towards the ‘German question’ irked Honecker. While ignoring East German requests to build its 
relations with Bonn and giving little attention to Honecker’s wish to delineate from the other 
Germany, Gorbachev seemed to expend considerable effort in seeking his own rapprochement 
with Bonn while discouraging East Berlin from doing the same. As will be shown, East German 
dissatisfaction and anger stemming from continuous frictions caused by Honecker’s insistence to 
visit Bonn in 1987, and Gorbachev’s attempt to dissuade him from such a visit, fed directly into 
the East German leader’s continued readiness to ignore Soviet directives. 
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 In Beijing, Chinese leaders secretly welcomed Honecker’s rejection of the Kremlin’s 
political reform path and, as was discussed in the last chapter, were not shy to make this known 
during Honecker’s 1986 visit. While the seeds for a Sino-East German ideological like-
mindedness were sown as soon as Gorbachev announced his Perestroika and Glasnost in 1986, 
this bond would grow due to what both governments perceived to be an imminent threat to the 
centrality of the party. As Beijing dealt with liberal tendencies in 1986 resulting from students’ 
desires for more political freedoms to accompany the economic reforms, East Berlin, plagued by 
its own concerns about its increasingly vociferous population, watched on curiously to see how 
Zhongnanhai would react.
518
 China’s subsequent decisive quelling of the 1986 protest movement 
and accompanying conservative backlash was welcomed in East Berlin and further deepened the 
conservative ideological commonality between the two regimes. For East Berlin, Beijing was 
increasingly becoming the dogmatic reference point that it had lost in Moscow. 
 This chapter will show that continued frictions on the German question, Gorbachev’s 
two-faced messages on his China policy as well as a common disagreement which Beijing and 
East Berlin shared on Gorbachev’s proposed reform path would drive relations forward. Cultural, 
political and, on a lesser level, economic relations continued to flourish. Despite the nagging 
knowledge in East Berlin that Beijing was tilting in Bonn’s favour when looking for technological 
cooperation, Deng and Honecker moved to deepen party ties and increasingly saw eye to eye in 
their dogmatic response to Moscow’s liberalization path. 
 
Soviet-East German relations: A growing sense of abandonment 
 
 As Honecker celebrated his much-anticipated and highly successful China-visit in 
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October 1986, he did so knowing that his erstwhile ideological role models in the Kremlin had 
become political liabilities rather than allies. As expected in East Berlin, this visit only had the 
effect of estranging Moscow even further. Gorbachev had reluctantly watched as Honecker 
paraded himself around China, riddled with a sense of personal affront. The East German visit 
was especially disrespectful in Gorbachev’s eyes since he had made his disapproval of a visit 
perfectly clear in the months prior to Honecker’s  October 1986 trip to Beijing.519  
 As Gorbachev’s initial reactions to Sino-East German relations would indicate, the 
same nagging frictions persisted and worsened under the new man in the Kremlin. Almost right 
away, any faint hopes that Gorbachev’s rise would reset Soviet-East German relations were 
quickly dashed when the SED-elite realized, among many worrying trends, that the Kremlin’s 
European policies would be centered around its own ‘selfish’ pursuits rather than concerning itself 
with the worries of its Eastern European allies. Especially in terms of inter-German relations, 
Honecker and the SED-elite were sometimes left scratching its head as to whose side Moscow 
was really on. 
To be sure, ideological tensions persisted. Honecker’s disagreement with Soviet calls for more 
transparency and accountability in government were increasingly finding their way from the privacy of 
negotiating rooms into the public eye. The clear ideological ‘break’ with Moscow came in late January 
1987. As Gorbachev announced in a January plenum of the CPSU CC his intentions to carry out secret 
ballots and intimated to his leadership circle that “we need democracy like we need air”, East Berlin 
shook in fear and anger.
520
 Gorbachev’s momentous talk was only printed in an abbreviated version in 
Neues Deutschland. In fact, after Gorbachev’s speech, the SED Politburo vowed to only publish speeches 
from comrades in the CPSU in short and “summarized” versions in the future.521 It was by now plain to 
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see that the SED sought a clear differentiation from the path embarked on by the CPSU. Not only were 
Moscow’s calls for political reform despised in East Berlin, but the Honecker regime also had to witness 
how Soviet liberal thinkers such as former journalist and Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisor Nikolai 
Portugalev were continuing to be granted a platform by the Kremlin to express their opinions. Thus, when 
Portugalev, a candidate member of the Central Committee no less, wrote an article in Moskoyskiye novosti 
in February 1987 which implied that East and West Germans belonged to one German nation, it sent 
shocks of horror through East Berlin.
522
 Accordingly, the East German state press started to selectively 
print the opinions of Soviet hard-liners such as Ligachev and made a concerted effort to suppress those of 
reformers such as Portugalev, Head of Propaganda Department Alexander Yakovlev and Moscow Mayor 
Boris Yeltsin.
523
 
 For Honecker, who had made it his life’s work to win the GDR more legitimacy and 
sovereignty, Moscow’s intransigence to the GDR’s position on the German question was more 
than just annoying slights. Considering that the presence of a hostile Cold War environment and 
the existence of a class-enemy across the border was one of the main raison d’êtres for the 
existence of East Germany, talk in the USSR of a ‘reunification’ were dangerous and careless 
from Honecker’s perspective. As Joachim Scholtyseck has pointed out, on the German question, it 
was a paradox that East Germany sought more coordination and ideological protection from 
Gorbachev in inter-German relations so as to not jeopardize the legitimacy of the GDR, while at 
the same time demanding more independence from Moscow in other areas of foreign policy.
524
  
 The severity of these insults was compounded by the fact that they were coming from 
the supposed ideological and administrative centre of the socialist camp, condoned by Gorbachev. 
To Honecker, this only further confirmed that Moscow could no longer be relied on to be the 
socialist world leader it once was. Rather, Honecker had started to determine that Soviet policies 
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were wholly incompatible with East Berlin’s vision of its own future.525 This realization only 
added to the disdain by the SED leadership towards Moscow. Egon Krenz would later recall that 
during the late 1980s, “More energy was expended in Politburo meetings discussing Gorbachev’s 
errors than on our own tasks at hand”.526 
 
Soviet-FRG relations from Pankow’s view: Why can you and we can’t? 
 
 Tensions with Gorbachev only strengthened East Berlin’s resolve to disregard all 
foreign policy directives from Moscow. Especially in its complicated ties with the other Germany, 
East Berlin was now ready to be more adventurous. As in the beginning of the decade, frictions 
between Moscow and East Berlin on how to engage with Bonn continued to have direct 
implications on East Berlin’s further willingness to ignore Soviet directives to deepen its 
engagement with China. 
 Indeed, things did not add up for Honecker from the beginning. Although Moscow 
openly maintained to East German leaders that it sought to punish Bonn for its positive stance 
towards the deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles on its territory, it engaged West 
Germany in areas of trade and economic cooperation. Honecker saw that on one hand, the new 
man in the Kremlin wooed West German leaders for Soviet economic advantages while with the 
other hand, the same man restrained East Berlin from doing the same. Honecker was not content 
with watching from the sidelines as relations between Bonn and Moscow warmed from the frosty 
chill of the early 1980s.
527
 Especially considering that the men in the Kremlin had made Honecker 
toe the line and cancel repeated attempts to visit Bonn, Gorbachev’s concurrent engagement with 
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West Germany from 1985 onwards seemed both duplicitous and suspicious.
528
 
 As before, Honecker was encouraged by Moscow to further postpone his planned visit 
to West Germany in 1987, something which Honecker had been repeatedly pushed to do since his 
Werbellinsee meeting with Helmut Schmidt in December 1981. The fact that the Kremlin did so 
while holding fast to a visit by West German President Richard von Weizsäcker to Moscow in 
July of the same year only added to the mutual distrust.
529
 This was exactly the same Soviet 
attitude that East Berlin was experiencing in its dealing with Moscows vis-à-vis China: Gorbachev 
insisted that the Soviet Union first initiate relations with West Germany before its client states did 
so. To East Berlin’s lament, Gorbachev stuck to his line. Inheriting the realistic worry from the 
Soviet leaders before him that further inter-German interaction would result in East Berlin’s 
increased economic dependency on Bonn, Gorbachev sternly warned East Berlin of the 
ramifications of greater indebtedness to the West.
530
 Much to the distress of Gorbachev, these 
warnings fell on deaf ears as the East German leader answered his disdain for Soviet meddling by 
sticking with his planned visit to Bonn. To make matters worse, Soviet-East German tensions 
were compounded by an emerging personality conflict between Honecker and the new Soviet 
leader. According to Hannes Adomeit, “Gorbachev’s flair, his spontaneously outgoing, radiant, 
optimistic, often unconventional attitude and sense of humour contrasted sharply with Honecker’s 
prim and proper appearance...”531 After all, Honecker must have thought, what could an upstart 
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like Gorbachev tell an experienced leader like himself on how to reform and govern a socialist 
country? The East German leader reportedly complained that “the young man had been making 
policy for a year, and already he finds it necessary to take on more than he can handle”.532  
 Showing his complete disregard for Soviet wishes, as he had already done with his 
China visit in 1986, Honecker held steadfast to his travel plans and he ventured across the 
German-German border to pay a visit to Bonn in September 1987. Although, in diplomatic 
parlance, it was only a working visit, due to Helmut Kohl’s reluctance to recognize Honecker as a 
state visitor, the two German leaders spent almost nine hours together.
533
 For Honecker, improved 
FRG-GDR relations were not only lucrative because it would yield substantial economic 
advantages, something that it came to increasingly depend on, but the visit would also underline 
the existence of two German states. In fact, Honecker’s visit to Bonn was in many ways one of the 
pinnacles of his political work. It was, according to Benno Eide-Siebs “Die Krönung seines 
Lebenswerkes”, the epitome of international recognition for the GDR.534 As Honecker himself 
would recount: 
The reception in Bonn in September 1987 was friendly. For the first 
time, the national hymn of the GDR played in Bonn and the state 
flag of the GDR was shown the honour rightful to her.
535
 
 
Even though Kohl would stress his wishes for a reunified Germany during his meetings with 
Honecker, the latter must have been more than satisfied that the common communiqué outlined 
that it was “in the sense of the Basic Treaty” to maintain normal and good neighbourly relations 
with each other…”536 As Gorbachev continued to tolerate and even encouraged Soviet liberal 
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thinkers to voice their opinions on the “German question”, this was also Honecker’s direct answer 
to Gorbachev that the GDR was here to stay.
537
 
 As the decade progressed Honecker was getting increasingly bolder in his disregard of 
Soviet directives.
538
 Undoubtedly emboldened by his belief that he was a more experienced 
foreign policy operator than Gorbachev, Honecker now mercilessly pushed forward his own 
foreign policy agenda. Like Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko before him, Gorbachev was 
confronted with the reality that East German goals in foreign affairs were in many ways 
irreconcilable and incompatible with Moscow’s wishes. 
 
Looking East – Soviet East Asian policy  
 
Just like his predecessors, Gorbachev seemed intent to continue Moscow’s duplicitous 
stance towards East Berlin in terms of its German and China policies. While Moscow’s 
inconsistent attitude towards Beijing had been on display at the beginning of the decade, East 
Berlin would soon find out that Soviet inconsistency would reach new levels under Gorbachev. 
The new Soviet leader seemed not only to continue his predecessors’ urging of restraint from 
engaging with East Berlin but was now also spending considerable effort in seeking a reset in 
relations with China. Indeed, while Brezhnev, Chernenko and Andropov had been relatively 
lethargic when it came to Sino-Soviet normalization, Gorbachev went ahead full-steam in an 
attempt to effect profound change in bilateral relations.
539
 Keeping Gorbachev’s fresh push 
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towards the East in mind, Moscow’s meddling in Eastern German-Chinese affairs seemed both 
traitorous and disingenuous, and it gave the East German leader all the more reason to ignore 
Soviet directives in all foreign affairs matters. 
 To date, Gorbachev’s considerable foreign policy advances in East Asia have only 
received scant attention, with Sergey Radchenko’s recent book the only major work dealing with 
this issue.
540
 While Radchenko draws our attention to Gorbachev’s considerable efforts to end the 
Cambodia quagmire and to improve relations with Japan in addition to driving forward the Sino-
Soviet normalization process, Gorbachev’s first focus, as Vladislav Zubok convincingly observes, 
was firmly set on Western Europe and across the Atlantic.
541
 This was partly due to the world that 
the Soviet leader inherited from the men in the Kremlin before him.
542
 With Soviet-American 
relations highly strained due to issues ranging from Afghanistan to SDI, Gorbachev spent much of 
his attention in his first years in power trying to limit the damage done to superpower relations 
through a series of summits with his American counterparts.
543
 
This is not to say that Gorbachev did not have a clear vision for a more vigorous Asia 
policy. On the contrary, even though his attention was required in mending fences with the West, 
a more activist Soviet Asian policy arose from the Kremlin after he took over the top job in 
Moscow. In terms of Moscow’s rapprochement with China, the new leader in the Kremlin sought 
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to revive the normalization process that had not seen any significant progress since Leonid 
Brezhnev tried to breathe new life into Sino-Soviet dialogue in 1982. During his Vladivostok 
speech on 28 July 1986, the Soviet leader indicated that he was willing to concede on some 
aspects of China’s three conditions for rapprochement, for example by pulling out troops from the 
Sino-Soviet frontier. The General Secretary stated, full of hope: 
Speaking in a city that is but a step from the People’s Republic of China, 
I would like to dwell on the most important issue in our relations. These 
relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the 
fact that we are neighbours, that we share the world’s longest land border 
and that we, our children and our grandchildren are destined to live near 
each other ‘forever and ever’. A noticeable improvement has occurred in 
our relations in recent years. I would like to affirm that the Soviet Union 
is prepared – any time, at any level – to discuss with China questions of 
additional measures for creating an atmosphere of good-
neighbourliness…544 
 
His adjoining statement that there was a urgent need for a “radical break with many of the 
conventional approaches to foreign policy, a break with the traditions of political thinking” 
seemed to indicate that he was also very serious about breaking with the past and affecting 
profound changes in Soviet East Asian policy.
545
 
 Indeed, Gorbachev had already started to breathe new life into Soviet East Asian policy 
well before his Vladivostok speech. Soon after coming to power in 1985, the new man in the 
Kremlin had undertaken a major foreign policy overhaul that affected nearly every institutional 
level. Old-timer Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s replacement with more pragmatic and 
controllable Eduard Shevardnadze was indicative of Gorbachev’s new direction. The new Soviet 
General Secretary sought to bring in a new group of reform-minded individuals who, like him, 
wanted to shed the polemic past that tainted the Soviet Union’s relations with many of its 
adversaries. This was also reflected in his re-shuffle of his China–team. Dogmatic, Brezhnev-era 
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holdovers were quickly removed. And the first person on the chopping block would be the man 
behind the Interkit himself: Oleg Rakhmanin. While the Interkit had fizzled out after 1982, it was 
Gorbachev who finally pulled the chair from under the conservative apparatchik by demoting him 
in 1985 and finally removing him from his position as First Deputy Head of the Central 
Committee Socialist Countries Department in 1987.
546
 In March 1986 Gorbachev sent Brezhnev’s 
former personal assistant, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, another Brezhnev-era relic, into 
retirement and in early 1987, Mikhail Kapitsa, Deputy Foreign Minister and another inflexible 
hardliner on China, was downgraded to a position at the Institute of Oriental Studies.
547
 In their 
stead, Gorbachev brought in a new generation of foreign policy thinkers who embraced Glasnost 
in Moscow’s foreign relations. In August 1986, Gorbachev elevated experienced and liberal 
China-hand Igor Rogachev to the position of Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for oversight of 
the entire Asia/Pacific region. In the same vein, Anatolii Cherniaev, Gorbachev’s new foreign 
policy assistant, was a friend of many liberal Moscow think-tankers and welcomed Gorbachev’s 
new path. To signal to Beijing that he was serious about change, he sent Oleg Troianovsky, 
former Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations and one of the most experienced and trusted 
Soviet diplomats to take up the ambassadorship in Beijing in May 1986. This was part of a general 
renewed initiative to improve Soviet relations with its East Asian neighbours. Thus, Gorbachev 
also dispatched Nikolai N. Soloviev, a trained Japanologist, to become the new Ambassador in 
Tokyo to overcome the Kremlin’s often tense relations with Japan, with mixed success.548 
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 Contemporary commentators noticed this change in direction. In 1988, Stephen 
Young, a former Soviet Asian policy analyst in the American embassy in Moscow noted the 
increased exchanges occurring between China and the Soviet Union. He noted that a series of 
prominent delegations, including ones headed by Supreme Soviet Deputy Lev Tolkunov (October 
1985), Deputy Premier and candidate Politburo member Nikolai Talyzin (March 1986) and 
Central Committee Secretary Georgiy Razumovskiy (July 1987) visited China.
549
 The tenth and 
eleventh rounds of political normalization talks were held in April and August of 1987. In a move 
that was both a positive externality of a renewed détente between the US and the Soviet Union 
and motivated by Moscow’s desire to fulfil some of the aspects of China’s three demands, 
Moscow decided to scrap all 100 medium-range SS-20 missiles in Asia as part of the ‘global 
double-zero option’ package in addition to withdrawing a motorized division from Mongolia.550 
The Soviets seemed to pull out all the stops. To the chagrin of Washington, the CIA even received 
information that Georgy Arbatov, long-time foreign policy advisor to Soviet General Secretaries 
and the founder of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian studies, was sent to Beijing in late 1986 to 
reassure the Chinese of the unlikelihood of a breakthrough in US-Soviet ties and to convince 
China to “stop blaming the superpowers equally for the world’s tensions in order to join the USSR 
and its allies against the ‘imperialist camp’”.551 
 
Holding back East Berlin 
 
 Soviet advances in East Asia initially received a mixed reaction from East Berlin. 
East German diplomats in Beijing first welcomed Gorbachev’s renewed push for normalization 
with China, as positive reflections on expanding cultural and political dialogue between the two 
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countries were sent back from the East German embassy in Moscow in July 1985.
552
 However, 
any sense of joy and jubilation that Moscow had finally seen the light and was ‘following in 
Honecker’s footsteps’ in seriously re-engaging with China were quickly snuffed out by what was 
perceived in East Berlin as the Soviet Union’s continued duplicity in its message for East 
German-Chinese relations. 
 In Beijing, officials became increasingly aware of disagreements between the Soviet 
Union and East Berlin and in a carefully calculated move to show understanding, Chinese leaders 
and diplomats exuded compassion towards East Berlin’s dilemma. In a private meeting in July 
1987 between Chinese diplomats and MfS agents, the Political Secretary in the Chinese Embassy 
in the GDR, Liu Qibao, intimated that the deteriorating relations between the USSR and East 
Germany were a “cause for concern” but reassured the interlocutor that Beijing viewed relations 
with the GDR and the USSR separately. In a thinly veiled encouragement for the GDR to take an 
even more independent stance, the Chinese Ambassador in East Berlin Ma Xusheng told the MfS 
contact that he welcomed the “increasing independence and political weight” that Eastern 
European states were gaining and promised to “encourage [independent] tendencies” in these 
states.
553
 
 These remarks should also be viewed as a Chinese response to Moscow’s courting of 
Vietnam, a state that Beijing deemed in its sphere of influence, into an anti-Chinese direction. 
Indeed in 1987 Beijing viewed Moscow’s stubborn continued support of Vietnam as a major 
hindrance to the normalization process. Even despite Gorbachev’s conciliatory measures in 
scaling back the Soviet troop presence in Asia, there was little movement in the Kremlin on the 
Vietnam issue, raising doubt in Beijing if Moscow was sincerely seeking normalization.
554
 Thus, 
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China had little reservation in subversively courting a close Soviet ally and, having already 
signalled to East Berlin that it valued the relationship by inviting Honecker to Beijing in 1986, 
continued to push forward relations in 1987. 
 Improving relations had effects on every aspect of bilateral affairs. For example, the 
MfS had already noted in the aftermath of the Honecker visit in 1986 that the five known agents 
of the Chinese security services (Guojia Anquanbu) stationed in the GDR were not conducting as 
much subversive activity as before and that this was  definitely influenced by “the continued 
expansion of bilateral relations with the PRC in different areas…”.555 This is in stark contrast to a 
1983 report which still outlined a threat from “special services which were operating out of the 
Albanian and Chinese embassies”.556 Far from enmity, inofficial agent “Kern” (a professor), who 
had kept up exchanges with Chinese Embassy contacts since the 1970s was granted a trip to China 
as guest of the Culture Ministry in August 1988. Given his regular contacts and his inquisitive 
questions on China, it is safe to say that the Chinese probably knew of his true identity and 
activities.
557
 
 For China, East Germany also became a partner in a time when many socialist 
countries remained sceptical about Beijing’s drastic domestic reform path. Even previously trusted 
friends started to make their disagreements known. In the case of Romania, once China’s trusted 
middleman between itself and Moscow, disputes over Deng’s economic reform course meant that 
bilateral relations started to cool off significantly in 1988. Chinese Embassy staff in Bucharest 
informed their East German colleagues in the spring of 1988 that relations had suffered because 
there was a lack of willingness on the Romanian side to “seek progressive change in their internal 
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politics”.558  
 In light of these developments in Sino-GDR affairs, Soviet duplicity continued. Thus, 
when Honecker went to Moscow on an extended working-level visit in September 1988, any hope 
that the Soviet Union would be more encouraging on Honecker’s China policy were quickly 
extinguished. Aside from Gorbachev’s stern reminder that China was still not in the socialist 
family, the meeting was called by Moscow to “work out suggestions for overcoming obstacles in 
bilateral relations” between the SED and CPSU leaderships. 559 In detailed discussions, the same 
nagging frictions came to the fore that would continue to serve as further catalysts for Honecker’s 
independent foreign policy.  During their private meeting, Honecker, in view of Kohl’s impending 
visit to Moscow in October of the same year, stressed the importance that Moscow support East 
Berlin’s stance on its territorial sovereignty and impart on West German leaders “the unassailable 
position of the borders and the unconditional respect of the existing territorial and political 
realities”.560 Gorbachev’s noncommitent and steely response to hold increased dialogue on the 
matter certainly elicited little confidence from Honecker.
561
 To add insult to injury, Honecker’s 
hopeful request to increase raw material deliveries in the time span from 1991-1995 were met 
with Gorbachev’s similar cold response that “this is currently not possible”.562 In a post-meeting 
estimation, the GDR’s Ambassador in Moscow wrote to the Head of the International Department 
of the SED CC that “it would take prolonged efforts to remove the frictions [between East Berlin 
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and Moscow].
563
 
 These episodes of continued disagreement between Moscow and East Berlin became 
the rule rather than the exception in the latter part of the decade. Especially in 1988, when 
Gorbachev, unlike his predecessors, was spending considerable time to court China’s favour, 
Moscow’s directives on China went in Honecker’s one ear and out the other. In the MfAA plan on 
how to expand relations in 1988, East Germany vowed to continue to establish contacts in the 
cultural, political as well as the scientific areas with Beijing.
564
  
 
China: Reform at a price 
 
 While Deng frantically expanded his foreign contacts in order to funnel in technology 
and experience for his modernization project, a series of domestic challenges emerged in the mid 
1980s which almost derailed the entire reform project. In 1986, after half a decade of reform, 
Zhongnanhai was confronted with the first wave of popular dissatisfaction at what protestors 
deemed an incongruent disconnection between political and economic reforms. Beijing’s 
conservative backlash in quelling the popular liberal challenges to party rule in late 1986 and early 
1987 opened up a new channel of mutual understanding hitherto unexplored between East 
Germany and China. Honecker and Deng saw eye-to-eye in dogmatic defiance of political reform 
as propagated by Moscow. 
 In many ways, the ordinary citizen in China had good reason to be dissatisfied with 
Deng’s reforms. Not only did the average Chinese not derive any tangible benefits from the boom 
on the coasts but new wealth had also introduced previously unknown vices to China. In the 
Special Economic Zones, a laissez-faire attitude spawned a widespread wave of smuggling, 
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profiteering and speculation. Especially local officials, who were able to use their networks and 
positions of power to take advantage of China’s more liberal atmosphere, did so.565 In this new 
environment where traditional communist principles were seemingly readily abandoned, many 
struggled to grasp what ideology meant in a newly liberalized China driven not by doctrine but by 
profit-seeking.      
 As early as December 1984, Renmin Ribao published an article which asked if Marx’s 
teachings were still relevant 101 years after his death, prompting foreign observers to speculate 
that Marxism was being abandoned in China.
566
 The July 1985 ousting of the Party propaganda 
chief Deng Liqun seemed to indicate that further liberalization was at hand. Testing the waters, it 
was not long before Chinese students started to agitate for more freedoms to accompany the 
country’s staggering economic advances. The reasons were simple. The newfound coastal wealth 
did not find its way onto the campuses. Students were still living in relative squalor in their 
dormitories and on stipends which amounted to 22 Renminbi a month, even then a measly sum.
567
 
In Hefei, progressive professors such as Astrophysicist Fang Lizhi started to openly call for 
greater independence in university administration and called for the emulation of western 
examples.
568
  
 In December 1986, student unrest quickly spread from the University of Science and 
Technology in Hefei province to renowned institutions such as Peking University and Shanghai 
Jiaotong University. Student leaders and their allies called for political reforms to accompany the 
economic ones called out by Deng.
569
 Conservative elements within the CCP placed the blame 
squarely on General Secretary Hu Yaobang and the reformist faction. In their opinion, Hu had 
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neglected to reinforce the importance of a binding ideology. On 27 December, a delegation of 
seven conservative leaders centered around Chen Yun and Hu Qiaomu visited Deng to demand 
Hu Yaobang’s demotion. With conservative pressure mounting, Deng consented and the 
demonstrators were criticized as expressions of “bourgeois liberalization” and disbanded.570 Zhao 
Ziyang replaced Hu as General Secretary and the conservative Li Peng rose to Zhao’s former 
position of Prime Minister.
571
 
 This episode taught the Chinese leadership that it would have to keep in mind the 
social ramifications of Reform and Opening. How was it going to keep the people satisfied who 
were benefitting so little from China’s economic growth? The immediate answer was found in a 
conservative backlash and re-education program aimed at the student population who were so 
often the sparks of domestic unrest. In September 1987, military training was once more 
emphasized in schools and during spring and summer vacations, some university students were 
sent to work on farms or in factories. A media monitoring office was created by Zhongnanhai to 
monitor China’s 1500-odd newspapers and 5000 and so periodicals to limit discussion on 
sensitive issues such as political reform. From March to September 1986, 594 newspaper and 
journals were shut down.
572
 Mindful to not let these conservative tendencies go out of hand, Deng 
spent much of the following months softening these leftist trends so that they would not interrupt 
his economic reforms. Through this episode Deng learnt that a vital ingredient to the continuation 
of his policies would lay in a stable, acquiescent population, and the perfect tool to achieve this 
was a re-emphasis, at least temporarily, on Marxist doctrine.
573
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A budding ideological relationship 
 
 In a drastically changing socialist world, where the Soviet leader now frequently 
called for political reform and openness, China’s conservative backlash seemed to go against the 
trend.
574
 And it was in this area that East Germany and China found even more commonalities. 
Having already defected wholesale from Moscow’s general China policy, East Berlin started to 
realize that it had a lot more to agree with in the ideological arena with their newly-found friends 
in Beijing than with its former ‘big brother’ in Moscow. After party-to-party relations, a highly 
symbolic yet important barometer in relations between socialist states, had been normalized 
during Honecker’s visit, the two countries would find that their views on the unassailability of the 
leading role of the party in both states would form a lasting bond between the two states.
575
 And 
as ideological commonalities started to be underlined, inter-party relations, began to flourish.
576
 
 By June 1987, this budding bilateral ideological convergence was solidified with 
Premier Zhao Ziyang’s much-anticipated visit to East Berlin.577 It did not take Honecker and Zhao 
long to get down to their most pressing concerns. Considering both regimes’ disdain for 
Gorbachev’s reform policies, both leaders went to great lengths to stress that the leading role of 
their respective parties would never be put in question. Indeed much of the conversation at the 
meeting revolved around questions of the future of communist ideology in East Germany and 
China. Here, commonalities abounded. Zhao, undoubtedly confident that he would elicit 
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agreement from his East German hosts, first informed to Honecker that the fall of Hu Yaobang 
was due to the former Chinese leader having become “too relaxed” in combating “a few 
intellectuals who were spreading liberalism among the people”. To put it beyond doubt that he 
would do everything necessary to make sure to quell domestic challenges to party rule, Zhao 
stressed that even when developing ”socialism with Chinese characteristics”, it was important to 
fight against “pollutions” in the area of ideology.578 
Describing the students’ demands for more liberalism and a “westernizing” of society as a 
result of Hu’s faulty leadership, Zhao told Honecker that the Party had now decided to start a 
campaign against citizen’s liberties, with a goal of strengthening education programs to bolster 
ideological orthodoxy. Beijing’s struggles against liberalization found an understanding audience 
in East Berlin. Agreeing with Beijing’s conservative path, Honecker resonated that “the leadership 
of socialist construction through the party, through both the CCP and the SED, demands that we 
must dedicate special attention to the fight against liberalization”, adding “we are ourselves 
leading a very hard fight to solidify (verankern) socialism and her ideology in our people.”579 
These words gain an even deeper meaning considering that Honecker had to fight “ideological 
pollution” coming from the West but also now from Moscow. Indeed, to make it absolutely clear 
that East Berlin was seeking a different course than Moscow, Honecker told Zhao that he wished 
the Soviet Union every success with their “proposed path”. “But”, he went on, “we also say that 
we live under different conditions.”580 Thus, Sino-GDR relations were continuously improving at 
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a time when a freeze had set in in Sino-Soviet normalization talks. In Dresden, Zhao intimated to 
Hans Modrow on the state of Moscow-Beijing relations: 
When a small ship wants to dock with a big ship on the ocean, it is 
a relatively easy manoeuvre. However, when two enormous ships 
want to do so, it a very difficult undertaking and it is to be done 
with great caution.
581
 
 
After Zhao’s visit, inter-party relations between the CCP and the SED took on a new 
dynamic. Exchanges gained in frequency. In November 1987, a study delegation dispatched by 
the Central Committee of the SED arrived in China for an 11-day tour to collaborate on party 
affairs. Throughout their time in China the delegation was received “very warmly”. In line with 
Zhao and Honecker’s discussion, officials such as Zhu Liang, Head of the International 
Department of the CCP Central Committee emphasized that socialism in both countries should be 
constructed while taking into account the special characteristics of each country, a clear rebuttal 
against Moscow’s liberal messages. Even though Deng was already pushing for a return to the 
reform path after the protests had temporarily derailed his momentum before the planned 13
th
 
Party Congress in October 1987, Zhu emphasized that Beijing would pay more attention to 
“strengthen the leading role of the party” and to fulfil this task the government would have to 
“strengthen ideological work…”582 Thus, perhaps it comes as no surprise that Chinese protests at 
American objections over the treatment of Fang Lizhi and the 1986 protestors received a willing 
audience in East Berlin.
583
 
China’s conservative response to the 1986 anti-government protests struck a chord with 
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East Berlin especially because it had its own concerns with popular discontent to deal with. Indeed, 
the East German population was not as submissive as some in hindsight have suggested and these 
problems were manifesting themselves with gathering pace in the late 1980s.
584
 The rise of a 
peace movement incubated by a resurgent church was only one of the regime’s problems as the 
population seemed to grow bolder in its rejection of SED policies.
585
 Dissatisfaction against the 
regime had already reared its head in the early part of the decade. In February 1982, for example, 
Reiner Eppelmann, an East Berlin church minister, was taken into custody after he had amassed 
more than 2000 signatures for the removal of the Soviet occupation forces from East Germany. 
Episodes like these increased in frequency as officially sanctioned channels of complaint were no 
longer sufficient for the populous to voice their anger.
586
 While Honecker’s judgment of the 
severity of these disturbances is under debate, there is no doubt that the East German leader knew 
that the population was far from docile.
 587
  According to Jan Palmowski, the average citizen 
learned to ‘play the rules’ of the political system, forcing the party to respond and sometimes even 
concede to the petitioners’ demands.588 It is therefore not surprising that the East German state-
apparatus kept a tight tab on its population, especially in the Honecker years.
589
 In an era where 
Honecker continued to disagree with Moscow on a variety of issues, China was quickly becoming 
a likeminded and willing partner in the ideological arena. As Gorbachev seemed intent on 
undertaking a thorough restructuring of the socialist state model, East Berlin was glad to find in 
Beijing a friend who was also suspicious of major political change. This fact served as the 
                                                          
584
 Sigrid Meuschell, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR 
1945-89 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992). 
585
 Bernd Schäfer, The East German State and the Catholic Church (Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), pp. 23-25. 
586
 See Roger Woods, Opposition in the GDR under Honecker, 1971-85 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986); On the 
East German Meckerkultur and officially sanctioned avenues of complaint see Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State – 
East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), especially chapter 13 “The 
people’s own voices? The culture of complaint and the privatisation of protest”, pp. 269-288. 
587
 For an interesting account of the surprising freedoms enjoyed ‘between the asesembly line and the bread queue’ in 
the Honecker era, see Josie McLellan, Love in the Time of Communism – Intimacy and Sexuality in the GDR 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
588
 To combat dissent,, Palmlowski has also shown that Honecker sought to tackle discontent by ‘inventing’ a bonding 
East German national consciousness, See Jan Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 9. 
589
 On the Stasi as a system and tool to enforce conformity during the Honcker years, see Gary Bruce, The Firm – the 
Inside Story of the Stasi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
183 
foundation for bilateral relations until the end of the decade.  
Political and cultural bilateral exchanges increased in pace and frequency at every level. 
For example, whereas there were only a handful of bilateral meetings in any given year before 
Honecker’s visit, 33 bilateral events took place in January 1987 alone.590 Relations were 
developed on all levels. In May 1987, the establishment of a direct Interflug route between East 
Berlin and Beijing was celebrated as a “bridge of friendship” in Neues Deutschland.591 During the 
same time, Renmin Ribao emphasized in June 1987 that the “friendship of both people have 
grown in the fight for revolution”.592 In May 1988, Hans Modrow took up Zhao Ziyang’s personal 
invitation and flew on the newly established Interflug-route on an Illyushin IL-62 machine from 
Berlin-Schönefeld to Beijing for a one-week tour of the coastal provinces. In Guangzhou Modrow 
was led through the “East Wind” TV-production facility, which was able to produce 410,000 TVs 
a year, with a view of upping production to 600,000 the next year. To demonstrate China’s new 
reform path, Modrow was given a tour of Shenzhen, the entrepot of Guangdong province and 
centre of Deng’s Gaige Kaifang. His Chinese guides proudly proclaimed that the Reform and 
Opening path had turned this little village, which only had 4,500 inhabitants in 1959, into a 
thriving metropolis of 600,000.
593
 
 What Modrow must have also appreciated is that Chinese firms were increasingly 
relying more on American as well as Western European sources for technological cooperation. 
However, Honecker still desperately maintained his push for more trade relations. Despite lacking 
Chinese interest, East Berlin continued to expend considerable effort to try to pry out whatever 
opportunities it could in the area of trade. Encouraged by central directives, delegations were sent 
out to seek out opportunities in China. For example, in January 1988, a sizeable East German 
delegation visited Nanjing in search for cooperation opportunities between East German and 
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Chinese electrical utility companies. While these overtures continued until the GDR’s eventual 
demise, one does not have to look far to see the rank of importance that trade contacts with East 
Germany had become in 1988. In the same file in the Jiangsu provincial archives, countless pages 
also describe local engagement with French, Belgian, West German as well as Hungarian and 
Polish trade delegations.
594
 As trade relations dipped with the GDR, the emerging conservative 
ideological like-mindedness between the two states gained even more in importance and slowly 
became the sole binding point between the two states in the late 1980s. 
 This budding ideological relationship was further cemented at the highest level. In 
June 1988, Oskar Fischer again met his counterpart Qian Qichen in New York at the margins of 
the third United Nations special session on disarmament. Both Foreign Ministers adamantly 
conveyed their wish to expand relations and cited the numerous high-level delegations exchanged 
between both countries as proof that relations are on the right path.
595
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 By ignoring Gorbachev and continuing on his Moscow-defying relationship with 
Beijing, Honecker was sending a clear message to the new Soviet leader that he, like the men 
before him in the Kremlin, would not be able to dictate East German China-policy. To Honecker, 
relations with China represented what he wanted the future of East German foreign relations to 
look like – successful and independent of Moscow. Seeking a separate legitimacy for East 
Germany became ever more of a goal, especially in light of Moscow’s nonchalant stance on East 
German sovereignty. This was clearly evidenced by Honecker’s continued pursuit of an improved 
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prestige-grabbing relationship with China. In fact, in trying to secure more legitimacy for the 
statehood of East Germany, Honecker was not even shy of engaging ‘imperialist enemies’, let 
alone ones that it had independently inducted back into the socialist rank of nations. Thus, 
Honecker even sent a congratulatory telegram in 1985 to the newly re-elected Ronald Reagan, 
which was subsequently published in Neues Deutschland. As if to take a page from Gorbachev’s 
book, Honecker stated in the telegram that relations on the principles of peaceful co-existence can 
only be beneficial for the strengthening of world peace.
596
  
 According to former East German Deputy Ambassador in Beijing Joachim Krüger, 
knowing that the Soviet Union was disapproving of its relationship with China, Honecker was 
nevertheless willing to gamble by expanding his ties to Beijing.
597
 This was at times a dangerous 
gamble. At least in terms of the German question, Honecker and his diplomats had to witness that 
Beijing sometimes played a duplicitous game. To East German officials, like Zhao Ziyang did to 
Oskar Fischer in December 1987, Chinese leaders always emphasized that China regarded the two 
German states as completely separate.
598
 When Wu Xueqian visited the GDR in June of 1986, the 
Chinese Foreign Minister didn’t mince words in stressing that China accepted the fact that there 
are two German states, promising that China “respects this historical fact and respects the politics 
of the GDR in this question.”599 But as the Chinese appetite for western technology increased, 
Chinese leaders would play a different tune to West German partners, often wanting to de-
ideologize relations and offering Zhongnanhai’s support for a speedy German reunification.600 
East German diplomats were made painfully aware of the preferential status that Bonn enjoyed in 
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China. In a meeting between Mei Zhaorong, the head of the Western Europe section of the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry, and East German Ambassador Rolf Berthold, Mei told Berthold with 
honesty that the relations between the FRG and China were developing at a fast pace and that 
West Germany had become the most important and biggest European trade partner for China.
601
 
Indeed, when Chancellor Kohl visited China in July of 1986, Deng Xiaoping told Kohl that theirs 
would be a lasting relationship, that cooperation should be built “not only with view of this 
century but also the next century.”602 
 What is telling is that Honecker was more than willing to turn a blind eye to this. The 
East German leader seemed content at reminding his counterparts in Beijing now and again that 
East Berlin did not appreciate any talk of a reunified Germany but did not let Beijing’s stance 
become a significant obstacle in relations. Seemingly appreciative of Deng’s pragmatism in 
engaging Bonn for its technological know-how, Honecker focused instead on a budding 
conservative ideological bond. For both countries, this bond gained more in importance as a series 
of external events challenged the authority of both regimes. 
 From 1987 onwards, Gorbachev’s attitude towards his Eastern European allies 
became ever clearer. Increasingly seeing the fraternal states as economic and political liabilities, 
with the Soviet leader remarking in a CPSU CC Politburo session in March 1988 that “we cannot 
remain a provider of cheap resources [for Soviet allies] forever”, Gorbachev had started to seek 
more distance rather than cooperation with his erstwhile clients.
603
 From the Soviet perspective, 
none was a more troublesome ally than East Germany. Rebellious, disloyal and imposing huge 
costs on the Soviet empire while yielding little political benefits, Honecker’s East Germany 
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started to embody everything that the Soviet leader thought was wrong with the Soviet bloc. As 
frictions mounted, Honecker was intent on staying on his dogmatic path in defiance of what he 
judged to be a misinformed reform stance propagated by Moscow. However, as the reformist 
winds swept across Eastern Europe, East Germany was not spared and East Berlin soon found out 
that the biggest challenge to its legitimacy would come from its own population. As similar 
popular unrest arose in China to demand for more political freedoms, both governments found 
themselves fighting to hang on to the political status quo. This common desire to suppress popular 
demands rather than acquiescing to them would only serve to solidify the Sino-East German 
ideological bond. 
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Chapter Five: Ideological Allies: Tiananmen and the Fall of the Wall, 
1988-1990 
 
Introduction 
 
Beijing. 4 June 1989. Tanks from the 27
th
 and 38
th
 armies of the People’s Liberation Army 
descend onto Tiananmen Square to disperse the student protestors who for months had demanded 
far-sweeping political reforms from Deng Xiaoping’s government. While numbers vary on the 
human costs, it is almost certain that at least a thousand students and civilians perished during the 
crack-down.
604
 The episode colloquially known in China as “Liu Si” (六四)605 had dramatic 
consequences for the Chinese leadership. Domestically, it pitted reformers against conservatives 
and briefly put into question whether Deng’s path of economic liberalization was sustainable for a 
communist system.
606
 The immediate international fallout was severe.  Despite efforts by U.S. 
President George H.W. Bush to protect Sino-U.S. relations, both Houses of Congress in 
Washington decided, with veto-proof majorities, to impose sanctions on China, some of which are 
still in place today.
607
 Fifty-seven other governments, including the European Communites and 
Japan, introduced sanctions. Public opinion of China in the West reached unprecedented lows. In 
fact, whereas a two-third of Americans had viewed China positively directly before the 
Tiananmen Square incident, less than a third did so in 1990.
608
 
A major newspaper headline from 5 June read: “Counter-revolutionary unrest in China put 
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down by the People’s Liberation Army”. However, this was not one of the self-justifying slogans 
put forth by CCP-mouthpiece Renmin Ribao, but rather appeared in print some 7000 kilometers 
away in East Berlin.
609
 Amidst the increasing international isolationism that resulted from 
Tiananmen, East Berlin was among a handful of reform-resistant regimes that supported Beijing’s 
actions. The head of the Stasi, Erich Mielke, ordered special protection for the Chinese embassy 
and condemned the counter-revolutionary violence.
610
 Indeed, as this chapter will reveal, a 
continued common ideological conservatism combined with a dogged intolerance towards 
political liberalization brought East Berlin and Beijing even closer together in common defiance 
against the winds of change blowing out of Moscow.  
While Gorbachev’s reforms and apparent abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine set forth 
a domino effect that gave hope to reform movements across Eastern Europe, it also had the 
consequence of drawing anti-reform regimes together. After having established a common 
dogmatic bond in the aftermath of Honecker’s 1986 visit, East Germany and China built on this 
like-mindedness in an atmosphere of uncertain political liberalization in the communist world. 
Both regimes came to be deeply suspicious of Gorbachev’s reform agenda and repeatedly voiced 
their concerns at bilateral meetings, especially as the Soviet leader gave more momentum to his 
policies in the late 1980s. This Sino-GDR ideological convergence resulted in an intensification of 
relations towards the end of the decade. Both vowed to stay firm in their conservative, anti-
political reform outlooks. To be sure, the visions that both regimes had for the future of their own 
countries were very different. Whereas the GDR sought a long-term solution to its economic 
problems while maintaining a political status quo, Beijing was eager to push forward a far more 
drastic reform plan for its economy. What brought them together were common criticisms of calls 
from Soviet leaders for increasing transparency and political freedoms in communist states. 
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Although under Deng, China had defected wholesale from socialist economic models, it still 
adhered to a similar belief held in East Berlin, that under no circumstances should the leadership 
of the party ever put into question or jeopardy. Political ideological affinity alone drew the two 
regimes together, as trade ties continued to disappoint. From East Berlin’s perspective seeking 
trade with Beijing was firmly relegated behind ideological reasons for expanding relations with 
the People’s Republic. 
As bilateral relations developed after at the end of the decade, Beijing was also able to 
learn useful lessons from events taking place in Eastern Europe. While Chinese leaders concluded 
that they had to deal with domestic unrest as soon as possible if they were to avoid the 
destabilization taking place in the spring of 1989 across Eastern Europe, they also sought to 
encourage their East German ally to hold fast to its ideologically conservative roots until the very 
end. Beijing’s lessons from witnessing the speedy unravelling of communism in Poland and 
Hungary had direct consequences on Beijing’s decision-making process on 4 June 1989. Beijing’s 
actions also had unintended and unforeseeable consequences for its allies. The international 
backlash from Tiananmen decreased the appetite for violent repression elsewhere in the 
communist world, especially in Moscow, thereby depriving the GDR of a measure of last resort in 
its own effort to deal with domestic unrest. 
This chapter will first analyze how the acceleration of Perestroika and Glasnost served to 
expedite a likeminded orthodoxy between East Berlin and Beijing from 1987 onward. It will argue 
that both governments thought that they had the ‘right’ version of socialism since both fought 
against Gorbachev’s efforts to restructure the system by reforming the central party structure. This 
‘bond’ was only tightened during the increasing unrest that swept across Eastern Europe and 
eventually, China in 1988 and 1989. Finally, in an uncertain environment, these two hard-line 
regimes clung to each other in ideological uniformity until the GDR eventually crumbled under 
popular pressure, leaving Beijing to retreat into a period of introspection and insecurity. 
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“Socialism in the Colour of the GDR” meets “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
 
As Gorbachev added further momentum to his political reforms during the XIX All-Union 
CPSU Party Conference in June 1988, tensions between East Berlin and Moscow intensified. 
More and more, frictions found expression not only behind closed doors between top leaders but 
were now played out in the popular press for everyone to observe. Liberal Soviet newspapers such 
as Sputnik, which had dared to shed an unfavourable light on Stalin’s actions during the Second 
World War and also put forth doubts about the Comintern and KPD’s (Kommunistische Partei 
Deutschlands, one of the predecessors of the SED) commitment to stop Hitler’s rise, were banned 
in the GDR. The war of words did not stop there.
611
 The Kremlin told SED chief-ideologue Kurt 
Hager in December 1988 that one should not censor authors and that the prohibition of Sputnik 
was not right (angemessen).
612
 This was a clear retaliation against the same person who had, in an 
overt attempt to draw a line to differentiate between the GDR and Soviet reform paths, forcefully 
posed a question if there would be a “a need to change the tapestry of your apartment, if your 
neighbour did so” during an interview with West German magazine Stern in April 1987.613 
Perhaps then it was not surprising that after repeated spats with Gorbachev over the Soviet 
leader’s reform stance, Honecker had declared on the 70th anniversary of the KPD on 29 
December 1988 that the GDR would pursue “Socialism in the colour of the GDR” (Sozialismus in 
den Farben der DDR).
614
 Soviet-East German relations had entered a new nadir and Honecker 
blamed the Kremlin for forcing his hand.
615
 
Beijing continued to share East Berlin’s disagreements with Moscow’s reform path. While 
Deng pressed on with his engagement with Gorbachev in pursuit of Sino-Soviet normalization, 
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there is little doubt about what the Chinese leader thought about the potential for success of 
Gorbachev’s reform. Deng stressed to numerous Eastern European visitors that China was to 
follow its own road towards modernization. For example, on 12 June 1987 Deng told Yugoslav 
Politburo Secretary Stefan Korosec that “every socialist country’s reform experiences will be 
different. Their history is different, experiences are different, the situations are different, hence 
reform cannot be the same.”616 
Considering the scepticisms both Beijing and East Berlin felt towards Gorbachev, a 
common ideological enmity towards the Soviet leader’s vision for the future served as a crucial 
binding point between both regimes after Honecker’s 1986 state visit. Relations seemed, as the 
East German leader hoped, to be entering a ‘second’ more intense stage.617 Chinese leaders started 
to pay ever-closer attention to the development of relations with East Germany, not least because 
closer relations with a ‘rebellious’ Soviet bloc state was a tool to bring the Soviets to respect its 
demands in the Sino-Soviet normalization process.
618
 While Zhao Ziyang’s visit in 1987 had 
confirmed Beijing’s interest in expanding relations with East Berlin, Honecker sought to 
reciprocate Zhao’s visit as swiftly as he could in order to further outline his interest in the 
expansion of relations with a conservative ally. Thus, Honecker once again dispatched 
Krolikowski to China in May 1988 on a mission to build on their likeminded stance. Deputy 
Foreign Minister Zhou Nan’s congratulations to Krolikowski on the “successes in the construction 
of socialism in the GDR” were reciprocated during Krolikowski’s toast at a dinner given in his 
honour.
619
 In the same month, SED Politburo Central Committee member Günter Schabowski was 
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treated to a warm welcome by Zhao Ziyang in Beijing. Again, bilateral agreements on ideology 
took center stage as Zhao Ziyang stressed that China was “maintaining the leadership of the party 
in all areas of life” and “strengthening the role of the party and placing emphasis on the political-
ideological work of the party.”620  
As a result of these meetings, a common ideological affinity between both regimes 
continued to develop. Tellingly, expressions of camaraderie were also often made between the 
youth organizations of the parties, which were considered the vanguard of ideological purity in 
both states. For example, in July 1987, a year before Krolikowski’s eventual visit, CCP Central 
Committee member Chen Peixian told the Central Commission of the Freie Deutsche Jugend 
(FDJ) that the “blossoming time of relations between both of our countries is coming again”, 
stressing that “after both our parties have expended mutual effort, we are fraternal parties again". 
Eager to forget the difficult time in relations when bilateral contacts were severely curtailed 
during Sino-Soviet disagreements, Chen emphasized “what happened in the past, we already 
forgot or want to forget - it is history”.621 The FDJ delegation noted that their hosts in the Chinese 
communist youth organization 共产主义青年团 (Gongchanzhuyi Qingniantuan, short 
Gongqingtuan, GQT) “went to significant efforts” to express their desire to deepen relations 
between both organizations, remarking that among the five fraternal states, the GQT’s relations 
with the FDJ was the “most developed”.622 
Indeed, East German-Chinese engagement in this era was driven almost solely out of an 
emerging ideological like-mindedness. In terms of trade, for example, hopes for a fruitful 
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relationship continued to fade despite desperate East German attempts to keep it alive. While 
Honecker’s ongoing interest to develop China as a trading partner found more impetus after his 
1986 trip, his initial hope of making China into an important East German export market fell on 
frozen ground.
623
 Even though a long-term relationship was inked by Günter Mittag and Li Peng 
during Honecker’s visit, trade volumes remained disappointing, with import and export dipping to 
50% of 1986 levels.
624
 However, considering the GDR’s continued economic stagnation, even 
more hope was placed on China. While preparing to negotiate the trade agreement between the 
two countries to 1990, the East German Ministry of Trade stubbornly reminded the MfAA as late 
as September 1989 that “a stagnation [in bilateral trade] can, due to economic and political 
reasons, not be allowed (zugelassen werden).”625 The benefits were clear to the East German 
Ministry of Trade. In a September 1989 estimation of the trade relationship, it remarked that 80% 
of exports in 1989 to the PRC were industrial finished goods, adding that, “Among socialist states, 
this kind of beneficial export structure is only achieved with China.” Additionally, East Berlin was 
gaining from China “imports it could otherwise only gain out of the non-socialist West (NSW)”, 
such as soybeans, cotton and rice.
626
  
The Chinese attitude towards East Germany was clear and remained the same: While it 
was interested in potential lessons arising out of East German experiences of economic 
development that it might be able to apply to the Reform and Opening process at home, its taste 
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for East German goods diminished towards the end of the decade.
627
 Chinese Ambassador to the 
GDR Ma Xusheng repeatedly stressed this stance to his East German counterparts.
628
 Undeterred, 
and disturbed by declining trends in bilateral trade, East German Trade Ministry official Jochen 
Steyer reminded Ambassador Ma Xusheng in November 1987 about stagnating trade from 1987 
to 1988, outlining East Berlin’s “urgent interest” (dringende Interesse) for a balanced 
development of trade with China.
629
 The GDR tried to foster ties with regular trade missions to 
Chinese provinces in an attempt to utilize the relative autonomy that local officials were gaining 
during Reform and Opening.
630
 This was coordinated with petitions at the top. In October 1988, 
Head of the Trade Ministry, Gerhard Beil wrote an impassionate letter to the new incoming 
Ambassador Zhang Dake to increase trade volume and economic cooperation between both states, 
finally signing off with: “Dear comrade Zhang Dake, I ask again, that you support these 
suggestions.”631 The Commercial Secretary in the PRC Embassy in East Berlin, Jin Shanglin, 
replied in December 1988 that delays were caused by “acute problems in the economic 
development of the PRC” as well as the problem that “the products offered by the GDR were 
under low demand in China”. However, Jin was quick to add that Beijing was “strongly impressed 
by the technical height and performance of the GDR economy” as “circa 100 delegations of 
technicians and specialists visited the GDR”, highlighting China’s continued interest in East 
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German economic knowledge.
632
 Overall however, trade officials on both sides realized that trade 
was not going to be a driving force in bilateral relations, even though on the East German side, a 
stubborn hope remained that someday a beneficial trade relationship might still materialize. 
 
Unrest 
 
As East Berlin and Beijing’s trade relationship diminished, both increasingly found 
common ground in terms of their likeminded Weltanschauung, especially as the bilateral 
relationship was soon faced with a series of external shocks arising from popular unrest in both 
countries. In East Germany, liberal influences from Moscow and the seeming abandonment of the 
Brezhnev doctrine lit the protest fires across the country. Previously dormant dissent movements 
now found the courage to come to the surface.
633
 In China, widespread corruption and a young 
generation that yearned for political reforms to accompany the economic changes found 
resurgence again in 1989 to ask the same questions they had asked in 1986 before they were 
disbanded and driven underground. As reform-minded mass movements formed on Chinese 
campuses as well as in East German churches and adopted Moscow’s messages for more 
transparency and liberalization, distrust in both East Berlin and Beijing of Gorbachev’s reform 
path grew. 
Indeed, as in many Eastern European countries, while most East German citizens lived 
a perfectly a “normal” life, individual strands of political dissatisfaction brewed just beneath the 
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surface for as long as the GDR existed.
634
 From 1987 on, dissident activity in the GDR, 
encouraged in part by Moscow’s reformist messages, became more organized and were marked by 
increasing polarization from their conservative government. Even though at the start only a 
minority of the East German population participated in various protest movements in asking the 
SED to move towards a more reformed version of socialism, the progressive coherence of this 
subset of the population would prove instrumental in the GDR’s eventual collapse.635 Peace 
movements, which sought a stable global environment amidst the international tensions associated 
with the Second Cold War, and human rights movements, which dealt with the burning issue of 
East Germans wanting to leave for the West, grew in scope during the mid-1980s, with some even 
producing anti-government samizdat publications.
636
 Public unrest only grew after a botched Stasi 
raid on an environmentalist group in November 1987. In January 1988, during the annual 
Luxemberg-Liebknecht march, the banned Rosa Luxemberg quote of “Freedom is always the 
freedom to think differently” appeared on dissident banners, causing a massive response from the 
Stasi and other state authorities. This was, according to GDR historian Mary Fulbrook, “the 
beginning of the end”.637  
               After a decade of economic reform, popular unrest was also brewing in China. Along 
with the economic boom came new, grotesque forms of corruption. As early as 1985, a group of 
CCP officials conspired to exploit the “enterprise zone” characteristics of China’s economic 
growth. Using funds that had been raised as development loans from Beijing banks, the Hainan 
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officials bought overseas products and then sold them to buyers all over China. It was estimated 
that their fraudulent schemes between January 1984 and March 1985 amounted to sums in excess 
of $1.5 billion.
638
 As the decade progressed, episodes like these caused the population to grow 
defiant and restless. To compound the problem, millions of Chinese students, university graduates 
and unemployed youths were starting to pose the same questions they asked in 1986, but remained 
unanswered: How was the new economic system going to benefit them? Sporadic unrest grew, 
with the 1986 protests only representing the (at the time) worst instance of social strife. By 
blaming Hu Yaobang, removing him from the position of CCP General Secretary and imposing an 
emphasis on ideological education, Beijing thought that it had found an effective way to tackle the 
problem. However, as events would show, societal tensions were not removed but simply swept 
under the rug. These tensions were again brought to the surface by Hu Yaobang’s passing on 15 
April 1989. Students across the country were quick to condem Hu’s ouster in 1987 and 
commemorated the former General Secretary as a liberal martyr who had to live his last years cast 
aside by a party he had given so much to. Student-led mourning soon led to massive protests 
across the country in the spring of 1989. In Beijing, numbers reached 300,000 on 13 May, 
paralyzing the city.
639
 
To the extreme annoyance of East Berlin and Beijing, Gorbachev was a beacon of hope for 
the protestors in both countries. For reform-craving movements in both states, Gorbachev 
represented something that their leaders were not - a seeming democrat, a reformer, and a force 
for economic and political transformation. In East Germany, “Gorbi” became a symbol for hope 
and change by 1988. And to the extreme annoyance of Honecker, some of the protest movements 
gained a sense of authority and legitimacy by adopting Gorbachev as their patron saint. East 
German youths started wearing Perestroika T-Shirts and Gorbi stickers to provoke authorities, 
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who in turn had a hard time forbidding such activity. Gorbachev became a weapon of East 
German popular movements, with the discontented now enrolling in record numbers in Russian 
classes so that they might use the reformist messages in Pravda to force authorities against the 
wall.
640
  
In 1989, China witnessed similar scenes. As Gorbachev was due to visit Beijing from 15-
18 May to formally normalize Sino-Soviet relations, students sent a petition of six thousand 
signatures was delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing on May 13 which praised Gorbachev’s 
“amazing courage and intelligence” and called on him to share with the students his “valuable 
experience of conducting socialist reform”.641 In Tiananmen Square a banner read: “We salute the 
Ambassador of Democracy”.642 Even though this caused extreme annoyance for Chinese leaders, 
Gorbachev was also someone Beijing could do business with. And even if Deng was absolutely 
against Gorbachev’s calls for more political freedom, he still appreciated the opportunity to 
normalize Sino-Soviet relations that Gorbachev presented him. This was a prize that had eluded 
all of his predecessors and had the potential to become a great personal triumph for Deng.
 643
 
However, the timing could not have been worse. With a throng of prominent correspondents 
(including American TV anchorman Dan Rather, who rarely travelled) in town to cover the 
historic normalization of relations between both countries, protestors seized the chance to get their 
message heard across the world.
644
 Knowing that Deng’s hands would be tied, the students started 
a hunger strike two days before the Soviet leader was due to arrive. Deng had no choice but to 
cancel the planned welcoming ceremonies in the square, greeting the Soviet leader instead at a 
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small ceremony held at the heavily guarded airport.
645
 This was most embarrassing to the Chinese 
leadership, who had always placed high value on protocol and ‘saving face’. The student 
movement had spoilt Deng’s party and left a bitter taste in the Chinese leader’s mouth. As events 
would tell, this would not be the only factor gradually eroding his tolerance for the student 
movement.  
 
Tiananmen 
 
As reformist movements across Eastern Europe gained momentum and legitimacy in 1989, 
Beijing watched with intense trepidation. Things seemed to move at an incredible pace. On 7 
April 1989, roundtable agreements were signed in Warsaw which recognized the trade union 
Solidarnosc as a legitimate political force. When the results of the Polish roundtable were made 
public in Hungary, the opposition parties made it known that they would accept nothing less than 
a genuinely competitive political system and free elections.
646
 Unrest stirred all across Eastern 
Europe and East Berlin was certainly not spared as protest movements gained in intensity, fuelled 
by developments in neighbouring states. Beijing’s reaction to this destabilization was to 
encourage Eastern European leaders to stay ideologically steadfast to the status quo. This message 
was repeated especially vociferously to its most ardent and like-minded Eastern European ally, 
East Berlin. 
What is almost beyond doubt is that events in Eastern Europe had a profound effect on 
leaders in Beijing, especially on how they responded to popular protest movements at home. 
Consider the scene from Zhongnanhai’s perspective: Popular movements in Hungary and Poland 
had extracted significant concessions from their governments and in the process destabilized the 
ruling communist party. The objective now was to prevent this contagion from spreading into 
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China at any cost.
647
 In the first half of 1989, Beijing was learning that, unlike in 1986, where 
unrest in China had been limited in scale, the Chinese student movement in 1989 seemed to be 
part of a general tide of pro-democratization movements in the wider communist world.
648
  
Indeed, history is dotted with instances where China adopted its domestic strategy 
according to lessons learnt from Eastern Europe. One only has to remember that part of the reason 
Mao launched the anti-rightist campaign in 1957 was due to concerns that China might experience 
the same kind of unrest that East Germany and Poland went through in 1953.
649
 Similarly, it is 
clear that the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 had a profound effect on the launching of the Great Leap 
Forward.
650
 And at the beginning of the 1980s, China had tightened its control of factories after 
Solidarnosc-style protests sporadically emerged in the country’s interior.651 In the same light, in 
1988 and 1989, Beijing was paying close attention to events in Eastern Europe in forming their 
response to the escalating protests in China.  
As the Soviet bloc came under pressure from within, Beijing repeatedly urged Eastern 
European leaders to stay steadfast and not be tempted to give into Gorbachev’s calls for reform. 
Indeed, as early as 1988, when Polish coal miners staged systemized strikes across the country, 
Deng Xiaoping was quick to advise caution to his Eastern European counterparts. At a meeting 
with Polish Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner on 7 June 1988, Deng repeated to him what he had 
told his Yugoslav colleague a year earlier - reforms should be conducted according to “the 
domestic conditions” of every country and that “independent thinking” (独力思考) should prevail 
rather than following models of other countries, concluding that the questions to be answered are 
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not the same if the situations in each country are not the same.
652
 The same message was reiterated 
to Romanian leader and old Chinese friend Nicolae Ceausescu on 17 October of the same year. 
Considering the situation in Eastern Europe where communist leaderships seemed to emulate each 
other in conceding to popular movements after the first domino was tipped in Poland, Deng 
emphasized in the summer of 1989 that “One shouldn't change just because others are changing. 
This will have no future.”653   
The same message was repeated throughout the time leading up to the Tiananmen Square 
incident. As the situation for communist regimes further deteriorated in Europe, Deng was 
presented with a picture of the nightmare that he desperately wanted to avoid. While the student 
protests grew in scope and intensity in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese leadership was confronted 
with a difficult choice. In Zhongnanhai’s view, it needed stability to further pursue Reform and 
Opening and thus it could not tolerate, let alone negotiate with a reform movement which 
threatened to derail Deng’s entire modernization project. With splits within the leadership, the 
hard-line faction around Premier Li Peng eventually prevailed over reformers like Zhao Ziyang 
and on 4 June 1989, tanks were sent in to disperse the student protestors who, like their 
counterparts in Eastern Europe, had for months demanded far-sweeping political reforms.
654
 By 
doing so, Deng hoped to avoid the fate that had befallen communist regimes there. And as the 
course of action was decided in Beijing, Deng was eager to back those who stood with him against 
political destabilization and reform. Thus, by shunning reformist tendencies and sticking to an 
unchanged path in 1988 and 1989 in the face of popular unrest, East Germany became even more 
of a like-minded stalwart defender of the status quo. 
Certainly, East Berlin’s response to Tiananmen endeared the GDR leadership to Beijing. 
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After the crack-down, East Germany was quick to defend its steadfast anti-political reform ally. 
The SED Politburo banned news outlets from disseminating images of Tiananmen and even 
ordered them to proclaim that existing images were faked.
655
 East German leaders openly called 
the protestors “counter-revolutionaries” while most of the world openly condemned the 
crackdown. East Berlin was duly rewarded for its loyalty. Hans Modrow, who had been invited to 
visit China in June, was personally re-invited by the Chinese Ambassador after Tiananmen. With 
three other colleagues, he toured Beijing, Xi’an, Nanjing and Xiamen from 28 June to 13 July, 
barely three weeks after the crackdown. In China, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian reaffirmed to 
Modrow China’s negative view of western-style reforms towards a parliamentary democracy and 
further denounced the student protestors as counter-revolutionaries.
656
 If that was not enough, on 
13 July Berlin SED-Party Chief Günter Schabowski flew on a chartered flight to Beijing to further 
reaffirm East Berlin’s allegiance to China. According to Modrow, this was also an attempt by 
Schabowski, who some considered to be a possible Honecker-successor, to secure the continued 
support of a socialist power for the GDR.
657
 
 As fate would have it, these displays of solidarity only added to the feeling of anger 
among the East German populace, most of whom condemned the Tiananmen Incident. This anger 
in turn served as a further catalyst for further undermining the SED’s legitimacy. From all levels 
of society, people collected signatures and petitions and forwarded them to a variety of 
government bodies. On June 6, a Dr. Jens Furkert from Schildow wrote an impassioned letter to 
Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, calling on him to take a stand against the “inhumanities” in China 
and to protect the “basis of socialist order”. Unbudged, the GDR leadership stuck to its stance. In 
a rare response on June 28, Oskar Fischer urged Furkert not to trust the “anti-socialist” western 
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media.
658
 Beijing was sure to continue to reward its steadfast ally for its loyalty. For example, 
members of the Stasi were treated to an extremely hospitable tour of China in September 1989.
659
  
After visits by Hans Modrow and Günter Schabowski, the East German public’s unease 
with their government’s stance towards the crackdown was only further exacerbated by SED 
second-in-command Egon Krenz’s visit to China from late September to early October as part of 
the East German delegation to the PRC’s fortieth anniversary celebrations, especially considering 
that the East German leader was one of the most vociferous supporters of Beijing’s crackdown 
among the SED-elite. After all, according to Krenz, the tanks had been attacked by the students 
and they were thus only defending themselves and by doing so, they had only “re-established 
order”.660 
It is therefore no surprise that many in the East German protest movement wondered what 
Krenz was doing in China from 25 September to 2 October. Was he gathering information for 
Honecker and the rest of the SED leadership from the hardliners in Beijing on how to deal with 
popular unrest? Was he seeking counsel for a potential “Chinesische Lösung” in the GDR? As 
recent research by Bernd Schäfer has shown, this was probably not the case. To be sure, Krenz’s 
visit was full of declarations of solidarity between the two countries. During his conversation with 
Party-chief Jiang Zeming, Egon Krenz agreed with the Chinese leaders’ remarks that the 
“counterrevolutionary unrest” had been a “bad thing” for the population and offered his own 
understanding sympathy.
661
 There are no indications, however, that Krenz was there to learn about 
tactics to quash a potential revolution. Indeed, from East Berlin’s perspective, the protest 
movement in the GDR in September and early October did not seem like it would ever reach 
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Tiananmen proportions. Even though Krenz must have pondered the future of East Germany as 
machinations for the Honecker-Krenz power transition were under way, the SED leadership did 
not yet see the need to contemplate Tiananmen style measures. Thus, Krenz appears to have 
believed that he had no reason to learn anything from the Chinese. Quite on the contrary, Krenz 
was happy to present the GDR as a beacon for stability to different Chinese leaders during 
meetings.
662
 What these high-profile visits by Modrow, Schabowski and Krenz show is that East 
Berlin very much wanted to reassure China of its solidarity after the Tiananmen incident. What’s 
more, the fact that all three were candidates for Honecker’s throne suggests that the potential next 
generation of SED leaders saw relations with China as an important feature in the future of East 
German foreign policy. It is not a stretch of the imagination to say that all three envisioned that 
the future would see, in light of Gorbachev’s liberalizing line, a recalibration of Moscow’s 
influence on East Berlin in favour of an even tighter cooperation with Beijing. This is not to say 
that this sort of a recalibration would have been politically or economically possible (or 
geographically feasible given that the Soviet Union lay between the GDR and China), but at least 
in 1989, it seemed to East Berlin that in the future, it might need to eek tighter cooperation with 
Beijing as both governments were increasingly marooned on an ideologically dogmatic island 
with Beijing and that it would have to stick to its Chinese partners to fight off the assaulting 
liberal waves. 
 While events in Eastern Europe seem to have influenced Chinese action on 4 June 
1989, Eastern European and Soviet observations of the international backlash against Beijing due 
to the Tiananmen crackdown certainly decreased the appetite in Moscow for any kind of armed 
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action against domestic protest movements.
663
 Thus, while Gorbachev had reluctantly agreed to an 
armed solution in Tiflis in February 1989, this became less of an option for him after 
Tiananmen.
664
 Indeed, it would have been hard to imagine someone who was pushing for a more 
liberalized version of socialism (and his international image as a peaceful reformer) now 
embarking on a path of armed intervention to keep the conservative status quo. This had far-
reaching implications for entire bloc, as a threat of violent, Moscow-led repressions against 
protests movements, which had existed the entirety of the Cold War, suddenly dissipated.
665
 Once 
Gorbachev decided to keep his troops in their barracks, the GDR’s fate was essentially sealed. A 
solitary intervention by the Nationale Volksarmee was out of the question logistically and 
pragmatically because of considerations that any armed action would sever East Berlin from its 
vital economic life-line in the West. According to Politburo member Günter Schabowski, this was 
a serious thought as everyone in the SED leadership appreciated that any continued survival of 
their GDR was hinged on an amicable relationship with the FRG.
666
 Thus, ironically, although 
East Berlin went out of its way to prove its ideological loyalty to Beijing, the consequences of 
China’s actions would eventually deprive the GDR of a measure of last resort to keep the regime 
afloat. 
 
“Wer zu spät kommt, den bestraft das Leben” 
 
While Krenz did not let his domestic worries show during his late September visit to China, 
events started to gather momentum after his return. On 6 October 1989, three months after his 
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visit to Beijing, Gorbachev was greeted with the same enthusiasm he received in the Chinese 
capital by demonstrating crowds (but also from local FDJ youth). A day later, Honecker and 
Gorbachev sat through what was to be the last parade of the Nationale Volksarmee. The tension 
must have been palpable. Gorbachev had already started to regard Honecker as a reactionary relic 
since early 1987 and for Honecker, Gorbachev had long become a reformist nuisance rather than a 
stalwart ally.
667
 In addition to his calls for political reforms, Gorbachev’s unabated engagement 
with the West and his new concept of a “common European home” threatened to rob the GDR of 
its very raison d’être.668 While some have speculated that by 1989 Gorbachev had lost his will and 
interest to keep the fraternal states together in a common bloc,
669
 it is also safe to say that his 
Eastern European allies saw the Soviet leaders’ policies towards the bloc in the final phase as 
“enigmatic”.670 Indeed, developments in Eastern Europe in the crucial summer months of 1989 
were met by an eerie silence from the Kremlin, resulting on one hand in dramatic changes in 
reformist states but also, as in Honecker’s case, significant trepidation as to whether the Kremlin 
would, despite all its liberal rhetoric, guarantee the bloc’s integrity.671  
Considering these circumstances, one can understand why Gorbachev’s October 1989 visit 
to East Berlin was both awkward and tense. While on the outside, Honecker and Gorbachev 
embraced and professed their wishes to continue cooperation, the two leaders’ visions for the 
future of communism could not have been more different. Whereas Gorbachev sought a true 
reformation of the Marxist-Leninist ideological construct, Honecker refused to consider far-
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sweeping changes in either the everyday-politics or the ideology of the SED. As East Germans left 
in droves through the newly opened borders in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Gorbachev, through 
his spokesperson Genadi Gerassimov, in a last-ditch effort to nudge Honecker into the direction of 
introducing political and economic reforms, is said to have uttered to Honecker: “Wer zu spät 
kommt, den bestraft das Leben”, roughly translated “Life punishes those who come too late”.672 
Having felt increasingly abandoned due to factors such as missing oil deliveries, Soviet 
intransigence towards the German problem as well as Soviet insistences on stopping a Sino-GDR 
rapprochement, one can only imagine Honecker’s reaction to these remarks. 
During these desperate times, Beijing stuck to its ally. Indeed, a significantly friendlier 
encounter occurred between Honecker and the Chinese representative Vice Premier Yao Yilin at 
the very same celebrations. Appreciating Beijing’s worries about the tumultuous situation in 
Eastern Europe, Honecker remarked that “many changes are taking place in the socialist world 
today, it is important that each country now to follow their own path according to its domestic and 
historic conditions”, reassuring that the GDR would “never give up the leading roles of the 
working class and of the communist party.” 673 Clearly appreciating the commitment of their 
steady ally, Yao Yilin thanked Honecker for his support during the “June-incidences” (Juni-
Ereignisse), assuring that China also “stood fast at the side of the GDR and will dedicate 
significant attention to the further development of bilateral relations.” Yao Yilin commented that 
China viewed the GDR as “the most important frontier of socialism in the west”. This must have 
been music to Honecker’s self-righteous ears. However, one wonders how the East German 
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leadership felt that Yao Yilin now accused Zhao Ziyang of allowing liberalism to flow into the 
country while being responsible for the “causes of the counter-revolutionary uprising”, the same 
accusation that Zhao had brought upon Hu some two years ago.
674
 
Amidst the assaulting waves of liberalization coming from both outside and within the 
communist world, two seemingly backward allies clung to each other in a desperate fight against 
uncertainty. While Yao Yilin vowed to further develop relations between the two countries during 
his 1989 trip, events soon took a turn for the worse for Beijing’s erstwhile stalwart ally. As many 
in the Kremlin had predicted (Gorbachev told the Politburo after his trip to East Berlin back in 
Moscow that Honecker had completely lost touch), the Honecker-era came to an abrupt end on 1 
November, bringing Egon Krenz to power.
675
  
Events then gathered pace and despite desperate attempts to reshuffle its leadership, the 
SED’s days were now numbered. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, popular pressure prevailed. 
The Berlin Wall effectively ceased to exist on 9 November 1989 and with it, the iron curtain came 
tumbling down.
676
 Beijing kept an eerie silence. As Liu Qibao, former Chinese Deputy 
Ambassador to the GDR confessed, Beijing hoped until the very last moment that the SED regime 
would continue to survive. Thus, it still sent out a special observer mission to the Volkskammer 
elections in March 1990 to gauge the situation. Liu remembered that “while we had to adopt the 
official stance of ‘respecting the people’s decisions in Eastern Europe’, we all secretly hoped that 
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the SED would somehow prevail in the East German elections.”677 Having supported its 
conservative ally until the last second, one can only imagine the feeling of insecurity felt in 
Beijing after the Allianz für Deutschland, led by the conservative CDU, won a majority of the 
seats, and the reconstituted PDS (formerly SED) only came in a mere third place.
678
       
The assessment in Beijing placed the blame squarely on Moscow’s shoulders. To the 
leaders in Zhongnanhai, Gorbachev was at fault for putting the entire socialist camp at risk. 
Having laid the responsibility for the demise of likeminded allies such as the GDR on the Kremlin, 
Beijing adamantly accused Gorbachev of being solely responsible for the collapse of communism 
in Eastern Europe. On 23 December 1989, four months before the fateful Volkskammer elections, 
the head of the CPSU’s International Department Valentin Falin was given the Chinese position 
on a trip to Beijing. Much of the dialogue revolved around Eastern Europe, with CCP Secretary 
General Jiang Zemin remarking to Falin that “China is a socialist country and naturally, we cannot 
but be concerned over the developments in other socialist countries.”679 Early in December 1989, 
the CCP Central Committee even circulated internal documents which blamed the events in 
Eastern Europe on five interrelated factors, with the emphasis being placed on the existence of 
non-communist parties and that the communist parties of Eastern Europe “were heavily influenced 
by the Soviet Union.”680 A good barometer of the mood in Zhongnanhai can be gauged from an 
internal party document in early 1990 which accused Gorbachev of having “completely betrayed 
the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism…”681 
What is almost certain is that its doomed support of the embattled East German regime 
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further solidified China’s adherence to its own principle of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of other countries to avoid being on the wrong side of history again. Thus, for example, even 
though Beijing initially rejoiced at Gorbachev’s arrest during the August 1991 hard-line coup in 
Moscow, it kept silent for as long as it could in an attempt to not pick the wrong side.
682
 Deng 
even made a point of issuing inner-party directives urging caution and forbidding party members 
from publicly airing opinions on the situation in the Soviet Union.
683
 
The unravelling of socialist rule in Eastern Europe started a process of frantic soul-
searching for Zhongnanhai’s leaders. Having witnessed the demise of Communist rule in Poland, 
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and East Germany, Beijing became even more ardent in its belief 
that Gorbachev was to blame for the demise of socialism in Europe. Immediately following the 
collapse, a series of post-mortems were conducted by a variety of CCP departments. The general 
assessment was aptly summarized in a report by an analyst in the CCP Organization Department 
who blamed “advocacy of pluralist ideology” and “advocacy of political pluralism via 
constitutional amendment” as the main reasons for Soviet and Eastern European destabilization.684 
Another report stated that by applying these principles, this new thinking undermined Eastern 
European regimes by emboldening antiparty elements, fractured the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact, 
gave scope for the West’s ‘peaceful evolution’ policies to make further inroads and represented a 
complete capitulation to the West.
685
  
The demise of its likeminded ally in East Berlin through people power (and Moscow’s 
reluctance to intervene against this popular pressure) reaffirmed Beijing’s belief that it had acted 
rightly in suppressing the Tiananmen protestors. Without a doubt, the collapse of communism in 
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Eastern Europe led to considerable introspection among the CCP rank and file. Moreover, the 
leaders in Beijing learnt through the example of Eastern Europe that, like in 1987, it needed to 
place renewed emphasis on political education, this time with an explicit goal of creating a 
binding ideology. As research by Rana Mitter, and more recently by Zheng Wang, have shown, 
Zhongnanhai has since harnessed memories of national humiliation to create a nationalist ideology 
to fill this void.
686
 Eager to discourage public discourse and debates on contentious issues such as 
Tiananmen, Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and subsequent leaders have sought to glorify the CCP’s 
exaggerated achievements in driving out the Japanese during the Second World War and unifying 
the country 1949. This strategy, coupled with Beijing’s continued ability to provide Chinese 
citizens with rising living standards, has so far averted a similar fate that East Germany 
experienced in 1989. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Certainly from Beijing’s perspective, the Soviet bloc’s collapse was largely brought about 
by the Kremlin’s new direction under Gorbachev.687 In the specific case of the GDR, Moscow’s 
effective renunciation of the GDR, as its erstwhile most loyal client state diverged ever more from 
Gorbachev’s reform path, spelled the beginning of the end for the SED regime. This was of course 
combined with Soviet domestic and economic constraints which led Soviet leaders to conclude 
that hegemony over the Eastern European states could not and should not be sustained, nudged 
forward by the Soviet military brass’ conclusion that a military presence in Eastern Europe 
reduced rather than enhanced Soviet security.
688
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that there would be a ‘reverse-spillover’ effect, in that the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe might eventually have a devastating destabilizing effect on the Soviet Union.
689
 
In addition to weakening the Soviet bloc, Gorbachev’s calls for reform also had the effect 
of bringing together two unlikely partners. Both Beijing and East Berlin, with Chinese leaders 
seeking their own brand of reform communism and East Berlin fighting calls for more 
transparency from Moscow, sought to clearly delineate themselves from Gorbachev’s Perestroika 
and Glasnost. Thus, ideological agreements against far-sweeping political reforms brought them 
together in the last years of the Cold War. Bilateral meetings after Gorbachev’s ascent to power in 
Moscow show that a common conservative outlook united both regimes in their absolute rejection 
of any change to their respective status quo. 
As political unrest enveloped Eastern Europe and China, both regimes placed the blame 
squarely on Gorbachev’s political reforms. This in turn served to deepen East Berlin and Beijing’s 
common understanding that their respective political status quo could only be kept alive by 
limiting Gorbachev’s influences. Beijing’s violent suppression of the student protests on 4 June 
1989 was a direct result of this consideration. By sending in the tanks, Beijing sent a clear 
message that it would not go down the path of Moscow-influenced Eastern European communist 
regimes who, according to the non-intervention principles espoused by Gorbachev, had let people 
power erode away state power. 
After Tiananmen, Beijing was adamant to support the GDR’s attempts to stay afloat by 
encouraging it to continue down its hard-line stance. However, the dramatic international backlash 
from Tiananmen only further ruled out Moscow’s support for any East German armed 
intervention against protestors, as Soviet and East German leaders feared the political and 
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economic consequences of a crackdown in the GDR and without Soviet consent, East Berlin was 
in no capacity to act alone. Beijing’s actions deprived the GDR leadership of a crucial lifeline. 
Thus, while Beijing was able to prevent the spread of the contagion from Eastern Europe, East 
Berlin ultimately fell victim to its inability to both insulate itself from external pressures as well as 
its powerlessness to independently act against internal popular pressures. 
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Conclusion 
 
“Berlin, nun freue Dich” (Berlin, rejoice). These words, yelled into the crowd by the 
reigning West Berlin mayor Walter Momper, encapsulated the raw emotions of both East and 
West Germans on 22 December 1989. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl ceremonially re-
opened the Brandenburg Gate and with it the symbolic barrier which had defined the iron curtain. 
One would be tempted to say that this was the final nail in the coffin of the dying GDR. But at this 
point, the coffin containing any aspirations that the remaining East German leaders had for the 
survival of the GDR into the 1990s was well below the ground, with six feet of dirt firmly packed 
above it.  
Scenes of jubilation and seemingly ecstatic joy were not only confined to the once 
impermeable inter-German border but were also echoed across the Soviet bloc.  From Bucharest 
to Warsaw, walls came tumbling down and borders opened. Of course, this joy was not shared by 
all. The old guard retreated, sometimes being hunted out of office.
690
 Cheering crowds in Potsdam 
and Leipzig must have shocked the SED-elite. If Honecker had been asked in 1979 on the fate of 
the GDR’s existence, he undoubtedly would have never pictured its demise in a mere ten years. 
Certainly, with his engagement with China, he was doing his part in securing the GDR’s future. 
To Honecker, his independent engagement with China was in many ways a success story. 
He was able to impose his priorities on the GDR’s powerful Soviet patrons in order to chase his 
own foreign policy wishes. During this process of Sino-GDR engagement Honecker would find 
out that the East Berlin and Beijing converged and discovered commonalities in three major areas. 
When reengagement became possible, early interest on both sides was first driven by a desire to 
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construct an economically beneficial relationship amidst Deng’s economic modernization process. 
This initial economic rationale was then replaced by an ideological bond as both governments 
rebuffed Gorbachev’s reform path. Throughout it all, both sides were also driven by a profound 
desire to usher in more prestige for both countries. And most certainly, this was reflected in 
bilateral dealings where East Berlin and Beijing sought to use engagement with a previously 
inaccessible partner to gain international standing. Let us deal with each of these themes in turn. 
 
Economics 
 
When discussing the GDR’s history, one would be hard-pressed to avoid discussions on 
the state of the East German economy as a contributing factor to East Germany’s eventual 
collapse. Even though economic historians have been quick to point the finger at the GDR’s 
sagging economic performance in the 1980s, it is clear now that East Berlin’s financial difficulties 
were a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the GDR’s demise.691 That being said, it is also 
apparent that the GDR’s economic malaises were recognized by Honecker and his lieutenants.692  
By desperately attempting to establish a beneficial trade relationship with China, Honecker 
attempted to bolster the GDR’s economy and stop worrying East German trade trends. 
Throughout his engagement with China, but especially in the middle of the 1980s, when bilateral 
relations entered new heights surrounding his state visit to Beijing in 1986, Honecker repeatedly 
tried to increase disappointing trade volumes between the two states. Stemming from the 
realization that inter-COMECON trade was not going to be sufficient in securing the GDR’s 
future, it is not a stretch to say that by the 1980s, East Berlin had long stopped looking eastward 
for economic help and trade. Amidst decreasing Soviet raw material deliveries and slowdowns in 
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the entire bloc, East Germany first oriented its economic feelers West towards the once-hated 
West Germany and then, as this thesis shows, to anyone else who also presented a viable 
alternative to its old trade partners. Thus, as Deng gradually opened China’s market to the rest of 
the world, cultivating ties to Beijing made perfect sense for Honecker. 
In an era of Reform and Opening, China was more than interested in funnelling in as much 
expertise and knowledge as possible for its own modernization drive. And who better to engage 
with than the industrial leader of the socialist world? To Beijing, engaging with a advanced 
socialist industrialist country for economic know-how made perfect sense. Aside from the benefit 
of perhaps being able to directly apply entire systems and processes which had already been 
adapted to a socialist system, Beijing could also use its engagement with East Germany to 
undermine the rival Soviet Bloc. Of course, Deng was also faced with the luxury that he did not 
have to choose. With the capitalist West willingly throwing open its doors to him, he was also 
more than happy to cast a curious eye towards Eastern European countries to gauge their 
economic experiences and source their expertise. In other words, he, unlike Honecker, did not 
have to consider any negative externalities that might result from deepening relations with East 
Berlin. 
For East Germany, the inevitable side-effect of engaging with a Soviet enemy was Soviet 
condemnation and disapproval. What is perhaps most telling is that East Germany did not seem to, 
aside from token statements for ‘bloc-solidarity’, give much attention to Moscow’s displeasure. 
On the contrary, during the latter Brezhnev years as well as the Andropov-Chernenko 
interregnum, Honecker used the power vacuum in Moscow to push forward his engagement with 
Beijing. East Berlin made its stance towards Deng’s stance perfectly clear by rebelling against 
Soviet coordination mechanisms such as the Interkit, which were specifically designed to keep its 
client states in line. In observing the forcefulness and the confidence in which rebuttals against 
Moscow’s attempts at restraint were made, one appreciates that for Honecker, intransigence 
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towards Moscow’s China policy did not arise out of this issue alone but were rather based on a 
history of general frictions with Moscow. Thus, this thesis has tried to frame Honecker’s 
disagreement with the Kremlin on China using a broader interpretation.  It showed that GDR-
Soviet tensions on China were not solely based on mutual distrust on the GDR’s adventurist China 
policy but were rather also the result of repeated East Berlin-Moscow collisions on other issues. 
To name a few, the Soviet Union’s 1979 incursion into Afghanistan to prop up Babrak Karmal’s 
regime there threatened détente, the economic benefits of which East Berlin had become 
increasingly reliant on. Soviet inaction during the Solidarnosc strikes in Poland in 1980 and 1981 
coupled with Brezhnev’s physical weakness only seemed to reinforce the notion in East Berlin 
that the Kremlin was unfit to lead the Soviet bloc. Added to this, Moscow’s inability and 
unwillingness to provide East Germany with cheap, subsidized oil only exacerbated tensions. 
 
A question of prestige 
 
Indeed, disagreements with Moscow and a desire to add a potentially important trade 
partner were decisive factors in pushing forward East Berlin’s wish to engage a reformist China 
under Deng. And certainly, they were a large part of Honecker’s vision of what the future of the 
GDR should look like – politically independent and economically successful. Thus, Honecker’s 
renewed engagement with China was fundamentally rooted in the East German wish to seek not 
only practical advantages for his GDR but also to ‘put East Germany on the map’ once and for all. 
Having experienced repeated crises of legitimacy in the GDR’s early days under Walter Ulbricht, 
always remembering that only a small pool of eleven communist countries had recognized East 
Germany at its founding in 1949, the question of East German existence was never far from 
Honecker’s mind.693  Honecker had scored a major victory by concluding the ‘Basic Treaty’ with 
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Bonn in 1972. East Germany’s subsequent induction into the United Nations and recognition by 
international organizations and governments who previously had refused to associate themselves 
with the Pankow regime gave the GDR legitimacy and more importantly perhaps, sovereignty 
from the other Germany. Honecker actively courted his new relationships and spent much of his 
tenure visiting foreign capitals. In the process, he fashioned himself as an able statesman and his 
GDR as economically vigorous and politically important.  
Honecker welcomed the spotlight and he enjoyed the new recognition foreign relations 
garnered him. Thus, an element of prestige also played into his eagerness to engage with China. 
He knew that while the potential practical advantages from fostering relations with Beijing were 
very real, it also carried the added benefit of validating the GDR’s sovereignty in the eyes of a 
new, powerful friend. And for this, he was willing to risk alienating old friends who had decreased 
to benefit the GDR. Honecker never shied away from telling his Chinese partners of the successes 
of East German engineering, the above-average living standard of the East German citizen or of 
his standing in the Soviet bloc. That Beijing not only seemed to take these statements at face value 
but also started to pay special attention to him and his GDR, epitomized by granting him the first 
post-Sino-Soviet split state visit by a Soviet bloc leader to Beijing in 1986, cemented his belief 
that he was conducting an even more successful China-policy than his Soviet patrons. This 
attention only whetted Honecker’s appetite for broader recognition, and deeper engagement. To 
Honecker, this was killing two birds with one stone. If he was successful in creating a beneficial 
relationship for East Germany, he was one step closer to his goal of, to paraphrase James 
McAdams, creating “a model of socialist well-being and abundance”, while also re-validating the 
GDR’s sovereignty.694 
The curious anomaly is that Honecker’s pride in his GDR would also cause him to be 
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‘blind’ for any lessons he might have learned from his engagement with China. Thinking his 
version of reform and socialism to be superior, he was never open to learning from Beijing’s 
reform path. Rather, he revelled in a sense of accomplishment that he derived from selling the 
superiority of his socialist experiment to his new Chinese friends. Indeed, throughout the 1980s, 
there is no evidence that Honecker took China’s reforms as a serious and note-worthy project.  
To add to the irony, Honecker’s drive for recognition and prestige also served as one of the 
major friction points between himself and the Soviet Union. The basic fact was that priorities were 
drastically different in Moscow and East Berlin. In many ways, this was natural. To Moscow, the 
task of managing the empire and a truly international strategy overrode any niggling concerns that 
client states might have had. Thus, the question of East German legitimacy, a priority for Ulbricht 
and Honecker, was never accorded the weight that East Berlin wanted Moscow to allot it. This 
trend was by no means new in the 1980s. For example, as Mary Elise Sarotte has forcefully 
argued, the CPSU micro-managed East Berlin through inter-German talks in the détente era and 
sacrificed core East German interests with the goal of averting international tensions.
695
 But 
whereas Sarotte’s analysis of how East Berlin dealt with Ostpolitik posited that “the desire of the 
SED to gain more authority for itself vis-à-vis Moscow seems to have existed, there is not enough 
evidence of it to make any decisive statements”, this thesis argues that in East Germany’s dealings 
with Deng’s China, this tendency for more independence from Moscow was clearly visible.696  
 
Ideology  
 
While economic concerns and Honecker’s relentless pursuit for prestige were important 
motivating factors in pushing forward his courting of Beijing, an ideological dimension also 
emerged in the late 1980s. And without a doubt, this was the strangest and most unexpected 
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feature of Sino-GDR relations. After all, what would an East German state founded under Soviet 
auspices have in common with a country which broke from the Soviet Union to pursue its own 
version of agrarian socialism? Yet, in the 1980s commonalities abounded. Both Deng and 
Honecker were trying to steer their states towards greater economic success. East Berlin did this 
by attempting to secure an additional export market for its goods in China while sourcing loans 
and transfer-payments from West Germany. China did this by opening its markets to the outside 
world. And both states desperately sought legitimacy. Beijing’s emergence out of the Cultural 
Revolution and its renewed engagement, first with America in the early 1970s and subsequently 
with the rest of the world, was also done with the goal of reasserting itself on the international 
stage as a rising power in mind. But perhaps most importantly, both Deng and Honecker believed 
economic and political advancement was only possible under the guidance of an unassailable, 
omnipotent Party. Marxist-Leninist ideology was made to conform to local imperatives and 
utilized fully to justify foreign and domestic policies.
697
 
This common adherence to the centrality of the Party would be put to the test in the late 
1980s. As turmoil brewed in Eastern Europe in 1989, both countries feared that political unrest 
stemming from reformist movements would derail their simultaneous pursuits of legitimacy and 
economic vitality by threatening the role of the Party. Both leaders fearfully watched as strict 
central control was diluted in a series of formerly orthodox socialist states. This common 
trepidation towards political destabilization served as a powerful uniting bond between Beijing 
and East Berlin. Government officials on both sides repeatedly voiced their concerns over the 
deteriorating situation in the Soviet bloc and vowed to support each other in these times of 
uncertainty. Thus, at the 40
th
 anniversary celebrations of the GDR, it was China who ardently 
voiced its backing for the continued non-reformist course of its Eastern European ally while 
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Moscow urged it to seek a drastic reform course.  
Fatefully, it was this stubborn adherence to a hard-line ideology which would cost East 
Germany dearly in the end. After all, the two states operated within very different parameters. 
While Beijing could resort to the use of force to maintain the continuity of the party by dispelling 
challengers, East Berlin was left with no such option. Having to consider West German reaction 
as well as Muscovite disapproval for a military intervention, the Nationale Volksarmee stayed in 
their barracks and with it, East Germany surrendered its last means of keeping the regime afloat. 
Through these last months, Moscow stayed remarkably silent. The GDR’s Soviet brothers, while 
not entirely abandoning the East German project, had certainly grown increasingly tired of it. 
Under Gorbachev, scientific experts at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had submitted 
numerous memos in 1987 questioning the sustainability of the East German state, asking if the 
synthetic division of the German people could be anything but a temporary solution.
698
  
During the dying months of the GDR, none was perhaps as steadfast in their unwavering 
support as Beijing. Zhongnanhai desperately sought to prevent further destabilization in the 
socialist bloc, fearing what consequences it might have for its own future. In the end, geography 
as well as the political conditions in the two countries played a major role in the eventual 
outcomes in both states. East Berlin’s fate was taken out of its own hands. Former allies such as 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary opened its borders to the West and the Honecker regime was forced 
to watch as droves of its own citizens haemorrhaged westward. Meanwhile, those who stayed 
behind demanded drastic reforms and the ouster of the old SED guard. Being surrounded by 
socialist allies where reformist movements were gaining ground, East German leaders were 
unable to insulate the country from outside events. Added to this of course was the specifically 
East German problem of having a direct comparison with the economically wealthier West 
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Germany. The ‘world-leading’ GDR was not able to survive the unrest created by the basic 
yearning from many of its citizens to have the same freedoms and standard of living as their 
cousins in the West. 
Of course things were very different in China. Without a doubt, the student protests in 
Tiananmen Square were also motivated by simultaneous liberalization movements in Eastern 
Europe and Gorbachev’s calls for a more reform-minded version of communism. However, 
whereas geography dictated that East Germany was unable to prevent events in surrounding 
countries in drastically altering its course in history, Beijing had the luxury of being able to 
insulate itself after the drastic Tiananmen intervention from the outside world. Mass-arrests 
against student leaders were made and communication was cut off from the rest of the world. 
Briefly, the hard-line faction surrounding Premier Li Peng steered China towards a more 
conservative, dogmatic path, abandoning many of the central tenets associated with the original 
Reform and Opening mantra preached by Deng Xiaoping. 
Seeing East Berlin’s last-ditch attempts at averting total collapse fail, Beijing sunk deeper 
into a period of introspection. Without a doubt, socialism’s demise in Eastern Europe had a 
profound effect on Zhongnanhai. Already, reeling from the realization that large tracts of the 
population did not agree with the course of the government, the sudden and unexpected sinking of 
half of the socialist world confronted Beijing with the reality that it had never faced before – that 
not only the ideas of socialism were at risk but that the party-centric socialist governance model 
was perhaps unsustainable. Blaming everything on a senior official (in this case Zhao Ziyang) was 
no longer a sufficient strategy to secure the continuity of communist China. More needed to be 
done to ensure the continuity of the party and the subscription of the population.  
Significant efforts were spent on reining in some of the entrepreneurial and liberal spirit 
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that Deng had inadvertently created among the populace.
699
 Deng was briefly outmanoeuvred by 
leftists surrounding Li Peng and Jiang Zemin. This did not last for long. As Deng has repeatedly 
shown throughout his career, he was amazingly adept at manoeuvring back into power. While he 
formally retired as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989, he staged a quasi-
comeback in 1992 when he undertook a ‘southern tour’ of Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai 
provinces in order to further lend his energy and support to the Special Economic Zones. While 
the centre under Jiang Zemin showed little support, the public fully embraced Deng’s energy for 
continued reforms, eventually forcing China back onto a reform path. 
With the example of Eastern Europe fresh in his memory, Deng Xiaoping knew that the 
only way for China to retain stability under the CCP would be to combine China’s economic 
reform drive with a binding nationalist ideology. Indeed, one is left to wonder whether Deng felt a 
sense of accomplishment and relief as he visited joint ventures and viewed state-sponsored 
infrastructure projects along the coast. He had, for the time being at least, averted East Berlin’s 
fate. 
 
Of ‘big ships’ and ‘small ships’  
 
 Whereas Zhao Ziyang had likened the difficulty of the Sino-Soviet normalization process 
as two big ships attempting to dock, the process of Sino-GDR rapprochement was not necessarily 
less cumbersome.
700
 Even though a relatively ‘smaller’ ship than the two socialist behemoths, the 
GDR’s docking with China was nevertheless made challenging by Moscow’s insistence to steer 
East Berlin’s course in every aspect of its foreign policy. Only Honecker’s dogged resolve to 
follow his own path to seek economic and political advantages by engaging with Beijing 
eventually resulted in the GDR’s speedy rapprochement with China. Rather than displaying 
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absolute loyalty to its economic and political guarantors, Soviet client states often diverged from 
the ‘common good’ to pursue their own interests and policies.701 This was no different in the last 
decade of the Cold War. Rather than being content at obediently functioning in a bipolar structure, 
superpower allies on both sides of the iron curtain pulled and tugged their patrons into a more 
multipolar construct to satisfy domestic yearnings and needs.
702
 These tendencies during the last 
years of the Cold War amongst Soviet allies are as of yet undocumented in the current available 
literature.  
 In addition, this study questions the commonly held assumption that Eastern-European-
Chinese rapprochement were a mere appendix of the Sino-Soviet normalization process. East 
Berlin did not wait for Moscow’s relations with Beijing to improve before aggressively seeking to 
ameliorate its ties with the People’s Republic. In doing so, it rid itself of its previous blind 
subscription to Soviet tensions with Beijing. After all, issues, such as the Soviet troop presence in 
Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet frontier as well as Afghanistan, which for Beijing had made Sino-Soviet 
normalization so difficult, were not direct factors in Sino-GDR relations. Once East Berlin chose 
to ignore the construct imposed on the Soviet client states by the Sino-Soviet Split, the 
rapprochement process would be infinitely easier to navigate than the Sino-Soviet one. Unlike 
Moscow, East Berlin had never engaged in bitter ideological as well as physical altercations with 
Beijing. And to be sure, it also held different aspirations than its Soviet patrons. Rather than being 
a rival for the leadership of the socialist camp, East Germany ‘merely’ sought to diversify its 
foreign policy portfolio as well as seeking out potentially beneficial trade relationships. Certainly, 
only East Berlin’s willingness to turn a blind eye to Sino-Soviet tensions as well as its less 
threatening nature to Beijing made the East German ship’s docking with Beijing’s far easier than 
the Sino-Soviet encounter. Thus, before Deng would shake Gorbachev’s hands in Beijing in 1989, 
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he had welcomed Honecker in a grand state visit some three years earlier, illustrating that in many 
ways, East German-Chinese relations were ‘ahead’ of the Sino-Soviet normalization process 
during much of the decade.  
 This thesis has also shown that the final decade of the Cold War was defined by an 
increasing economic multipolarity towards China, especially after Deng’s initiation of his Reform 
and Opening process in the early 1980s. Drawn in by the potential of the Chinese market, 
countries of all sizes and shapes flocked to China in order to take advantage of the opening of a 
sizeable export market. Struggling with economic problems at home, East Berlin also wanted to 
come to the dance. Its tireless pursuit of a beneficial trade relationship with China shows 
Honecker’s sincere wish to use China to address some of the GDR’s economic malaises. The draw 
of this market was also one of the main reasons that East Berlin ignored Soviet calls for restraint. 
Knowing that the Soviet Union was not able to furnish it with the economic support it needed, 
Honecker sought to diversify its portfolio by looking towards China. Overall, China’s appeal as a 
market and re-emerging ‘third’ economic power drastically changed the international 
environment. Bloc solidarity on both sides were abandoned for the more pressing draw of this 
potentially vast market. Thus, like Western European countries, select Eastern European countries 
had started to engage with Deng without much coordination with Moscow in the 1980s. 
Globalization had started to chisel away at the rigid bipolar Cold War construct.  
 Finally, the course of East German-Chinese relations in the 1980s adds further evidence 
that seemingly ‘rigid’ communist states supposedly built on the absolute adherence on socialist 
ideological tenets are capable of incredible doctrinal malleability when faced with internal or 
external challenges. In China, economic necessity after the Cultural Revolution combined with 
Deng’s vision of a more prosperous and modern China led Beijing to reconfigure ‘Chinese 
communism’ to include elements of the free market – certainly something that was never 
originally envisioned in Mao Zedong-thought. In East Berlin, political frictions with Moscow as 
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well as a desire to engage with Deng’s China led Honecker to abandon his oath to blindly follow 
the Soviet leadership through thick and thin. In hindsight, East Berlin’s willingness to seek out an 
independent policy towards China at the cost of worsening its ties to the Soviet Union seems to 
have been a massive miscalculation. Honecker’s engagement with China, coupled with his 
incessant push to seek economic ties with West Germany, estranged the East German regime 
further and further from Muscovite approval as the decade entered its nadir. These moves 
antagonized the only regime that could have possibly delayed its eventual demise in 1989. Though 
of course it would have been hard to imagine Gorbachev sending in troops to prop up East Berlin, 
perhaps some kind of coordinated message of solidarity from Gorbachev and Honecker on 
reforms in late 1988 and early 1989 to reassure the restive East German population might have at 
least delayed East Berlin’s fate. However, having watched East Berlin abandon its China-strategy 
as well as repeatedly snubbing its directives on a variety of other issues, Moscow watched from 
the sidelines as events took their turn across the GDR. Certainly, declarations of solidarity until 
the last minute from Beijing mattered little in the end as Honecker’s adventurist foreign policy 
seemed to catch up with him as Walter Momper addressed the crowds in December 1989. 
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